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Essays in the Economics of Labor and Higher Education
Evan Riehl
This dissertation examines the role of information in influencing both individuals’ college
outcomes and the productivity of a higher education system. It focuses in particular on
large-scale educational reforms that raise different mechanisms than those in the existing
literature on the returns to college attendance and college quality.
Recent work has shown that the choices of whether to attend college and which college to
attend can both affect individuals’ future earnings. These papers typically focus on a narrow
subset of students or schools to credibly identify the effects of college choice. This dissertation
instead uses data on the near universe of college students in an entire country to explore
informational mechanisms that are difficult to isolate in existing work. To do this, I exploit
reforms to the higher education system in Colombia that affect the information on individual
ability that is transmitted to colleges, to employers, or to students themselves. This allows
me to adapt traditional labor economic topics like employer learning (Jovanovic, 1979) and
assortative matching (Becker, 1973) to the context of higher education. In addition, the
large-scale nature of these reforms raises general equilibrium issues that may not arise from
marginal changes in college admissions (e.g., Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998).
In Chapter 1, “Assortative Matching and Complementarity in College Markets,” I examine
one type of assortative matching in college markets: students with high socioeconomic status
(SES) are more likely to attend high quality colleges. Assortativity matters if SES and
college quality are complementary educational inputs. I develop an econometric framework
that provides tests for the existence and sign of this complementarity. I implement these
tests by exploiting a 2000 reform of the national college admission exam in Colombia, which
caused a market-wide reduction in assortative matching in some regions of the country. I
find that the reform lowered average graduation rates and post-college earnings in affected
regions, consistent with a positive complementarity between SES and college quality. I also
find evidence of mismatch: part of these negative effects came from the low SES students
who were shifted into higher quality colleges. However, both the market-wide and mismatch
effects die out several cohorts after the exam reform, which suggests that complementarity
may evolve with large-scale changes in assortativity.
In Chapter 2, “The Big Sort: College Reputation and Labor Market Outcomes,” W. Bent-
ley MacLeod, Juan E. Saavedra, Miguel Urquiola, and I ask how college reputation affects
the process by which students choose colleges and find their first jobs. We incorporate a
simple definition of college reputation—graduates’ mean admission scores—into a compet-
itive labor market model. This generates a clear prediction: if employers use reputation
to set wages, then the introduction of a new measure of individual skill will decrease the
return to reputation. We confirm this prediction by exploiting a natural experiment from
the introduction of a college exit exam in the country of Colombia. Finally, we show that
college reputation is positively correlated with graduates’ earnings growth, suggesting that
reputation matters beyond signaling individual skill.
Finally, in Chapter 3, “Time Gaps in Academic Careers,” I ask if interruptions in students’
academic careers can lower their overall schooling attainment. I study an academic calendar
shift in Colombia that created a one semester time gap between high school and potential
college entry. This brief gap reduced college enrollment rates relative to unaffected regions.
Low SES students were more likely to forgo college, and individuals who did enroll after the
gap chose higher paying majors. Thus academic time gaps can affect both the mean and the
distribution of schooling attainment, with implications for the design of education systems
and for wage inequality.
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Chapter 1. Assortative Matching and Complementarity in College Markets
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1. Introduction
College admission exam scores are often strongly correlated with socioeconomic status
(SES). This contributes to a form of assortative matching in college markets—high SES
students are more likely to attend high quality schools. Testing agencies in several countries
have rewritten exams to decrease the correlation of scores with SES in an attempt to reduce
assortativity in college admissions. For instance, this was a primary motivation for the 2016
overhaul of the SAT in the U.S. How do reductions in assortative matching from such reforms
affect students’ aggregate outcomes?
This paper shows that assortativity matters for aggregate outcomes if there is a comple-
mentarity between SES and college quality. A complementarity exists if, for example, top
colleges have a comparative advantage in educating high SES students. Current research on
college quality does not cleanly identify this complementarity, either because it cannot iso-
late mechanisms or it makes strong assumptions on unobservables. I develop an econometric
framework to derive tests for the existence and sign of this complementarity in the presence
of an exogenous shift in assortativity. I implement these tests by exploiting an admission
exam reform in Colombia that reduced assortativity in some regions of the country. I find
that the reform lowered graduation rates and post-college earnings—both region wide and
for low SES students in particular—consistent with a positive complementarity between SES
and college quality. However, these negative effects die out several cohorts after the reform,
suggesting that complementarity may evolve with large-scale changes in assortativity.
My framework begins by defining two elements of the match between students and colleges:
assortativity and complementarity. Assortativity is a feature of the distribution of matches. I
define assortativity as the correlation coefficient between measures of student SES and college
quality. A complementarity exists if student and college traits interact in the production
of graduation or earnings outcomes. Formally, I say that the potential outcome function
for students’ human capital accumulation exhibits a complementarity if it is not additively
separable in individual and college characteristics.
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The purpose of my framework is to show that an admission exam reform that alters
assortativity is informative about complementarity in college markets. I consider a reform
that reduces the correlation of exam scores with SES. If this exam plays an important role
in college admissions, then it should also reduce assortativity; low SES students gain access
to higher quality colleges, and high SES students are displaced to lower-ranked schools.
I derive two propositions on the nature of complementarity between students and colleges.
First, I show that the reduction in assortativity provides a clean test for the existence of a
complementarity. The shift in assortativity allows me to estimate the aggregate effect of a
market-wide reallocation of college quality, or what Graham (2011) calls an average reallo-
cation effect. My first proposition states the average reallocation effect is zero unless there is
a complementarity between students and colleges. Intuitively, there may be “winners” and
“losers” from the reform, but on average these effects net out if there is no complementarity.
The test in Proposition 1 has advantages in identifying complementarity relative to work
on the impact of admission to selective colleges (e.g., Dale and Krueger, 2002a; Hoekstra,
2009a). Selectivity papers typically cannot isolate the mechanisms through which colleges
affect students’ outcomes because they focus on a narrow set of individuals or schools to
achieve credible identification. My framework shows that selectivity estimates are consistent
with a wide range of models of the college production function, including those with no com-
plementarity (e.g., linear-in-mean peer effects or student-invariant value added). Even when
researchers examine heterogeneity by SES, variation in selectivity estimates may reflect dif-
ferences in the colleges chosen by non-admitted students rather than a true complementarity.
By contrast, the exam reform allows me to measure college quality effects across an entire
market, which can separate models with and without a complementarity.
My second proposition shows how a change in assortativity can be used to test a bench-
mark assumption in research on college mismatch (Arcidiacono and Lovenheim, 2016). The
mismatch hypothesis states that students who are academically unprepared for top colleges
are better off attending lower-ranked schools. The best evidence of mismatch relies on the
strong assumption that student/college matches are random conditional on observable traits
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(Arcidiacono, Aucejo and Hotz, 2016). This allows researchers to uncover the causal returns
to college quality from observed matches and then use these returns to explore counterfactual
match outcomes. I can test this assumption in my context by comparing effects predicted
by the mismatch methodology to those actually realized after the exam reform.
Proposition 2 states that under this assumption, the exam reform that I consider should
reveal a positive market-wide complementarity, but it should not lead to mismatch. I show
that pre-reform returns to college quality in my context are larger for high SES students than
for low SES individuals, which suggests a positive complementarity. But these returns are
positive even for low SES students, suggesting no mismatch. Thus if pre-reform data reveal
the true returns to college quality, a decline in assortativity should 1) reduce market-wide
graduation and earnings outcomes, but 2) increase these outcomes for low SES students.
The framework concludes by describing how these effects may evolve over time if students
or colleges respond to the exam reform. An assumption underlying both propositions is that
the distributions of student and college traits are stable across cohorts. This may not hold
if, for example, colleges adapt their curricula to their new student bodies. Such responses
are potentially important given that I consider larger changes in colleges’ class composition
than in the work noted above. I show that these responses may cause the predicted effects in
Propositions 1 and 2 to differ between the first few cohorts exposed to the redesigned exam
and students in later cohorts.
The empirical part of the paper uses administrative data from Colombia and a reform of its
national admission exam to test the implications of Propositions 1 and 2. In 2000, this exam
underwent a major redesign similar in spirit to the 2016 SAT overhaul. The new exam aimed
to reduce socioeconomic bias by testing “competencies” rather than “content.” I explore the
effects of this reform using system-wide data that link admission scores, college records, and
earnings for individuals in the two cohorts before and after the overhaul (1998–2001).
I begin by showing that the reform led to a dramatic reduction in the correlation of exam
scores with SES. I define an index of socioeconomic traits that includes mother’s education,
high school quality, and gender, and I show that the correlation of this index with exam
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scores decreased sharply in the post-reform cohorts. Low SES students scored substantially
higher on the new exam, and high SES students scored correspondingly lower. In several
subjects, the decrease in the SES/exam score correlation was as large as 50 percent.
Next, I exploit features of the Colombian college system to identify effects of the exam
reform on assortativity. Each administrative region has a large flagship public university
that is often its most selective college. Flagship admissions affect the composition of students
at nearby schools because college attendance is highly localized. The majority of flagship
universities admit students solely based on scores from the national test, but some flagships
administer their own admission exams. The reform was ex ante more likely to affect college
admissions in regions where the flagship university used only national exam scores. The
reform was likely to have fewer effects in regions where flagships used their own exams.
My “first stage” result confirms that the reform reduced student/college assortativity in
regions where the national exam was more important for admissions. Specifically, the reform
decreased the correlation of college quality—defined as school mean pre-reform admission
scores—with the student socioeconomic index in affected regions relative to unaffected re-
gions. Low SES students became more likely to attend high quality colleges relative to their
control region peers, and high SES students were shifted into lower quality colleges.
I then present my main result: the reduction in assortativity led to a market-wide decrease
in graduation rates and post-college earnings, suggesting a positive complementarity between
SES and college quality. Overall graduation rates in affected regions fell by 1.4 percentage
points relative to unaffected regions. Region-wide formal sector earnings, measured ten years
after the admission exam, also fell by about one percent. These results hold in differences in
differences regressions and in event-study graphs, which show sharp decreases in outcomes
in the first cohort after the reform. This rejects models that do not exhibit a student/college
complementarity, as stated in Proposition 1. Further, the decrease in market-wide outcomes
is consistent with a positive complementarity, as predicted by Proposition 2.
However, I also find evidence of mismatch, which is inconsistent with the “conditional
on observables” assumption in Proposition 2. I find that the market-wide reduction in
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graduation rates and earnings is partially driven by the lowest SES students, whose college
quality increased with the reform. The low SES result is evidence of mismatch, but it is
not what one would predict given the positive pre-reform return to college quality for these
students. Together with the market-wide effects, the Colombian context thus provides mixed
support for the benchmark assumption in mismatch research.
In the final section of the paper, I show that the negative graduation and earnings effects
die out several cohorts after the exam reform. The above results are from the first two post-
reform cohorts (2000–2001), which provide the cleanest identification and data coverage.
But the question of whether the initial effects persist into later cohorts has important policy
implications. I first show that the reform’s effects on admission scores and on assortativity
are stable over the next five cohorts (2002–2006); low SES students continue to score higher
on the new exam, and in affected regions they continue to enroll in higher quality colleges.
However, the negative graduation and earnings effects disappear by the sixth cohort after
the reform (2005).1 In other words, after several cohorts there are no longer differences in
market-wide or low SES outcomes between affected and unaffected regions.
In sum, the Colombian reform provides evidence of a positive complementarity between
SES and college quality, and it shows that some students may have better outcomes at
lower-ranked schools. However, the results from more recent cohorts suggest that mismatch
and complementarity are not fixed, inevitable concepts. There may be adjustment costs to
admission reform, but the nature of college quality—and thus the productivity of a college
system—may adapt to large-scale changes in the assignment of students to schools.
My paper adds to the mismatch literature by showing evidence of mismatch under weaker
assumptions. Previous research has characterized the necessary conditions for mismatch
(Arcidiacono et al., 2011) and the large gaps in academic preparation within colleges (Hoxby
and Avery, 2013b; Dillon and Smith, 2016), but the few papers that document mismatch
require strong assumptions on the distributions of unobservable traits (Arcidiacono et al.,
1 These graduation and earnings effects are measured at younger ages due to data constraints.
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2014; Arcidiacono, Aucejo and Hotz, 2016).2 Further, I show that mismatch can affect labor
market earnings in addition to the graduation outcomes examined in these papers. However,
the short-term nature of my findings suggests that mismatch may not be solely due to class
rank (Murphy andWeinhardt, 2014). Instead, mismatch may arise because colleges specialize
in educating certain types of student, and these specializations may evolve in response to
changes in a school’s student body (Duflo, Dupas and Kremer, 2011).
My paper contributes to the selectivity literature (Dale and Krueger, 2002a, 2014a; Hoek-
stra, 2009a; Saavedra, 2009; Ketel et al., 2012; Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman, 2013b;
Goodman, Hurwitz and Smith, 2014; Canaan and Mouganie, 2015; Kirkebøen, Leuven and
Mogstad, 2016) by showing that some mechanisms consistent with their findings—including
linear peer effects or a fixed value added—cannot fully explain how colleges affect student
outcomes. In contrast to standard results from this literature, I find that low SES students
experience a negative return to college quality in the initial post-reform cohorts, and a zero
return in later cohorts. My results suggest the conclusions from selectivity research may not
apply to policies that cause large changes in the distribution of student/college matches.
My paper also relates to work the econometrics of assignment problems (Bhattacharya,
2009; Graham, 2011; Graham, Imbens and Ridder, 2014, 2016).3 These models explicitly rely
on the existence of a complementarity to generate non-zero reallocation effects under coun-
terfactual match distributions. My framework differs in that it develops a reduced-form test
for the existence of a complementarity. I also explore validity of the benchmark assumption
that allows for counterfactual estimation in this literature. I find that pre-treatment data
partially but incompletely explain the post-treatment effects, which highlights the difficulty
of predicting counterfactual outcomes in contexts with social spillovers (Graham, Imbens
and Ridder, 2010; Carrell, Sacerdote and West, 2013; Manski, 2013).4
2 Several studies take reduced form approaches by exploiting affirmative actions bans (Cortes, 2010; Backes,
2012; Hinrichs, 2012, 2014), but they find no direct evidence of mismatch.
3 These papers focus on contexts where the output of a match is observed by the econometrician. Other
work explores contexts in which one observes the match distribution but not match output (Choo and Siow,
2006a,b). See Chiappori and Salanie (2016) for a review of this literature.
4 However, I present evidence that non-linear peer effects (Tincani, 2014; Booij, Leuven and Oosterbeek,
2015) cannot fully explain the difference between the predicted and realized effects in my context.
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More broadly, my paper contributes to a large theoretical and empirical literature on
matching models. Since Becker (1973)’s canonical study of assortative mating, many papers
have asked whether the match function in different markets is supermodular, which implies
a positive complementarity between two populations (Topkis, 1998; Siow, 2015). My paper
provides evidence of a supermodular but malleable match function in the context of college
markets. This relates to work on numerous educational matching mechanisms, including
centralized assignment (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak and Roth, 2005),
affirmative action (Bertrand, Hanna and Mullainathan, 2010; Antonovics and Backes, 2014;
Bagde, Epple and Taylor, 2016), “percent plans” like the Texas Top Ten Percent rule (Cullen,
Long and Reback, 2013; Black, Cortes and Lincove, 2015; Kapor, 2015), and admission tests
like the SAT (Rothstein, 2004).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the framework, and Section 3 describes
the Colombian exam reform. Section 4 shows that the reform reduced assortative matching,
and Section 5 presents its effects on human capital accumulation. Section 6 examines the
evolution of these effects beyond the initial post-reform cohorts. Section 7 concludes.
2. Econometric framework
This section presents a framework that uses an exogenous change in assortative matching
in a college market to test for a complementarity between student socioeconomic status (SES)
and school quality. I begin by defining student/college characteristics and the concepts of
assortativity and complementarity. I then consider the effects of an admission exam reform
that reduces student/college assortativity. I show how this reform can be used to test for the
existence of a complementarity, and I discuss how this analysis contributes to existing work
on college selectivity. Next, I show how the sign of this complementarity that is revealed by
the exam reform can be used to test the key “conditional on observables” assumption in the
literature on college mismatch. Finally, I discuss potential student and college responses to
the reform that could cause this complementarity to evolve over time.
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The setup of this framework is a simplified version of that in Graham (2011), which
is motivated by the study of reallocation effects—changes in an outcome that arise from
alternate matchings of two populations. This typically requires strong assumptions on the
distributions of unobservable characteristics or on the form of the matching function. My
framework differs in that it exploits an admission exam reform for a reduced form exploration
of student/college reallocation effects.
2.1. Students, colleges, and human capital. This framework considers the matching of
two populations in a market—students and colleges. It begins by defining the characteristics
of both populations that affect students’ human capital accumulation.
The first population consists of students, who have academic ability that can be decom-
posed into observable and unobservable components. Students are indexed by i and have
ability Ai, which is given by:
(1) Ai = Xi + εi.
Xi is an index of an individual’s observable socioeconomic characteristics. In the empiri-
cal analysis below I define Xi to be a socioeconomic index based on mother’s education,
high school quality, and gender; specifically, I use the mean admission exam score within
cells defined by these characteristics. Thus Xi gives a finely-grained measure of an individ-
ual’s expected performance on the admission exam given her socioeconomic characteristics.
I normalize Xi to have mean zero and standard deviation one. The residual term εi re-
flects unobservable components of an individual’s academic ability that are independent of
Xi. Thus εi captures those aspects of individuals’ abilities that are uncorrelated with their
observable socioeconomic backgrounds.
The second population consists of colleges, which also have observable and unobservable
characteristics. Colleges are indexed by c, and each college has quality Qc that can be
decomposed in an analogous manner:
(2) Qc = Wc + νc.
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Wc is an observable measure of college quality, which is normalized to mean zero and standard
deviation one. Below I define Wc to be the average admission exam score of a college’s
students. Thus Wc gives an individual’s expected performance on the admission exam given
her college. I denote the unobservable component of college quality by νc, which I define to be
independent of Wc. This means that Wc will reflect other aspects of a college’s quality that
are correlated with the average exam score of its students, including its financial resources
and faculty expertise. Wc may also be correlated with other unobservable characteristics of
a college’s students, such as their family resources. νc thus reflects all other aspects of a
college’s financial, faculty, or peer quality that are uncorrelated with mean exam scores.
Both individual and college characteristics can affect a student’s human capital accumu-
lation.5 This notion is captured by the potential match output function:
(3) Y(i,c) = Y(i,c)(Ai, Qc).
Y(i,c) is the human capital that would result from the potential assignment of student i to
college c, as measured by graduation outcomes or subsequent labor market earnings. This
output depends on a student’s academic ability, Ai, and the quality of her college, Qc.
Potential output is defined for all combinations of these characteristics, but the data contain
only one realization of output, Yic, based on the college a student actually attended.
2.2. Assortativity and complementarity. This paper highlights two features of the match
between students and colleges: assortativity and complementarity.
Assortativity is a feature of the distribution of student/college matches. In particular,
positive assortative matching between students and colleges occurs when high socioeconomic
students are more likely to attend high quality colleges. In matching research, assortativity
is frequently measured using the correlation coefficient between the characteristics of two
populations. I follow this convention in defining assortativity in college markets:
5 Throughout this paper I use the phrase “human capital” to refer to graduation and post-college earnings
outcomes. Colleges may affect these outcomes through channels other than pure human capital accumulation.
For example, the college a student attends may affect her earnings through a signaling mechanism (MacLeod
et al., 2015). My use of the term “human capital” is not meant to rule out these other mechanisms.
10
Definition. The assortativity of student/college matches in a market is the correlation
coefficient, ρ, between the socioeconomic index, Xi, and observable college quality, Wc.
SinceXi andWc are both defined to have standard deviation one, the correlation coefficient
between these two characteristics is equivalent to the ρ coefficient in the linear regression:6
(4) Wc = ρXi + uic,
where uic is the residual. Equation (4) yields a convenient representation of ρ for the empirical
analysis below.
While assortativity is a feature of the match distribution, complementarity is a character-
istic of the potential match output function, Y(i,c). A complementarity exists if there is an
interactive effect of individual ability and college quality in the production of human capital.
Formally, I define complementarity as follows:7
Definition. The potential match output function, Y(i,c), exhibits a complementarity if is not
additively separable in Ai and Qc.
For example, a simple potential output function with no complementarity is Y(i,c) = θaAi+
θqQc. By contrast, the potential output function Y(i,c) = θAiQc exhibits a complementarity;
the return to college quality, Qc, is higher for students with higher academic ability, Ai.
Note that I define assortativity in terms of the observable indices Xi andWc, which allows
me to compute a value of ρ from the data. By contrast, I define complementarity using Ai
and Qc, which include both observable and unobservable components. Below I show that a
change in assortativity provides a clean test of complementarity defined in terms of Ai and
Qc. I also show that stronger assumptions are necessary to interpret this complementarity
as one between the observable characteristics Xi and Wc.
6 Specifically, ρ = cov(Xi,Wc)/σXσW = cov(Xi,Wc)/var(Xi) since σX = σW = var(Xi) = 1. I also omit a
constant term from equation (4) because both Xi and Wc are mean zero.
7 Following Graham (2011), I use the word “complementarity” to denote either a positive or a negative
interactive effect. Some researchers use “complementarity” for positive interactions and “substitutability”
for negative interactions.
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2.3. Admission exam reform and a reduction in assortativity. This framework con-
siders a college admission exam reform that reduces the correlation of exam scores with
student SES, and thus reduces the assortativity of student/college matches.
Let τit be the score of individual i on a college admission exam in period t. In this
framework I consider two periods defined by individuals’ exam cohorts, t ∈ {0, 1}, where 0
represents the cohort before the admission exam reform, and 1 is the post-reform exam co-
hort. I use a linear specification to define the relationship between test scores and observable
socioeconomic characteristics in each cohort:
(5) τit = ρexamt Xi + uit.
As above, I normalize exam scores, τit, to be mean zero and standard deviation one; thus
ρexamt represents both the linear regression coefficient and the correlation coefficient between
exam scores and the socioeconomic index in cohort t.
An admission exam reform that reduces the correlation of test scores with students’ so-
cioeconomic backgrounds implies that:
(6) ρexam1 < ρexam0 .
In other words, the correlation between test scores, τit, and the socioeconomic index, Xi, is
lower in the post-reform cohort. Equation (6) gives the key characteristic of the admission
reform instrument that I document empirically in Section 3.
The reduction in the correlation of Xi with exam scores in equation (6) does not perfectly
translate into an effect on college admissions because tuition costs and other preferences
also influence students’ college choices. Nonetheless, if exam scores play an important role
in admissions, the reform should also reduce the assortativity of student/college matches.
Allowing the definition of assortativity in equation (4) to differ between the two exam cohorts,
this implies:
(7) ρ1 < ρ0.
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Equation (7) is the “first-stage” prediction for my empirical analysis, which I test in Section
4.
2.4. Existence of complementarity and the college selectivity literature. This sec-
tion shows that a change in assortativity from admission exam reform provides evidence
on the existence of a complementarity between student and college characteristics. I then
show that the estimand from such a reform has advantages in identifying a complementarity
relative to empirical designs that are common in the literature on college selectivity.
The decline in assortativity represented by equation (7) implies a reallocation of stu-
dent/college matches across an entire market. This allows me to estimate the market-wide
effect of this new match distribution on human capital accumulation. This estimand is what
Graham (2011) calls the average reallocation effect, and it is given by:
(8) β = E1[Yic]− E0[Yic],
where E0[Yic] and E1[Yic] denote the average values of an observable measure of human
capital, Yic, in the cohorts before and after the exam reform. The average reallocation effect,
β, is thus the change in market-level match output from the exam overhaul. It is the primary
estimand of this paper, although in the empirical analysis below I estimate a differences in
differences version of β.8 In this framework I use the single difference estimand (8) for
simplicity of exposition.
The key assumption necessary to identify a complementarity is that the distributions of
academic ability and college quality are stable over time.9 In the case of academic ability,
this assumption means that the distributions of both the observable, Xi, and unobservable,
εi, components of Ai are the same in the pre- and post-reform cohorts. In my analysis,
8 The differences in differences specification uses regional variation in the effects of an exam reform to net out
concurrent common shocks to human capital accumulation. Specifically, I define treated (T ) and control (C)
regions of Colombia based on the potential effects of the exam reform, and estimate the average reallocation
effect as β = (ET1 [Yic] − ET0 [Yic]) − (EC1 [Yic] − EC0 [Yic]). See Section 4 for details on the differences in
differences analysis.
9 In the differences in differences specification below, the assumption is that there are parallel trends in these
distributions across regions.
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Xi includes only pre-determined characteristics that cannot be affected by the exam reform.
The assumption for εi is stronger because this term includes aspects of individual ability that
are potentially influenced by the reform. For example, the overhaul could induce students
to study harder for the new exam, raising their human capital.
The assumption of stability in college quality, Qc, means that the distributions of both the
observable, Wc, and unobservable, νc, components are the same in the pre- and post-reform
cohorts. Below I define Wc using only pre-reform characteristics, and any changes in its
distribution are testable. The stability of unobservable college quality, νc, is the strongest
of these assumptions. For example, colleges may change curricula or support services in
response to the reform. More importantly, νc includes aspects of a student’s college peers,
which necessarily change as a result of the decline in assortativity from the exam reform.
Thus if peer effects are an important component of college quality, the distribution of νc may
not be stable across exam cohorts.
I examine the empirical evidence related to these competing explanations in Section 4.3. I
argue that the pattern of results in the initial cohorts after the reform is difficult to explain
through changes in the distributions of unobservable ability, college quality, or peer effects.
However, in subsequent cohorts I present evidence of student/college responses that alter
the reform’s initial human capital effects.
If the distributions of academic ability, Ai, and college quality, Qc, are stable across exam
cohorts, it immediately follows that the average reallocation effect (8) provides a clean test
of the existence of a complementarity. Any potential output function that does not exhibit
a complementarity is additively separable in Ai and Qc, which means it can be written in
the form Y(i,c) = f(Ai) + g(Qc) for some functions f(·) and g(·). The average reallocation
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effect under this potential output function is:
β = E1[Yic]− E0[Yic],
= E1[f(Ai) + g(Qc)]− E0[f(Ai) + g(Qc)],
= E1[f(Ai)]− E0[f(Ai)] + E1[g(Qc)]− E0[g(Qc)],
= 0,
where the last line follows from the assumption that the academic ability and college quality
distributions are stable. Thus the average reallocation effect of a decline in assortativity
should be zero unless there is a complementarity between student and college characteristics.
This is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If the distributions of student ability and college quality are stable over time,
a decline in assortativity has no effect on market-level human capital accumulation unless
student and college traits are complementary.
The idea that a complementarity is necessary to generate a non-zero reallocation effect
is not new. In particular, Graham (2011) notes that the study of assignment problems is
only interesting in the presence of a complementarity. The contribution of Proposition 1 is
to exploit an exogenous admission exam reform to provide a test for the existence of such
a complementarity. By contrast, existing empirical work on reallocation effects typically
measures complementarity using strong assumptions on the distributions of unobservable
match characteristics (see, e.g., Bhattacharya, 2009; Graham, Imbens and Ridder, 2010), as
I discuss in the next subsection.
The average reallocation effect in (8) has advantages in identifying complementarity rel-
ative to empirical designs that are common in another literature that takes a reduced form
approach to measuring college quality effects—the “college selectivity” literature (e.g., Dale
and Krueger, 2002a; Hoekstra, 2009a). The estimand of interest in selectivity studies takes
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the general form:
(9) βCS = E[Yic|Ai = a,Qc = qH ]− E[Yic|Ai = a,Qc = qL].
The college selectivity effect, βCS, measures the human capital return to attending a high
selectivity college with quality qH rather than a less selective college with lower quality
qL. This return is estimated for students of a given academic ability, a, which typically
corresponds to a marginally accepted student; for example, numerous studies use regression
discontinuity designs with a given by the location of an admission threshold for the selective
college.10
The first three rows of Table 1 show predictions for the college selectivity estimand in (9)
and the average reallocation estimand in (8) under simple potential match output functions
that do not exhibit a complementarity. The first row represents a model in which colleges
contribute to individual outcomes through a value added component, θQc, that does not
depend on any student characteristics. The second row defines a case in which an individual’s
human capital accumulation depends only on the mean peer ability at her college, θĀc.11
This linear-in-mean peer ability model is widely used in both theoretical (e.g., Epple and
Romano, 1998b) and empirical (e.g., Manski, 1993) work on peer effects. The third row
depicts a model in which a student’s human capital accumulation depends only on her class
rank. This is often a key part of the implicit or explicit model used in college mismatch
papers (e.g., Arcidiacono and Lovenheim, 2016), which argue that students can become
discouraged or receive poor grades if their academic ability is too far below that of their
classmates.12
10 Hoekstra (2009a), Saavedra (2009), Ketel et al. (2012), Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2013b), Good-
man, Hurwitz and Smith (2014), Canaan and Mouganie (2015), Kirkebøen, Leuven and Mogstad (2016) all
use regression discontinuity thresholds for college admissions. Other papers use similar empirical designs in
the context of high school admissions (e.g., Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013; Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist and
Pathak, 2014).
11 Thus in this model, college quality, Qc, depends only on the mean ability at a college, Āc.
12 Several more complicated models of class rank, such as a student’s percentile rank, yield similar predictions
to this simple model.
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Table 1. Predicted selectivity and reallocation effects from simple match functions
Potential match College Average
Description output, Y(i,c) selectivity effect, βCS reallocation effect, β
Common value added θQc θ(qH − qL) 0
Linear-in-mean peer ability θĀc θ(āH − āL) 0
Class rank θ(Ai − Āc) θ(āL − āH) 0
Complementarity θAiQc θa(qH − qL) θ(E1[AiQc]− E0[AiQc])
Notes: The average reallocation effect, β, is defined in equation (8). The college selectivity effect, βCS , is defined in
equation (9).
For each of these three models, the college selectivity effect, βCS, is potentially non-zero,
and is given by the difference in quality of the high and lower selectivity colleges. For
example, in the linear-in-mean peer ability model, the selectivity effect is θ(āH − āL), which
reflects the difference in the mean student ability at the two colleges. By contrast, the
average reallocation effect under all three models is zero. This arises because there are no
interactive effects between student characteristics and college quality, and thus market-level
output does not depend on which students are assigned to which colleges. In the peer ability
model, for instance, students that are shifted into colleges with high mean ability after the
reform may see gains in their outcomes, but these gains are offset by losses among students
displaced to colleges with lower mean ability. In net, the reallocation of student/college
matches has no effect on market-level output under such a model.
The last row of Table 1 depicts a potential output function with a simple complementarity
between student and college characteristics, Y(i,c) = θAiQc. The college selectivity effect
under this model is again non-zero, and it captures the quality difference between high and
lower selectivity colleges for students with ability Ai = a. However, a decline in market-level
assortative matching implies that the average value of AiQc differs before and after the exam
reform. Thus, the average reallocation effect is also potentially non-zero.
Table 1 highlights the benefit of using the average reallocation estimand (8) in identifying
complementarity. The average reallocation effect generates different predictions for models
with and without a complementarity, while the college selectivity effect is potentially non-
zero in all cases.
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Furthermore, it is difficult to identify a complementarity even when researchers examine
heterogeneity in college selectivity estimates across different types of students. Researchers
frequently estimate the college selectivity effect, βCS, for students who vary on some ob-
servable dimension, Xi, like race or family income; that is, they estimate E[βCS|Xi = x] for
different values of x. For example, some papers find that college selectivity effects are larger
for low-income students (Dale and Krueger, 2002a). This result might appear to suggest a
negative complementarity between college quality and family income, but this need not be
the case.
Suppose that, as in the first row of Table 1, potential match output is given by a common
value added term, Y(i,c) = θQc. Thus there is no complementarity between students and
colleges. For all students, βCS measures the effect of admission to the same selective college
with quality qH , but the counterfactual college that students attend if they are not admitted
may vary across individuals. Thus the value added component for non-admitted students
(qL in Table 1) is actually an average of the value added terms for all colleges attended by
these students. Heterogeneity in college selectivity effects is therefore given by:






where qci is quality of the college attended by student i, and Nx is the number of non-
admitted students for whom Xi = x. Since E[βCS|Xi = x] depends on the counterfactual
colleges chosen by non-admitted students, selectivity effects can vary across values of x
even though there is no complementarity. For example, βCS would be larger for low-income
students if the schools they attend when they are not admitted to the selective college tend
to have lower value added than those of high-income students.
If researchers can also control for the quality of the counterfactual college, qL, then het-
erogeneity in college selectivity effects is more likely to reveal a true complementarity. With
the notable exception of Kirkebøen, Leuven and Mogstad (2016), such empirical designs are
rare in the selectivity literature. Yet even if counterfactual conditioning is possible, college
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selectivity estimates only reveal complementarity for marginally-admitted students and for
the colleges included in the study. These effects may not reveal the average value of such a
complementarity across an entire college market or in the presence of large-scale changes in
the student/college match distribution, which is the focus of my analysis.
2.5. Sign of complementarity and the college mismatch literature. This section
shows that a change in assortativity from admission exam reform can be used to test a
key assumption in the literature on college mismatch: students and colleges are randomly
matched conditional on observables. I further show that adopting this assumption yields
the predictions that, in my context, a reduction in assortativity should decrease market-
wide average graduation rates or earnings, but it should increase these outcomes for low SES
students. In other words, under this assumption the data predict a positive complementarity
between student SES and college quality but no mismatch for low SES individuals.
The mismatch hypothesis states that the return to college quality may be negative for
students who are academically unprepared for top colleges (Arcidiacono and Lovenheim,
2016). The best evidence of mismatch comes from structural models that estimate the
change in human capital accumulation that occurs in a counterfactual assignment of students
to colleges. For example, Arcidiacono, Aucejo and Hotz (2016) show that overall science
and technology graduation rates in the University of California system would have been
higher had admissions been based more on measures of academic preparation—like GPA
and SAT scores—and less on minority status. Related work also takes a structural approach
to the counterfactual matching of two populations in other contexts, including roommate
assignment (Bhattacharya, 2009) and segregation (Graham, Imbens and Ridder, 2010).
This work requires strong assumptions about the unobservable characteristics of the two
populations under consideration. In this framework I use a stylized regression model to
illustrate this assumption and highlight its key consequences for counterfactual outcomes.
In the empirical analysis below I use non-parametric regressions that align more closely with
the estimating equations in mismatch research.
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To explore the effects of counterfactual student/college matches, researchers estimate an
equation analogous to the following specification:
(10) Yic = α + θxXi + θwWc + κXiWc + eic.
Equation (10) expresses human capital, Yic, as a parametric function of characteristics ob-
servable to the researcher: the student socioeconomic index, Xi, and college quality, Wc.
This specification also includes a term, XiWc, that allows for a complementary effect of
observable student and college traits. The parameter κ measures how the return to college
quality, Wc, varies with an individual’s socioeconomic background, Xi. The unobservable
determinants of human capital, including individual ability, εi, and college quality, νc, are
lumped into the residual, eic.
Equation (10) is a stylized representation of the observable components of potential output,
but an advantage of this specification is that it yields a simple form for the average match
output in a market:
E[Yic] = α + θxE[Xi] + θwE[Wc] + κE[XiWc],
= α + κρ.(11)
The simplification in (11) comes from the fact that Xi and Wc are both mean zero and
standard deviation one; thus, the E[Xi] and E[Wc] terms disappear, and E[XiWc] is equal
to the assortativity of student/college matches, ρ, as defined by equation (4).13 Average
output in a market, E[Yic], is therefore given by the product of the complementarity, κ, and
assortativity, ρ, of student and college characteristics (plus a constant term, α).
This specification also gives a convenient representation of the average reallocation effect—
the change in average output from the exam reform given by equation (8). Using 0 and 1
subscripts to denote the values of each parameter in the cohorts before and after the exam
13 In other words, E[Xi] = E[Wc] = 0, and ρ = cov(Xi,Wc)/var(Xi) = E[XiWc]−E[Xi]E[Wc] = E[XiWc].
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overhaul, the average reallocation effect can be written as:
β = E1[Yic]− E0[Yic]
= κ1ρ1 − κ0ρ0(12)
= κ0(ρ1 − ρ0) + (κ1 − κ0)ρ1.(13)
Equation (12) shows that the average reallocation effect depends on the complementarity,
κ, and assortativity, ρ, of student and college characteristics in the pre- and post-reform co-
horts.14 Equation (13) decomposes the average reallocation effect into two terms.15 The first
term, κ0(ρ1 − ρ0), represents the distribution effect of reallocation. This term measures the
effect of a change in the assortativity of matches, ρ, given the initial value of student/college
complementarity, κ0. The distribution effect captures the essence of how researchers explore
the effects of counterfactual matches. Researchers can estimate initial assortativity, ρ0, and
complementarity, κ0, from the data, and the goal is to examine how outcomes changes under
counterfactual distributions, ρ1.
The second term, (κ1 − κ0)ρ1, reflects a change in complementarity, κ, applied to the
post-reform assortativity of matches, ρ1. This term is a selection bias component because
the complementarity that arises under the new allocation, κ1, is unknown—it can depend on
unobservable student/college match characteristics. To deal with this selection bias term, a
benchmark assumption in structural work is that students and colleges are randomly matched
conditional on their observable types, Xi and Wc. This assumption, which Graham (2008)
calls double randomization, ensures that the joint distribution of unobservable student and
college traits, εi and νc, is the same across all observed matches. For example, Arcidiacono,
Aucejo and Hotz (2016) assume that student/college matches are random conditional on
indicators for the sets of colleges to which students applied and were accepted—a strategy
first proposed by Dale and Krueger (2002a). The assumption that matches are generated
14 Note that the constant term, α, falls out because of the assumption of stability in the distributions of
individual ability and college quality.
15 Equation (13) is derived by adding and subtracting κ0ρ1 from equation (8).
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randomly implies that κ0 is the true, causal value of complementarity, and is therefore equal
to κ1. Thus the selection bias term (κ1 − κ0)ρ1 disappears from (13), and researchers can
estimate counterfactual reallocation effects by changing the match distribution ρ1.
Adopting the double randomization assumption allows me to predict the consequences of
an admission exam reform in my context. If there is no selection bias term, the sign of the
average reallocation effect in (13) is equal to the sign of the distribution effect, κ0(ρ1 − ρ0).
The exam reform reduces assortativity as given by assumption (7), so (ρ1 − ρ0) is negative.
It remains to estimate the sign of the pre-reform student/college complementarity, κ0. One
would observe κ0 > 0 if high SES students benefit more from attending top colleges than
students with lower values of Xi. Conversely, κ0 < 0 could arise if low SES students benefit
more from admission to top colleges.
Figure 1 shows evidence that κ0 > 0 in the Colombian college market (see Sections 3
and 4 for more details on the context, data, and variable definitions). The horizontal axis
depicts an index of students’ socioeconomic status, Xi, and the vertical axis represents one
measure of human capital accumulation, Yic: log earnings measured ten years after taking a
college admission exam. The figure divides students into two groups based on the observed
quality of their colleges, Wc. The solid black line contains students from above the median
quality, while the light-red dashed line depicts students at colleges below the median of Wc.
The fanning out of the two lines as Xi increases suggests that κ0 is positive. Students of all
socioeconomic backgrounds have higher earnings at top colleges than those at low quality
colleges, but this gap is significantly larger for high SES students. Appendix A.1 shows that
other measures of human capital accumulation, including drop-out and graduation rates,
also exhibit a positive observed complementarity, although they are less pronounced.
If κ0 > 0, then the distribution effect in equation (13), κ0(ρ1 − ρ0), is negative. Thus the
overall effect of a reduction in assortativity is a decline in human capital accumulation unless
the selection bias term is sufficiently positive to offset the distribution effect. The selection
bias component can be non-zero if the change in student/college matches also affects sorting
on the unobservable determinants of human capital, εi or νc. For example, hard-working
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Figure 1. Observed complementarity in earnings
Notes: This figure uses data on college enrollees who took the Colombian national admission exam in 1998–1999.
See Sections 3 and 4 for details on the data and variable definitions. The solid black line depicts the non-parametric
relationship between a socioeconomic index, Xi, and log earnings measured 10 years after taking the admission exam,
Yic, for students who attended colleges with quality, Wc, above the median. The light-red dashed line depicts the
analogous relation for students at colleges below the median of Wc.
students may learn more at top colleges, and the exam reform may change the relationship
between student work ethic and college quality. If work ethic is unobservable but correlated
with Xi, this could affect estimates of κ. A reduction in assortative matching may also affect
κ through changes in the peer characteristics at a student’s college, which are not captured
in the simple interaction term XiWc.
A similar derivation can be used to predict the reform’s effects for students with different
levels of SES. Specifically, define the average reallocation effect for individuals with a value
of the socioeconomic index Xi = x as:
(14) βx = E1[Yic|Xi = x]− E0[Yic|Xi = x].
Since Xi is a pre-determined characteristic, the only assumption necessary to interpret this
estimand as the causal effect of the exam reform is stability in the distribution of Xi over
time. βx thus gives the reduced-form effect of the decline in assortative matching for different
values of Xi.
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However, one can use the regression model (10) and a “conditional on observables” as-
sumption analogous to double randomization to derive a prediction for the value of βx:
βx =E1[α + θxXi + θwWc + κXiWc + eic|Xi = x]−
E0[α + θxXi + θwWc + κXiWc + eic|Xi = x]
=(θw + κx)
(
E1[Wc|Xi = x]− E0[Wc|Xi = x]
)
(15)
The derivation of equation (15) uses two related assumptions. The first assumption is
E1[eic|Xi = x] − E0[eic|Xi = x] = 0, which implies that the determinants of human capital
accumulation other than the observable characteristics Xi andWc have the same mean in the
pre- and post-reform cohorts. The second assumption is that the values of the parameters
θw and κ are the same in the two exam cohorts. This is analogous to double randomization
in that it assumes that conditioning on Xi and Wc allows the researcher to uncover the true
value of these parameters.16
Given these assumptions, equation (15) defines βx as the coefficient (θw + κx) times the
difference in observable college quality, Wc, for individuals with Xi = x. The decline in
assortativity given by equation (7) implies that E1[Wc|Xi = x] − E0[Wc|Xi = x] is positive
for students with low values of x, and it is negative for high values of x. In other words, low
SES students experience increases in college quality with the exam reform, while high SES
students are shifted into lower quality colleges.
The sign of βx thus depends on the sign of the coefficient (θw + κx), which includes the
college quality effect, θw, the complementarity coefficient, κ, and the value of the socioe-
conomic index, x. These terms come from the stylized regression model (10), but they
capture the basic intuition in the mismatch literature of a tradeoff between between college
quality, θw, and academic fit, κx (Arcidiacono and Lovenheim, 2016). The college quality
component is typically hypothesized to be positive, and thus if θw is large enough then there
is no mismatch—all students, regardless of their socioeconomic backgrounds—benefit from
16 Equation (15) also uses the stability assumption E1[α+ θxXi|Xi = x]− E0[α+ θxXi|Xi = x] = 0.
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attending higher quality colleges. Conversely, mismatch arises for low SES students if the
fit component, κx, is larger in magnitude than the college quality component, θw.
Figure 1 suggests that in the Colombian context, the coefficient (θw+κx) is positive for all
values of the socioeconomic index, Xi. The solid black line, which represents average earnings
at high quality colleges, is always above the red dashed line, which gives average earnings
at low quality colleges. Appendix A.1 shows that this pattern also holds for drop-out and
graduation outcomes. Thus, if the double randomization assumption holds in Colombia, the
sign of the reallocation effect for individuals with Xi = x is given by the sign of the term
E1[Wc|Xi = x] − E0[Wc|Xi = x]. This suggests that the admission exam reform should
increase human capital accumulation for low SES students (i.e., βxL > 0), who experience
increases in the college quality on average. Conversely, the reform should reduce human
capital accumulation for high SES students (i.e., βxH < 0), whose average college quality
decreases in the post-reform cohort.
Proposition 2 summarizes the market-wide and individual-level predictions on the sign of
complementarity given the double randomization assumption.
Proposition 2. If the double randomization assumption holds in the Colombian context,
then a decline in the assortativity of student/college matches (ρ1 < ρ0) should:
• Decrease market-wide human capital accumulation (β < 0),
• Increase human capital outcomes for low SES students (βxL > 0), and
• Decrease human capital outcomes for high SES students (βxH < 0).
In sum, an admission exam reform provides an opportunity to test the double randomiza-
tion in the Colombian context. Estimates of the average reallocation effect, which include
both the distribution and selection bias effects from equation (13), can be compared to the
predicted signs from the distribution effects alone. The test is particularly compelling if
there is exogenous variation in the effects of the admission reform, which I document in my
setting in Sections 3 and 4. By exploiting the variation in student/college matches from
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an exam overhaul reform, the principal assumptions for this paper are weaker than those
common in structural work on college mismatch.
The above discussion used a parametric model to characterize reallocation effects. In the
empirical section below, I use non-parametric specifications to test Proposition 2. Instead
of the assortativity (ρ) and complementarity (κ) parameters, I calculate non-parametric
versions of the distribution of student/college matches (Pr[Xi = x,Wc = w]) and match
function (E[Yic|Xi = x,Wc = w]). This specification is closer to those used in the mismatch
literature.
2.6. Longer-term responses to the reform. This section discusses three potential ways
in which students or colleges could respond to the exam reform. Each possibility would cause
outcomes observed in the initial cohorts exposed to the new exam to differ from those in
later cohorts.
First, over time students may respond to the reform in a way that undoes some of its effects
on the distribution of scores. For example, high SES students may engage in tutoring that
improves their performance on the new exam. Students may also begin to select high schools
with better performance on the new exam. Such affects could alter the correlation between
the socioeconomic index, Xi, and students’ exam scores, τit, as defined by the parameter
ρexam. In other words, the strength of the exam reform instrument—captured by equation
(6)—may evolve across post-reform cohorts.
Second, students’ college choices may change over time even conditional on exam scores.
Students with the same scores as their peers in previous cohorts may end up in different
colleges if schools adjust admission standards in response to their changing student bodies,
or if students’ preferences change in the response to the exam overhaul. This would lead to
a change in the assortativity parameter, ρ, and it would cause the “first stage” prediction
(7) to differ between initial and subsequent cohorts.
Third, even if the reform had a lasting effect on students’ exam scores and college choices,
the human capital effects of the reform can be temporary if the distributions of student
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ability or college quality respond to the reform. Both Propositions 1 and 2 rely on the
assumption that the distributions of student ability and college quality are stable over time.
This may not hold if, for example, colleges respond to their new student bodies by increasing
support services for low SES students, or by adjusting the content or target levels of their
curricula. Students may also respond by increasing effort or altering study habits while in
college. Any of these effects could lead the human capital outcomes for later cohorts to differ
from those observed in the initial cohorts affected by the reform, even if the SES/exam score
correlation, ρexam, and the degree of assortativity, ρ, are persistent over time.
Instability in the ability and quality distributions is potentially important in my setting
given that the exam reform leads to larger changes in student/college matches than in re-
lated work. For example, regression discontinuity designs in the college selectivity literature
capture the effects of school quality that correspond to a marginal reduction in a college’s
admission threshold. A marginal change in the threshold may have important implications
for the student who gains admission, but it does not significantly alter the nature of the col-
lege’s student body. However, a reform that leads to large-scale changes in student/college
matches may compel schools to alter their curricula or support services in ways that marginal
admission policy reforms do not.
Testing for the persistence of effects on student outcomes thus reveals something about the
mechanisms that underlie students’ human capital accumulation while in college. In partic-
ular, it reveals whether the complementarity between students and their colleges is fixed—as
would arise if students’ outcomes depend purely on their class rank or on a constant college
value added—or whether student and college responses can change this complementarity.
In the final section of this paper, I examine the persistence these effects by measuring out-
comes beyond the first few cohorts exposed to the redesigned admission exam. In particular,
I examine persistence of the three stages of my analysis: 1) the strength of exam score/SES
correlation, ρexam, as captured by equation (6); 2) the degree of assortativity, ρ, as captured
by equation (7); and 3) the human capital effects as discussed in Propositions 1 and 2. I
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compare each of these outcomes for the first two post-reform cohorts to those observed in
cohorts up to seven years after the overhaul.
3. Admission exam reform in Colombia
This section provides background on the Colombian college system, my related data
sources, and a reform of the national admission exam. I show that the reform led to a
sharp reduction in the correlation of exam scores with SES. This provides an instrument for
student/college assortativity, which I examine in Section 4.
3.1. Institutional background and data. In this paper I use three administrative datasets
that correspond to different parts of the Colombian higher education system.
The first dataset includes records from a national standardized exam called the ICFES,
which Colombian students are required to take to apply to college.17 The Colombian exam
is generally analogous to the SAT in the U.S., but it is taken by nearly all high school
graduates regardless of whether they plan to attend college. In this paper I use individual
administrative records from the testing agency that cover 1998–2006 exam takers, which
provide each student’s test scores, high school, and background characteristics.
The second dataset includes enrollment and graduation records from the Ministry of Ed-
ucation that cover the near universe of colleges in Colombia. Colombia’s higher education
system consists of public and private institutions with varying selectivity and degree offer-
ings. As in the U.S., admissions are decentralized; students apply to individual colleges and
each institution controls its own selection criteria.18 Nonetheless, the Ministry of Educa-
tion tracks individual-level enrollment and graduation at nearly all colleges in the country.
I use the Ministry’s records on all enrollees from 1998–2012, which contain each student’s
institution, program of study, and dates of entry and exit.
17 ICFES stands for Institute for the Promotion of Higher Education, the former acronym for the agency
that administers the exam. The ICFES exam is now named Saber 11°.
18 Unlike in the U.S., Colombian students apply not just to individual colleges but to college/major combi-
nations. Below I discuss whether my effects are driven by college effects, major effects, or both.
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My last data source is from the Ministry of Social Protection, which provides post-college
earnings for all college enrollees. These data contain monthly earnings for any college enrollee
employed in the formal sector in 2008–2012. From these records I calculate average daily
earnings by dividing monthly earnings by the number of formal employment days in each
month and averaging across the year.
I link the admission exam, college, and earnings records using individuals’ names, birth-
dates, and ID numbers. The resulting dataset contains college enrollment and graduation
outcomes for 1998–2006 exam takers and 2008–2012 formal sector earnings for college en-
rollees.19
3.2. The 2000 admission exam reform. The Colombian national exam was first ad-
ministered in 1968 with the aim of supporting college admissions. As the exam achieved
widespread coverage in the 1980s, the government additionally began to use admission exam
results to evaluate high schools.
In the mid 1990s, policymakers concluded that the exam was poorly designed for the dual
objective of college admissions and high school accountability. There was a perception that
the exam rewarded innate ability and rote memorization more than the capacity to apply
material one has learned. Critics thus argued that it was a poor measure of high school value
added, and that scores were biased in favor of high SES students.
To address these concerns the testing agency completely redesigned the admission exam,
altering the type of questions, tested subjects, and scoring system. The goal was to develop
an exam that tested “competencies” rather than “content,” and in doing so to align the exam
with the high school curriculum and the skills that predict college success. Appendix A.3
gives further details on the changes to the exam structure, and it provides sample questions
from the pre- and post-reform tests.
The new exam debuted in 2000 after more than five years of psychometric research. The
exam overhaul was widely publicized in the preceding months including substantial coverage
19 Appendix A.2 provides details on the coverage of each dataset and the merge process.
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in El Tiempo, the leading Colombia newspaper. In its objective and publicity, the redesign
of the exam was thus similar to the overhaul of the U.S. SAT that debuted in 2016.
3.3. Reduction in the correlation of exam scores with SES. This section shows that
the 2000 overhaul led to a large and immediate decrease in the correlation of exam scores
with individuals’ SES. This corroborates assumption (6) in Section 2.
To do this I define an index Xi based on students’ socioeconomic traits, where i denotes
individuals. The characteristics I use are indicators for a mother with a secondary education,
a student’s high school, and a student’s gender. The index Xi is the average pre-reform
(1998–1999) admission exam score in cells defined by these characteristics.20 There are
over 7,500 high schools in my sample, so this index gives a finely grained prediction of a
student’s expected exam performance given her socioeconomic characteristics. On average,
men, students with secondary-educated mothers, and students from top high schools have
higher values of Xi.
Figure 2 shows how the socioeconomic index relates to scores on the mathematics subject of
the admission exam for two cohorts before and after the reform.21 The horizontal axis depicts
the index Xi, and the vertical axis contains the math score. Each variable is normalized to
mean zero and standard deviation one; this scaling is convenient because the linear regression
coefficient—denoted by ρexam on the graph—is the correlation coefficient between the two
variables.22
The dark solid lines show the non-parametric relationship between math scores and the
socioeconomic index for the two pre-reform cohorts. The correlation between these variables
is 0.55 among 1998 exam takers, and is nearly identical in 1999 at 0.56. This implies that
students who are two standard deviations above the mean SES have average math scores
roughly one standard deviation above the mean.
20 This index is the average score across all exam subjects. I use a leave-one-out mean for each 1998–1999
exam taker so that Xi is not mechanically correlated with the outcomes examined below.
21 Appendix A.2 provides details on the sample for Figure 2 and the remaining analyses in this paper.
22 Equality of the regression and correlation coefficients is not strictly true for any individual cohort since I
hold Xi constant over time, but the differences are minor.
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Figure 2. Math scores by admission exam cohort
Notes: This figure shows the non-parametric relationship between the socioeconomic index, Xi, and normalized math
score, τit, for all exam takers in each cohort from 1998–2001. Both Xi and τit are normalized to mean zero and
standard deviation one. It also displays the coefficient, ρexam, from the linear regression of τit on Xi for each cohort.
See Appendix A.2 for details on the sample and variable definitions.
The dashed lines show that this relationship declines sharply in the two cohorts immedi-
ately following the reform; the correlation between the socioeconomic index and math scores
falls to 0.23 in 2000 and 0.26 in 2001. Thus the exam reform led to substantially higher
math scores for low SES students and relatively lower scores for high SES students. Put
another way, the overhaul dramatically reduced ρexam, the correlation of math scores with
Xi, consistent with assumption (6).
Figure 3 summarizes the reform’s impact on other subjects of the exam. The height of each
bar is analogous to ρexam in Figure 2; it is the correlation between the socioeconomic index,
Xi, and the normalized subject score listed on the horizontal axis. The reform reduced this
correlation by more than 50 percent in both math and physics, with more modest declines
in other subjects. Yet for all subjects, the reform led to a sharp and meaningful decrease in
the correlation of exam scores with SES.23
23 Appendix Table A6 shows that SES/exam score correlation also declines when I consider the average
exam score across all subjects. This finding also holds for different definitions of the socioeconomic index,
Xi, including one based only on mother’s education and one defined using only the 1998 exam cohort (instead
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Figure 3. SES/exam score correlation by subject
Notes: The height of each bar is the coefficient, ρexam, from the linear regression of normalized math scores, τit, on
the socioeconomic index, Xi, for each exam cohort and subject. See Section A.3 for details on the subjects included
in the pre- and post-reform exams.
In sum, low SES students scored relatively higher on the post-reform exam, and high
SES students scored correspondingly lower. Although this result suggests that the testing
agency achieved its goal of designing an admission exam with less socioeconomic bias, it
raises an additional question: what characteristics did the new exam measure? A second
objective of the reform was to design a better measure of the competencies that predict
success in college, but a decrease in the correlation of scores with SES could arise if the new
exam simply contained more measurement error. Appendix A.4 explores the characteristics
measured by the pre- and post-reform exams by taking advantage of the fact that a small
number of students took both tests. It shows that the post-reform exam is a better predictor
of these students’ college outcomes once one controls for socioeconomic characteristics.24
Thus the evidence is consistent with both of the major stated objectives of the overhaul: the
redesigned exam led to a dramatic reduction in the correlation of admission scores and SES
without substantially reducing its predictive power for college success.




This section shows that the exam reform described in Section 3 caused a decrease in
student/college assortative matching in some regions of Colombia. I first define a set of
“treated” regions in which the reform was ex ante more likely to affect allocation of students
to colleges because the national exam plays a larger role in admissions. Then, I show that the
reform led to a reduction in assortativity in treated regions relative to other regions, with low
SES students displacing high SES students at top colleges. Finally, I discuss other potential
confounding effects of the exam reform and provide evidence that the primary effect was
a reduction in assortativity. This sets up a natural experiment that allows me to explore
how a decrease in region-wide assortative matching affects human capital accumulation in
Sections 5 and 6.
4.1. Definition of treated and control regions. I identify the exam reform’s effects on
assortativity by exploiting two features of the Colombian college system that create regional
variation in the stakes of the national exam.
First, most of Colombia’s large administrative regions have a flagship public university that
is a major player in the local market.25 College attendance is highly regional, and in some
cases the flagship school enrolls more than one-third of all area college students. Flagships
are substantially less expensive than comparable private universities and give large tuition
discounts to low-income students. Since financial aid markets are underdeveloped, the local
flagship is often the only top college available to low SES students. As a result, flagship
universities are the most selective colleges in the country. For example, the flagship university
in Bogotá, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, typically admits less than ten percent of
applicants, while the top private college, Universidad de Los Andes, has an admission rate
near 50 percent.
The second relevant feature of the Colombia college system is that flagship universities
control their own admission criteria. The majority of flagships admit students solely based
25 Colombia has 33 administrative departments (departamentos) that I call regions.
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on the national admission exam scores. These colleges compute major-specific weighted
averages of the national exam subject scores and admit the highest ranking students up to
a predetermined quota. Other flagships, however, require applicants to take the university’s
own exam, and some also consider high school grades or personal interviews. For example,
Universidad Nacional de Colombia administers its own entrance exam, while Universidad
del Valle, the flagship school in Cali, uses only national exam scores for admission.
I classify Colombia’s 33 administrative regions as treated or control depending on the
pre-reform admission method of their flagship university. For this I collected data on the
pre-reform admission methods at each flagship university from historical websites and student
regulations.26 Black dots in Figure 4 represent cities with a flagship university that uses only
national exam scores for admissions. White dots are cities in which the flagship uses its own
entrance exam or other admissions criteria. Treated regions have flagships with national
exam admissions and are shaded red in Figure 4. The light-colored control regions are
those with other flagship admission methods. I define treatment for the sparsely-populated
southeastern regions with no universities using the closest flagship to their capital city.27
Table 1 displays summary statistics for pre-reform college enrollees in the 22 treated and
11 control regions. Both areas have about 90,000 enrollees per year, but control regions
have more colleges per student. Students in treated regions are more likely to attend public
colleges, while control students are more likely to enroll in technical schools or institutes
rather than universities.
The bottom of Table 1 shows how the features of the Colombian college system described
above are useful for identification. Most students attend college in their own region, including
57 percent of treated students and 84 percent of control students. Flagship universities in
both areas enroll a large fraction of all students, but there is substantial variation in exposure
to flagships that use the national exam. Nearly one-third of treated students attend national
exam admission flagships, compared with just two percent of control students.
26 Appendix A.5 provides details on the flagship universities, data sources, and admission methods.
27 Bogotá is its own administrative region. Figure 4 does not display the island region of San Andrés y
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Figure 4. Definition of treated and control regions in Colombia
Notes: Dots represent flagship universities. Treated regions (in red) are those with flagships that use only the
national exam scores for admissions (black dots). Control regions (in light yellow) are those with flagships that use
other admission methods (white dots). Bogotá, which is its own administrative region, is a control region. The map
does not show the island region of San Andrés y Providencia, which I define as a control region. I define treatment
for regions with no universities using the closest flagship to their capital city. See Appendix A.5 for details.




Colleges in region 111 185
College enrollees/year 89,143 89,098
Enrolled in a public college 0.51 0.37
Enrolled in technical school/institute 0.21 0.36
Enrolled in region 0.57 0.84
Enrolled in any flagship university 0.33 0.16
Enrolled in national exam flagship 0.31 0.02
Notes: See Figure 4 and Appendix A.5 for the definitions of flagship universities and treated/control regions. The
number of college enrollees per year is the average number calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
The combination of regional markets and decentralized flagship admissions creates geo-
graphic variation in the potential impact of the national exam reform. The exam redesign
was ex ante more likely to affect college admissions in treated regions, where flagship univer-
sities with national exam admissions comprise a large fraction of the market. The new exam
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altered the ranking of students in flagship admission pools and thus had the potential to
alter the type of students received by many colleges in the region. The new ranking mattered
less at flagship universities that used their own exams, so the reform was less likely to affect
college admissions throughout control region markets.
4.2. Effects on assortativity. I use a differences in differences specification to show that
the exam reform reduced market-wide assortative matching in treated regions relative to
other areas of the country. My specification differs from a standard differences in differences
analysis in that it measures changes in a slope coefficient rather than changes in a level.
Specifically, the goal is to measure the reform’s effects on the correlation of SES with college
quality, represented by the coefficient ρ from equation (4) in Section 2. This specification
follows Card and Krueger (1996), who ask how state-level policies affect another slope—the
return to education.
To provide intuition for this specification, it is useful to consider a two-step regression
procedure. The first step is modified version of the equation that defines assortativity:
(16) Wc = γrt + ρrtXi + uicrt,
Wc is the observable quality of college c, defined as its average admission exam score using
the two pre-reform cohorts in my data (1998–1999). Xi is the socioeconomic index defined
in Section 3.3, which is individual i’s expected pre-reform admission exam score given her
background characteristics. γrt are fixed effects for cells defined by region r and admission
exam cohort t. I define region as the administrative department in which a student attended
high school, and I include the 1998–2001 exam cohorts. uicrt is the residual. This equation is
analogous to equation (4) except it calculates a different value of assortativity, ρrt, for each
region and exam cohort.
The second step compares changes in the assortativity parameters across cohorts and
across treated and control regions:
(17) ρrt = γr + γt + βρδrt + ert.
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The regression includes region dummies, γr, cohort dummies, γt, and a residual, ert. The
coefficient of interest, βρ, is on the variable δrt, which is an indicator equal to one for
graduates from high schools in treated regions and post-reform cohorts (2000–2001). δrt
equals zero for all pre-reform cohorts (1998–1999) and for all graduates from control regions.
The coefficient βρ measures how the change in assortativity, ρ, between the pre- and post-
reform cohorts in treated region compares to that in control regions.
I estimate a single-step specification that is derived by plugging equation (17) into (16):
(18) Wc = γrt + (γr + γt + βρδrt)Xi + eicrt.
Equation (18) is a differences in differences regression on the slope ρ rather than on a level.
Since bothWc andXi are normalized to mean zero and standard deviation one, the coefficient
βρ captures the differential change in the correlation of SES and college quality in treated
and control regions. I cluster standard errors in all regressions at the region level.28
Since the exam overhaul reduced the correlation of scores with observable characteristics,
Xi, the main prediction is βρ < 0; the reform should reduce the correlation of Xi with
college quality, Wc, in treated regions relative to control regions. This corresponds to the
“first-stage” assumption (7) in Section 2.
Figure 5 plots coefficients from an event-study version of equation (18), which calculates
separate coefficients βρt for each exam cohort t. The horizontal axis shows the four exam co-
horts, and the vertical axis displays the βρt coefficients. The regression omits the interaction
between the treatment variable δrt and the dummy for 1999 graduates; this sets βρ1999 = 0
and makes all other coefficients relative to the 1999 cohort. The identification assumption is
parallel trends in treated and control regions in the counterfactual outcomes absent the re-
form. This implies that the pre-reform coefficients (1998–1999) should be similar, while sharp
changes in outcomes for the post-reform cohorts (2000–2001) support a causal interpretation
of my results.
28Appendix Table A9 shows that my main results are robust to the wild t bootstrap procedure recommended
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Figure 5. Exam reform effects on assortativity
Notes: This figure plots event study coefficients βρt from equation (18), with the interaction between the treatment
variable δrt and the dummy for 1999 graduates as the omitted group. Dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals using
standard errors clustered at the region level.
There is little evidence of differential pre-trends in assortativity in the two cohorts before
the reform. The average difference in ρ between treated and control regions is only 0.005
smaller in 1998 than it is in 1999, and this difference is not statistically significant. In 2000,
the first year of the new exam, the correlation between student and college traits falls sharply
in treated regions relative to control regions. By the 2001 cohort, the gap between treated
and control correlations is more than 0.03 points lower it was in 1999. In other words,
assortative matching of students and colleges—as defined by pre-reform characteristics—fell
in treated regions relative to control regions.
Table 3 presents regression estimates analogous to Figure 5. Column (A) depicts the
benchmark estimate of βρ from equation (18). The point estimate suggests that the exam
reform led to a 0.025 point decrease in the correlation of SES and college quality in treated
regions relative to control regions.
The remaining columns of Table 3 report results using different definitions of assortativity.
Column (B) is identical to column (A), except it defines the dependent variable, Wc, as the
average pre-reform admission exam score at the college-major level rather than the college
level. This reflects the fact that in Colombia admissions are to college-major pairs. Thus
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Table 3. Exam reform effects on assortativity
Dependent variable: College quality (Wc)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Definition of Definition of
observable characteristics treated & control regions
Wc defined Xi defined Closest Pre-reform
Treated regions and Benchmark at college- by mother flagship to enrollment
cohorts (δrt) × . . . specification major level edu. only municip. in municip.
Socioeconomic index (Xi) −0.025∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
N 714,071 714,071 714,071 714,071 714,071
R2 0.256 0.279 0.118 0.270 0.270
# regions 33 33 33 33 33
Mean assortativity 0.429 0.496 0.171 0.437 0.437
Notes: The table reports estimates of βρ from equation (18). Regressions in columns (D) and (E) replace region
fixed effects with municipality fixed effects. See the text for descriptions of the variables in each column. Parentheses
contain standard errors clustered at the region level. Mean assortativity is calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
it is possible that the exam reform led to changes in the distribution of students’ majors
in addition to changes in the distribution of their colleges. Columns (A) and (B) show
that the effects of the reform on assortativity are similar using the college and college-major
definitions of quality. Further, Appendix Table A7 shows that when I defineWc at the major
level only, the analogous coefficient is not statistically different from zero. This suggests that
the primary effect of the exam reform was a change in the schools students attended rather
than a change in their majors.29
Column (C) presents results using a different definition of the socioeconomic index, Xi.
The benchmark regression in column (A) defines Xi as the mean pre-reform admission score
in cells defined by mother’s education, gender, and indicators for a student’s high school.
This gives a finely grained measure of an individual’s socioeconomic status. In column (C),
29 This result contrasts with the finding in Kirkebøen, Leuven and Mogstad (2016) that the earning returns
to college-major pairs are primarily driven by major effects. One potential explanation for this result is
a difference between the higher education markets in Norway—the setting for the Kirkebøen, Leuven and
Mogstad (2016) paper—and Colombia. Anecdotally, the Colombian higher education system features greater
variation in college reputation, while colleges in Norway differ less in their perceived rankings. The results
in this paper also align with those in MacLeod et al. (2015), who find similar effects of the introduction of
a Colombian college exit exam using college and college-major definitions of school reputation.
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I define Xi simply as a dummy for whether a student’s mother has a secondary education.30
The effects on assortativity are similar to those in the benchmark specification. This shows
that the reform led to changes in distribution of college quality using even a rudimentary
definition of SES; however, the more finely grained measure of Xi is useful for analyzing the
distribution of outcomes below.
Columns (D) and (E) show that the effects on assortativity are robust to different defi-
nitions of treated and control regions. The benchmark specification defines the treatment
variable, δrt, by whether or not the flagship university in the region where a student attended
high school uses only the national exam score for admissions. Column (D) defines treatment
instead using the closest flagship university to a students’ municipality. This reflects the
fact some students are likely to attend college out-of-region if their high school is close to
a major city in a different region. The first stage effects on assortativity are similar us-
ing this more granular definition of treatment.31 Column (E) also uses a municipality-level
definition of δrt, but it is even more granular in that it allows for different intensities of
treatment. Treatment is defined using the fraction of pre-reform college students from each
municipality who enrolled in a flagship university using national exam admissions.32 The
effects of the reform on assortativity are slightly stronger using this intensity of treatment
variable. Nonetheless, the similarity of the coefficients in columns (A) and (E) suggests that
the benchmark specification captures the first order effects of the exam reform.
4.3. Alternative hypotheses. This section considers other effects of the exam overhaul,
and it argues that these alternative hypotheses are less likely to impact students’ human
capital accumulation than the reduction in assortativity.
30 I normalize this dummy to standard deviation one to make the coefficient in column (C) comparable to
those in others columns.
31 The regressions in columns (D) and (E) of Table 3 replace the region-level fixed effects in specification
(18) with municipality-level fixed effects.
32 Specifically, in column (E) δrt equals zero for all pre-reform cohorts, and for post-reform cohorts it equals
the fraction of college enrollees from the 1998–1999 cohorts in municipality r who enrolled in a flagship that
used only national exam scores for admissions. I normalize δrt to be mean zero and standard deviation 0.5,
which is approximately equal to the standard deviation of δrt in the benchmark specification. This makes
the coefficients in columns (A) and (E) comparable in magnitude.
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The key assumption for Proposition 1 is that the distributions of academic ability, Ai,
and college quality, Qc, are stable across exam cohorts. Instability of the academic ability
distribution may arise if the reform affected the probability that students enrolled in any
college, or if it induced them to retake or study harder for the exam. Instability of the college
quality distribution could arise if the number of students enrolling in each college changed
with the reform, which could stem from changes in school quotas or if students selected
colleges outside of their region.
To explore these alternative hypotheses, I use a standard differences in differences spec-
ification. This specification is identical to the second step regression (17), but it considers
other dependent variables, yirt:
(19) yirt = γr + γt + βδrt + eirt.
As above, this regression includes both region r and cohort t dummies, and the treatment
variable, δrt, is equal to one for graduates from high schools in treated regions and post-reform
cohorts. The coefficient of interest, β, measures the differential change in the outcome yirt
between treated and control region. I also estimate a specification that fully interacts the
right-hand side of equation (19) with dummies for quartiles q of the advantaged index, Xi.
This yields separate coefficients βq for students from different quartiles of the socioeconomic
distribution.33
Table 6 presents estimates of β and βq for dependent variables that correspond to other
potential effects of the exam reform. Each column of the table reports coefficients from two
different regressions. The top row shows estimates of β from the standard differences in
differences regression (19). The bottom four rows present estimates of βq from the version
with fully-interacted dummies for quartiles q of the socioeconomic index.
Column (A) in Table 6 shows that the primary effect of the reform was on where students
went to college, not whether they went to college. This regression expands the sample to
33 The coefficients βq are identical to those that would be obtained by estimating equation (19) separately
for each quartile q.
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Table 4. Alternative hypotheses
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Dependent variable
Enrolled Graduating Enrolled Kilometers Enrolled
Treated regions and in any from HS within between HS in different
cohorts (δrt) × . . . college this cohort one year & college region
All students −0.004 0.001 −0.001 −3.815 −0.014∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (3.082) (0.008)
Xi top quartile −0.019 −0.007 −0.005 −1.294 0.003
(0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (3.452) (0.009)
Xi quartile 3 −0.003 0.009 0.012 −7.178∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (2.537) (0.008)
Xi quartile 2 0.008 0.010 0.004 −8.222∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (3.313) (0.008)
Xi bottom quartile −0.000 −0.008 0.013 −2.037 −0.026∗
(0.007) (0.012) (0.023) (7.517) (0.013)
N 1,878,799 714,071 714,071 714,071 714,071
# regions 33 33 33 33 33
Dependent var. mean 0.358 0.790 0.426 82.734 0.298
Notes: The top row reports estimates of β from equation (19). The bottom four rows report βq coefficients from
a version of (19) that is fully interacted with dummies for quartiles q of the socioeconomic index, Xi. The column
header shows the dependent variable for each regression. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the region
level. Dependent variable means are calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
include all exam takers—not just those who attended college—and the dependent variable
is an indicator equal to one if a student attended any college in my records. The estimated
effect on any college enrollment is small and insignificant for the full sample, and there are
no statistically significant effects on the probability of college enrollment in any quartile
of the socioeconomic index, Xi. One explanation for this is that my instrument primarily
affects admission to selective schools, and Colombian college markets have a large, open-
enrollment sector where students can enroll if they are not admitted to top colleges. It is
also parallels the findings in research on other large-scale admission policies that primarily
affect admission to selective colleges. For example, other work has found that affirmative
action bans (Hinrichs, 2012) and percent plan admission rules (Daugherty, Martorell and
McFarlin, 2014) have little effect on the extensive margin of college enrollment.
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Columns (B) and (C) show that the reform had little effect on students’ likelihood of
repeating the exam or delaying their enrollment into college. The dependent variable in
column (B) is an indicator equal to one for students who took the exam in their year of
high school graduation. The dependent variable in column (C) is a dummy equal to one
for students who enrolled in college within one year of taking the admission exam. There
are no statistically significant effects on the average or distribution of these variables, which
suggests that the reform did not substantial alter the probability that students retook the
exam or delayed their college enrollment.
By contrast, columns (D) and (E) present evidence that the reform had some effects on
student mobility. Column (D) shows no average effect on the distance between students’ high
schools and colleges, but there was a reduction in this distance for students in the middle
of the socioeconomic distribution. This pattern is similar when I use a dependent variable
equal to one for students who attended college in a region different from that of their high
school (column (E)), although in this case the full-population coefficient is also marginally
significant. In both cases, there is evidence the reform may have induced some students to
attend college closer to home.
The results in columns (D) and (E) raise the concern that there may have differential
changes in average college quality across treated and control regions. To explore this fur-
ther, Table 5 shows the effect of the reform on four different measures of college quality:
my primary measure of quality, Wc, which is the average pre-reform admission score at each
college (column (A)); an indicator equal to one for colleges in the top ten percent of Wc (col-
umn (B)); an indicator for whether an institution offers university-level training as opposed
to technical training (column (C)); and an indicator for colleges that are selective, meaning
that they have more applicants than slots (column (D)).34 The top row shows that for the
full population of college enrollees, there were no statistically significant changes in average
college quality across all dependent variables. This suggests that even if the reform affected
34 Specifically, selective colleges are those for whom the number of applicants exceeded the number of offered
slots in a 2002 report from the testing agency entitled Estadísticas de la Educación Superior. I could not
find information on the number of slots in a pre-reform year.
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Table 5. Distribution of college quality
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Dependent variable
College College University-
Treated regions and quality in the top level Selective
cohorts (δrt) × . . . (Wc) Wc decile institution college
All students 0.006 −0.005 −0.009 0.022
(0.021) (0.003) (0.007) (0.017)
Xi top quartile −0.023 −0.010∗ −0.019∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.024) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019)
Xi quartile 3 0.032 0.005 −0.001 0.027
(0.023) (0.003) (0.009) (0.018)
Xi quartile 2 0.046∗ −0.000 0.007 0.044∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.002) (0.009) (0.014)
Xi bottom quartile 0.050∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 0.041∗∗
(0.017) (0.002) (0.009) (0.017)
N 714,071 714,071 714,071 714,071
# regions 33 33 33 33
Dependent var. mean −0.000 0.101 0.715 0.476
Notes: The top row reports estimates of β from equation (19). The bottom four rows report βq coefficients from
a version of (19) that is fully interacted with dummies for quartiles q of the socioeconomic index, Xi. The column
header shows the dependent variable for each regression. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the region
level. Dependent variable means are calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
student mobility, it did not have a substantial effect on the average change in college quality
across regions.
By contrast, the bottom four rows of Table 5 show that the reform affected the allocation
of college quality across students. Although not all effects are statistically significant, there
is a consistent pattern that the reform decreased the quality of colleges attended by the
highest SES students in treated regions. Correspondingly, average college quality increased
for treated region students with the lowest values of the socioeconomic index. This result
shows that the changes in assortativity documented in Figure 5 and Table 3 hold for other
measures of college quality.
In sum, the results from Tables 6 and 5 suggest that the exam reform did not have sub-
stantial effects on the distribution of academic ability, and though there is some evidence of
student mobility responses, these effects did not lead to average changes in college quality
44
across regions. Further, the strongest effects on mobility occur in the middle of the SES
distribution, whereas the strongest effects on the allocation of college quality arise for the
highest and lowest values of Xi. Taken together, these results suggest that the first order ef-
fect of the exam reform—at least for the highest and lowest SES students—was a reallocation
of college quality, rather than a change in its aggregate value.
5. Human capital results
This section shows that the reduction in assortativity from the Colombian exam reform
led to a region-wide reduction in graduation rates and post-college earnings. Further, I show
that these negative effects are driven by both the highest SES and the lowest SES students,
with the latter result providing evidence of college mismatch. Finally, I discuss implications
for Propositions 1 and 2 from the framework: the results reveal a positive complementarity
between SES and college quality, and they provide mixed support for the validity of the
“conditional on observables” assumption in the mismatch literature.
5.1. Graduation and earnings effects of the reform. I use the standard differences
in differences specification (19) to measure the effect of the reform on different measures
of human capital accumulation, Yirt. The β coefficient from this regression corresponds to
the average reallocation effect from equation (8) in Section 2. This measures the average
market-wide change in human capital in treated regions relative to control regions.
Figure 6 displays event-study coefficients βt for several measures of human capital. These
graphs are analogous to Figure 5, but they come from event-study versions of equation
(19) rather than equation (18). Panels A and B use measures of college completion as
outcome variables: persistence and graduation. Panel A shows that the probability of being
enrolled in college one year after entry changes little across regions between the 1998 and
1999 cohorts, but it falls sharply in the first year of the exam reform. Persistence rates
fell by about 1.5 percentage points among the 2000–2001 cohorts in treated regions relative
to control students. Panel B shows a similar pattern and magnitude for graduation rates.
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Panel D. Log daily earnings, 11 years later
Figure 6. Persistence, graduation, and earnings
Notes: This figure plots event study coefficients βt from equation (19), with the interaction between the treatment
variable δrt and the dummy for 1999 graduates as the omitted group. Dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals using
standard errors clustered at the region level.
regions to drop out of college within the first year, and this effect remained stable through
college graduation.
Panels C and D present analogous results using log daily earnings as the dependent vari-
able. Panel C uses earnings measured ten years after students took the admission exam, and
Panel D shows earnings eleven years after the exam.35 The earnings results mirror those for
college completion. There are no statistically different changes between treated and control
35 I observe earnings in 2008–2012, so ten and eleven years post-exam are the two years for which I observe
earnings for all four cohorts. Appendix Table A8 shows that the reform had little effect on the probability
of being employed in the formal sector.
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Table 6. Persistence, graduation, and earnings
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Dependent variable
Enrolled Graduated Log daily Log daily
Treated regions and one year from earnings, earnings,
cohorts (δrt) × . . . after entry college 10 yrs later 11 yrs later
All students −0.014∗∗ −0.014∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.013∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Xi top quartile −0.017∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.016∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Xi quartile 3 −0.010 −0.004 −0.002 0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
Xi quartile 2 −0.006 −0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Xi bottom quartile −0.022∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.013∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
N 714,071 714,071 354,034 361,044
# regions 33 33 33 33
Dependent var. mean 0.649 0.394 10.269 10.374
Notes: The top row reports estimates of β from equation (19). The bottom four rows report βq coefficients from
a version of (19) that is fully interacted with dummies for quartiles q of the socioeconomic index, Xi. The column
header shows the dependent variable for each regression. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the region
level. Dependent variable means are calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
regions from 1998 to 1999, although there is a slightly larger pre-trend in Panel D. Earnings
decline by about one percent in the 2000 treated cohort relative to control students, and this
gap widens further in 2001. These results suggest that the negative effects of reallocation on
students’ college competition also affect their labor market outcomes.
Table 6 presents regression estimates for these four measures of human capital accumu-
lation. This table has the same structure as Tables 6 and 5. The top row displays the
estimate of β from equation (19), which gives the regression analog of the results in Figure
6. The magnitudes of the full-population treatment effects are similar across all outcome
variables, with 1.4 percentage point declines in persistence and graduation rates, and 1.4
percent reductions in earnings.
The bottom four rows of Table 6 show estimates of βq, which come from a version of
equation (19) that is fully interacted with dummies for quartiles q of the socioeconomic index,
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Xi. This specification yields reallocation effects for individuals with different socioeconomic
backgrounds, and it corresponds to equation (14) in Section 2. The results suggest that the
market-level declines in human capital accumulation are driven by students both at the top
and bottom of the SES distribution. Persistence and graduation rates fall by more than
two percentage points for treated students relative to control students in the top quartile of
Xi. The decline in college completion is similar in magnitude for the lowest SES students
in treated regions, although it is larger in percentage terms as these students are less likely
to finish college. Both the top and bottom quartile students experience roughly 1.5 percent
declines in earnings relative to control students.
5.2. Implications for Proposition 1. Proposition 1 states that a change in assortativ-
ity should have no effect on market-level human capital unless there is a complementarity
between student and college characteristics. The results in Figure 6 and the top row of
Table 6 provide clear evidence that the reallocation of student/college matches can affect
market-wide human capital accumulation. Thus they are consistent with the existence of a
complementarity between students and colleges.
The key assumption necessary to interpret these results as evidence of a complementarity
is that the distributions of academic ability and college quality are not affected by the reform.
Tables 6 and 5 provide support for this assumption, but the main outstanding consideration
is that the reform altered peer composition at colleges. If peer effects are important for
students’ human capital accumulation, the graduation and earnings effects may be due to
changes in peer composition rather than a student/college complementarity.36
There are two arguments that suggest peer effects are not completely driving the declines
in human capital accumulation. First, peer effects must take a complicated functional form
in order to explain the full pattern of my results. As shown in Table 1, strictly linear peer
effects—in the spirit of Epple and Romano (1998b)—would lead to a zero reallocation effect,
as any gains to some students are exactly offset by losses to other students. Furthermore,
36 Peer effects may be broadly thought of as a consequence of the match between a student and her college,
but it is not strictly a complementarity according to my definition in Section 2.
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Table 6 shows that both low SES and high SES students experienced negative human capital
effects even though the reform led to opposite changes in their peer quality.37 Thus peer
effects must be oppositely-signed for low SES and high SES students in order to explain the
effects of the reform.
Second, Appendix Table A10 presents an additional analysis that argues against a model
of pure peer effects. This analysis exploits the fact that some high SES students choose to
attend lower-ranked schools even when they could be admitted to top colleges. I use pre-
reform characteristics to divide high SES students into two types: those who were likely to
choose top colleges, and those who were likely to choose lower-ranked colleges. I first show
that the former group of students experience changes in both college quality and peer quality
as a result of the reform, while the latter group experienced only changes in peer quality.
I then show that the negative graduation and earnings effects are primarily driven by the
students who saw changes in both college and peer quality. This suggests that, at least
for high SES students, peer effects cannot fully explain my results, and it provides further
support for the existence of a complementarity between student and colleges characteristics.
5.3. Implications for Proposition 2. Proposition 2 contains predictions about the sign of
the student/college complementarity under a key assumption from work on college mismatch.
The best existing evidence for mismatch assumes that students and colleges are randomly
matched conditional on their observable characteristics, as discussed in Section 2.5. Under
this assumption, Proposition 2 shows that the student/college complementarity is positive
in the Colombian context, and thus the reduction in assortativity should lower market-wide
graduation rates and earnings. However, this assumption also implies that there should also
be no mismatch from the Colombian reform, as the observed pre-reform return to college is
positive for all students.
37 Average peer quality as defined by pre-reform exam scores increased for low SES students and decreased
for high SES students. However, it is possible that these signs are flipped on other dimensions of peer
characteristics.
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To test this “conditional on observables” assumption, I compare the total effects of the
reform, as given by Table 6, to those that would be predicted by distributional changes alone.
I compute this distribution effect in two steps. First, I calculate the average pre-reform
outcome in cells defined by quantiles of the socioeconomic and college quality indices, which
I denote by Ŷic:38
(20) Ŷic = E0[Yic|Xi = x,Wc = w].
Second, I estimate the β and βq coefficients from standard differences in differences regres-
sions that instead use Ŷic as the dependent variable. These estimated coefficients give the
distribution effect of the reform described in Section 2.5, which is the effect from changes in
the distribution of matches holding constant the observable pre-reform match outcomes.
Figure 7 plots the total and distribution effects for log earnings measured ten years after
the admission exam. The black bars show the total effects, which are identical to the β and
βq coefficients from the log earnings regressions in column (C) of Table 6. The lighter red
bars show distribution effects from the above procedure.
The top of Figure 7 shows that the total and distribution earnings effects are similar for
the full population of students. The total effect of the reform was a 1.4 percent reduction
treated region earnings relative to control regions. Distribution changes alone can explain
a one percent reduction. This suggests that complementarity on observed student/college
characteristics is, at least to a first-order, predictive of the aggregate reallocation effects. In
other words, the fact that the observed college quality in Figure 1 increases with SES is not
exclusively due to sorting; top colleges may be partially better prepared to educate high SES
students.
However, the bottom of Figure 7 shows that distribution effects cannot fully explain the
results for different quartiles of the socioeconomic index, Xi. While the total and distribution
effects are similar for the top quartile of Xi, distributional changes alone cannot account for
38 Specifically, I use 40 quantiles of the socioeconomic index, Xi, and ten deciles of observable college quality,
Wc. This yields a 10 × 10 matrix of mean outcomes for each quartile of the socioeconomic index. In this
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Figure 7. Total and distribution effects for log daily earnings, 10 years later
Notes: The black bars plot the point estimates from column (C) in Table 6. The light-red bars plot coefficients
from identical regressions, except the dependent variable is Ŷic as defined by equation (20). In other words, it is the
average log earnings within cells defined by 40 quantiles of the socioeconomic index, Xi, and ten deciles of observable
college quality, Wc, calculate using only the 1998–1999 cohorts.
the mismatch effects observed for the lowest SES students. In particular, distribution effects
predict a small increase in earnings for students in the lowest quartile of Xi, but the reform
actually led to a 1.6 percent decline in earnings for these students.39
Appendix Table A11 shows that the patterns for log earnings in Figure 7 are similar
for college persistence or graduation outcomes.40 Thus the Colombian admission exam re-
form provides mixed support for the “conditional on observables” assumption employed in
mismatch research; this assumption predicts the market-wide impact of the reform to a
first-order level, but it fails to capture the full distribution of effects across SES groups.
There are two takeaways for the results related to Proposition 2. First, they suggest that
observed differences in graduation rates or earnings for similar students at different colleges
may be due in part to selection bias. Exogenous variation in student college matches is
important to test the mismatch hypothesis, as Arcidiacono and Lovenheim (2016) note.41
39 Figure 1 and Figure 7 correspond to slightly different distribution effects because I use a non-parametric
calculation for the estimates in Figure 7.
40 In fact, the distribution effects for persistence and graduation rates are slightly less predictive of the total
effects for the full population of students.
41 Rothstein and Yoon (2008) also make this point in the context of law school admissions.
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My results provide evidence of mismatch effects without relying on the “conditional on
observables” assumption common in other studies in this literature.
Second, it is worth exploring why the mismatch effects in my context may not arise in
papers in the college selectivity literature. This research often finds positive earnings effects
of admission to a selective college for low income students. One potential explanation for this
apparent discrepancy is that the Colombian reform may have led some students to attend
colleges at which they were well below the target teaching level. In selectivity studies, all
admitted students—whether high or low SES—are qualified for admission by the college’s
own academic standards. The Colombian exam reform, by contrast, led to large changes in
the distribution of students’ academic preparation at selective college.42 Thus the reform
may have caused some students to attend colleges at which they would have been deemed
unqualified prior to the reform.
This suggests that mismatch may only arise when students are substantially underpre-
pared for a college’s curriculum. Other contexts that exhibit mismatch have similarly large
differences in students’ incoming academic preparation (e.g, Arcidiacono, Aucejo and Hotz,
2016). Such differences in student preparation are not present in the heterogeneity analyses
of college selectivity papers.
6. Results for later cohorts
This last section shows that the effects of the Colombian admission reform on the SES/exam
score correlation and on assortativity persist beyond the initial cohorts who took the new
exam. However, the negative effects on graduation rates and earnings in treated regions
die out several cohorts after the exam reform—both at the market-level and for low SES
students in particular.
The above results focus on the first two cohorts exposed to the new admission exam
(2000–2001) for three reasons. First, the testing agency stopped collecting data on mother’s
education in subsequent cohorts. Second, my earnings records extend only through 2012,
42 Appendix Figure A7 shows that the exam reform led to a substantial shift in the distribution of pre-reform
academic ability at flagship colleges in treated regions.
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so it is less likely that I observe individuals entering the labor force after college during
my data period.43 Third, students in later cohorts may have chosen different high schools
once information on school-level scores on the new exam became available. This could alter
the distribution of ability reflected in the socioeconomic index, Xi, which raises a potential
threat to identification.44
Nonetheless, the evolution of reallocation effects across cohorts is informative about the
mechanisms that underlie colleges’ contributions to student human capital accumulation.
In this final section I therefore examine the persistence of the above effects beyond the
2000–2001 cohorts. This involves addressing the three questions raised in Section 2.6 of the
framework: 1) Did the exam overhaul’s effects on the distribution of scores persist? 2) Were
the effects on students’ college choices persistent? and 3) Were the human capital outcomes
persistent?
Figure 8 presents evidence related to the first two questions.45 Panel A shows the cor-
relation between the socioeconomic index, Xi, and admission scores for all exam takers in
the 1998–2006 cohorts. This correlation is analogous to those in Figure 3, but I use only
the average exam score across all exam subjects. Further, unlike in previous analyses, Xi is
defined as the average 1998–1999 admission score for cells defined by only gender and high
school; I do not also use mother’s education to define Xi since I do not observe this variable
beginning in 2003. The correlations reported in Figure 8 are relative to that for the 1999
cohort.46
43 The time between high school graduation and college completion is much greater in Colombia than it
is in the U.S. because students often do not enter college right away (Riehl, 2015). Further, most college
programs take five years, and on-time completion rates are low.
44 Students in the 2000–2001 cohorts were already in their final years of high school when the exam overhaul
occurred, and thus it is unlikely that many students switched schools in response to the reform.
45 Appendix Table A12 presents regression estimates corresponding to Figure 8.
46 Specifically, the correlations in Panel A are estimated from a regression of exam scores on the socioeco-
nomic index, Xi, interacted with cohort dummies, with the 1999 cohort as the omitted interaction. This
regression also includes dummies for cohort-region cells and interactions of Xi with region dummies. In
Figure 8, exam scores, Xi, and Wc are also normalized to mean zero and standard deviation one for each
cohort. This ensures that the regression coefficients are equivalent to the correlation coefficients between
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Panel B. Assortativity
Figure 8. Longer term exam score and college quality effects
Notes: Panel A shows results from a regression of average exam scores, τit, on dummies for cohort-region cells,
interactions of the socioeconomic index, Xi, with region dummies, and interactions of Xi with cohort dummies.
The panel plots coefficients from the interaction of Xi with cohort dummies with the 1999 cohort as the omitted
interaction. Panel B plots event study coefficients βρt from equation (18), with the interaction between the treatment
variable δrt and the dummy for 1999 graduates as the omitted group. Dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals using
standard errors clustered at the region level. τit, Wc, and Xi are all normalized to mean zero and standard deviation
one for each cohort.
There is little difference in the correlation of Xi and exam scores in the 1998 and 1999
cohorts, but this correlation falls sharply by roughly 0.1 points for the 2000–2001 cohorts.
This replicates the results in Figure 3. However, Panel A also shows that the reform’s
effect on this correlation persists through the 2006 cohort with only small changes in its
value. This suggests that the exam reform was successful in producing lasting changes in
the distribution of exam scores, and that high SES students were not able to “undo” the
reform’s effects through exam prep or by choosing different high schools.
Panel B examines the persistence of the exam overhaul’s effects on assortativity. This
figure is similar to Panel A, but it reports the correlation of Xi with college quality, Wc,
defined as each college’s mean admission score for 1998–1999 enrollees. Further, Panel B is
analogous to Figure 5 in that it reports event study coefficients from equation (18), which
compares changes in this correlation between treated and control regions. Consistent with
Figure 5, the change assortativity between 1998 and 1999 is similar in treated and control
regions, and this correlation falls sharply for the 2000–2001 cohorts. However, Panel B also
shows that, with the exception of the 2005 cohort, the decline in assortativity in treated
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Figure 9. Longer-term persistence and graduation effects
Notes: This figure plots event study coefficients βt from equation (19) for the three listed dependent variables, with
the interaction between the treatment variable δrt and the dummy for 1999 graduates as the omitted group.
regions relative to control regions persists through 2006. Thus, the exam overhaul also
appears to have had lasting effects on the distribution of student/college matches in treated
regions. This is not surprising given the persistence of the exam score results in Panel A,
since admission to flagship universities in treated regions was based purely on national exam
scores.
The final question is whether the effects of the decline in assortativity on students’ human
capital accumulation are also persistent. Figure 9 analyzes students’ shorter-term college
success using outcomes that I can cleanly define given the time horizon of my data. Specifi-
cally, it examines whether students are still enrolled in college one year after entry, whether
they are enrolled three years after entry, and whether they graduated college within six
years of taking the admission exam. The graph displays event study coefficients analogous
to Figure 6, with the 1999 cohort as the omitted group.
The pattern of coefficients is strikingly different from those in Figure 8. As in Figure 6,
there are sharp declines in outcomes for the 2000–2001 cohorts in treated regions relative
to control regions, but these decreases begin to fade out in the 2002 cohort. In the 2004–
2006 cohorts the effects for all three outcomes are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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Thus while the exam overhaul appears to have generated a lasting effect on student/college
assortativity, the negative effects of this reallocation on students’ college outcomes appear
to die out after several cohorts.
Table 7 reports regression estimates analogous to the results in Figure 9. The regressions
for this table are similar to the benchmark differences in differences regression (19), but they
include the 1998–2006 cohorts and calculate separate treatment effects for three post-reform
cohort groups.47 Columns (A)–(C) use the three outcomes from Figure 9 as dependent
variables. The dependent variable for column (D) is log daily earnings. The regression in
column (D) is more complicated because my earnings records cover only five years, which
means I cannot measure earnings at the same time since the admission exam for all 1998–
2006 cohorts. To address this, the regression in column (D) includes earnings measured at
any “experience” level from six to 11 years after the admission exam, and it interacts all
control variables with experience dummies. This ensures that the reported coefficients are
identified only from variation in earnings with the same experience level.48
The top panel of Table 7 shows estimates for the full population of college enrollees. In the
2000–2001 cohorts, there are market-wide declines in persistence rates, graduation rates, and
post-college earnings in treated regions relative to control regions. This is consistent with
the findings in Table 6. However, these negative effects begin to die out in the 2002–2003
cohorts, and by the 2004–2006 cohorts the point estimates are near zero and not statistically
significant.
47 The full specification for this regression is:
Yirt = γr + γt + β00−01δr,00−01 + β02−03δr,02−03 + β04−06δr,04−06 + eirt,
where, for example, δr,00−01 is an indicator equal to one for the 2000–2001 cohorts in treated regions.
48 The full specification for column (D) is
Yirte = γre + γte + β00−01δr,00−01 + β02−03δr,02−03 + β04−06δr,04−06 + uirte,
where e ∈ {6–11} denotes the number of years since the admission exam. Note that in this regression,
treatment effects for the 2004–2006 cohorts are estimated using earnings measured six to eight years after
the admission exam, when not all students had completed college.
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Table 7. Persistence, graduation, and earnings in later cohorts
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Dependent variable
Enrolled Enrolled Graduated
one year three years six years Log daily
Treated regions × . . .× . . . after entry after entry after exam earnings
2000−2001 cohorts −0.013∗∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.011 −0.012∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
All students 2002−2003 cohorts −0.011 −0.009 −0.008 −0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
2004−2006 cohorts −0.001 0.000 −0.002 −0.004
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
2000−2001 cohorts −0.015∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Xi top quartile 2002−2003 cohorts −0.011 −0.014 −0.021∗∗ −0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013)
2004−2006 cohorts −0.003 −0.008 −0.019∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.017) (0.016) (0.007) (0.013)
2000−2001 cohorts −0.023∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.006 −0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Xi bottom quartile 2002−2003 cohorts −0.015∗ −0.005 0.008 −0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016)
2004−2006 cohorts −0.003 0.011 0.013 −0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015)
N 1,332,751 1,332,751 1,332,751 1,812,004
# regions 33 33 33 33
Dependent var. mean 0.649 0.554 0.111 10.294
Notes: The sample includes all college enrollees from the 1998–2006 exam cohorts. The top panel displays estimates
of the β coefficients from the regression in footnote 47 for columns (A)–(C), and from the regression in footnote 48 for
column (D). The bottom two panels display estimates from analogous regressions in which all control variables and
coefficients are interacted with dummies for quartiles q of the socioeconomic index, Xi. Parentheses contain standard
errors clustered at the region level. Dependent variable means are calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The bottom two panels of Table 7 show analogous estimates for students in the top and
bottom quartiles of the socioeconomic index, Xi.49 For the 2000–2001 cohorts, the negative
49 The estimates for both of these bottom panels come from a single regression that interacts the specification
for the top panel with dummies for quartiles of Xi. To save space, I omit coefficients for the middle two Xi
quartiles from Table 7; almost all of these coefficients are near zero and statistically insignificant.
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effects on graduation and earnings outcomes mirror those in Table 6, although not all esti-
mates are statistically significant.50 With only one exception, these effects also fade toward
zero in subsequent cohorts.
In sum, the results suggest that while the Colombian exam reform had a lasting impact on
the distribution of test scores and the assortativity of student/college matches, its negative
effects on graduation rates and earnings disappear after several cohorts. Six cohorts after the
reform, there are no longer differences between treated and control regions in market-wide
human capital measures. Further, there are few significant differences in these outcomes for
either high SES or low SES students.
As discussed in Section 2.6, these findings suggest that time invariant mechanisms cannot
fully explain how colleges affect student outcomes. For example, they are inconsistent with
colleges providing an unchanging value added, or with graduation rates that depend purely on
class rank. Instead, these results suggest that colleges can adapt to changes in their student
bodies, perhaps by altering curricula or support services. Students may also respond to their
new college types by increasing effort.
More broadly, these findings suggest that complementarity and mismatch are not fixed
concepts. The negative effects for initially-exposed cohorts suggest that there can be adjust-
ment costs to admission reform, but over time students or colleges may be able to take steps
to address any resulting gaps in academic preparation. Further, my results suggest that find-
ings in the college selectivity literature, which analyzes effects for marginal applicants, may
not extend to settings with large-scale changes in the distribution of student/college matches.
My results suggest that the nature of school quality can evolve with the composition of a
college’s student body.
50 Unlike Table 6, not all of negative effects for the 2000–2001 cohorts in Table 7 are statistically significant.
There are three reasons for this: 1) the dependent variable definitions are somewhat different; 2) I cannot
use mother’s education to define the socioeconomic index, Xi, for Table 7; and 3) I restrict the sample for
Table 7 to students taking the admission exam in the year of their high school graduation.
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7. Conclusion
A growing literature on college selectivity finds that, at least for certain individuals, at-
tending a more selective college can lead to better career prospects (e.g., Dale and Krueger,
2002a; Hoekstra, 2009a). This work helps to explain why students and parents expend a
great deal of energy on college admissions (Ramey and Ramey, 2010), as it addresses the
salient question of whether college choice matters from an individual’s perspective.
This paper has instead explored the consequences of college assignment from amarket-level
perspective. Specifically, it asked whether the matching of students to colleges can affect
average outcomes across an entire college market. This follows in a long line of research on
how the distribution of matches impacts aggregate outcomes (e.g., Gale and Shapley, 1962;
Becker, 1973; Crawford and Knoer, 1981; Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak and Roth, 2005).
A market-level focus raises issues distinct from those that are relevant to a college-bound
individual. One must examine the full distribution of students and colleges, not just stu-
dents on the margin of admission at selective colleges. Further, one must allow for general
equilibrium effects of college choice; the selectivity literature reasonably assumes that college
quality is unaffected by marginal changes in a school’s admitted student body, but larger-
scale changes in class composition may alter the mechanisms through which college quality
affects outcomes. Finally, one may consider the possibility of an equity/efficiency trade off
in college admissions (Durlauf, 2008); for example, does the allocation of selective college
slots to disadvantaged students raise or lower the total productivity of a higher education
system?
This paper has used data and a natural experiment from Colombia to provide evidence
on the market-level consequences of the assignment of students to colleges. It analyzed a
major reform of the national college admission exam in 2000, which led to higher scores for
low SES students and thus relatively lower scores for high SES students. In certain regions,
the reduction in the SES/exam score correlation led to market-wide decline in assortative
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matching on family and school resources, with some low SES students replacing high SES
individuals at top colleges.
In the first two cohorts after the reform, market-wide graduation rates and post-college
earnings fell in affected regions, with part of these declines coming from the lowest SES
students who were shifted into higher quality colleges. These findings are consistent with
a positive complementarity between socioeconomic status and college quality in the pro-
duction of human capital outcomes, and they suggest that mismatch can arise in college
assignment. This mirrors the finding in Arcidiacono, Aucejo and Hotz (2016) that science
graduation rates would have been higher—for both minority students and for the University
of California college system as a whole—in the absence of affirmative action policies. This
paper extends these results to an entire college market and to labor market earnings after
college completion. Further, it shows that this finding holds under weaker assumptions on
the distribution unobservable match characteristics.
The results for initial cohorts suggest that college admission exams play an important
role in matching students to schools at which they can succeed. Admission exams provide
colleges with information on the types of students they are receiving, and thus changes in the
structure of these exams can affect what colleges know about their student bodies. Reforms
to admission systems, such as the 2016 SAT overhaul in the U.S. or the recent movement
among top colleges to de-emphasize entrance exams, may therefore have consequences for
both individual and system-wide outcomes.
However, this paper also showed that the negative effects of the Colombian reform on
graduation rates and earnings died out after several exam cohorts. By the sixth post-
reform cohort, there were no significant differences between affected and unaffected regions
on market- or individual-level human capital outcomes, even while the reform’s effects on
assortativity persisted. Put another way, after several cohorts the return to college quality—
for both high SES and low SES individuals—was zero.
The results for later cohorts suggest that the concepts of mismatch and complementarity
are not set in stone. Colleges may have a comparative advantage in educating certain
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individuals, but these specializations may evolve to fit the backgrounds of their incoming
students. For example, colleges may be able to change their curricula or provide more support
services to help low SES individuals be successful. Such responses mean that the individual
returns to college quality can differ from those that arise under large-scale admission system
reforms.
The malleable nature of student/college complementarity weakens the argument that ad-
mission policies like affirmative action are undesirable because they create mismatch. My
findings suggest that such reforms may come with adjustment costs but do not reduce the
efficiency of a college system in the long run. Although I do not find evidence of equity gains
in the form of higher graduation rates or earnings for low SES students, there may be other
societal benefits to increased diversity (e.g., Rao, 2013; Fisman, Paravisini and Vig, 2016)
that justify attempts to reduce the influence of socioeconomic status in college admissions.
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A. Appendix
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Figure A1. Observed complementarity in persistence and graduation rates
Notes: This figure is identical to Figure 1, except it uses different dependent variables. In Panel A, the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one if a student is still enrolled in college one year after entering. The dependent
variable in Panel B is a dummy equal to one if a student graduated from any college.
A.1. Complementarity on observable characteristics. This section shows that the ob-
served positive complementarity for log earnings documented in Section 2.5 also extends to
other outcomes.
Figure A1 is analogous to Figure 1 in Section 2.5, but it uses different dependent variables.
The dependent variable in Panel A is a dummy equal to one if a student is still enrolled in
college one year after entering. The dependent variable in Panel B is a dummy equal to one
if a student graduated from any college. The patterns in both panels are consistent with the
positive complementarity observed for log earnings in Figure 1.
Table A1 presents the regression version of Figures 1 and A1. It displays the κ coefficients
on the interaction term XiWc from regressions using different outcome variables Yic. These
regressions are similar to equation (10) in that they include controls for individual ability
and college quality.51 The dependent variables are the main outcomes that I analyze in
Section 5: persistence in college—defined as being enrolled one year after entry (column
51 Specifically, the regressions for Table A1 take the form Yic = γXi + γc + κXiWc + eic, where γXi and
γc are fixed effects for Xi cells and colleges. This specification provides an even stronger test of the null
hypothesis κ = 0 than would a direct estimation of equation (10).
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(A)), graduation from college (column (B)), and log daily earnings measures ten or eleven
years after taking the Icfes exam (columns (C) and (D)). The κ coefficients are positive for
all dependent variables and are statistically significant in all but one case.
Table A1. Estimates of pre-reform complementarity, κ0
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Dependent variable
Enrolled Graduated Log daily Log daily
one year from earnings, earnings,
after entry college 10 yrs later 11 yrs later
Complementarity term (XiWc) 0.005∗ 0.006 0.024∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
N 356,480 356,480 179,007 182,140
# colleges 296 296 267 268
Dependent var. mean 0.649 0.394 10.269 10.374
Notes: The table displays coefficients from a regression of the dependent variable listed in each column header on the
interaction between the socioeconomic index, Xi, and observable college quality, Wc. See Appendix A.2 for details
on the data and variable definitions. The regression also includes fixed effects for each college and each cell of the
socioeconomic index. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the college level. Dependent variable means
are calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
A.2. Data, sample, and variable definitions. This section describes the coverage and
merging of my three main administrative datasets: college admission exam records, enroll-
ment and graduation records, and earnings records. It also discusses how I select my main
analysis sample for Sections 3–5, and my longer-term analysis sample for Section 6. Finally,
it describes the definitions of key variables.
The first dataset includes records from the ICFES national standardized college entrance
exam. The data include all students who took the exam between 1998–2001. Between 2002–
2006, the data include all students who took the exam in their last year of high school (11th
grade). In other words, the 2002–2006 data do not include individuals who repeated the
exam or took it after they finished high school. For this reason, my main analysis sample
includes all exam takers, but my longer-term analysis sample (which ranges from 1998–2006)
includes only 11th grade exam takers.52
52 I identify 11th grade exam takers in the 1998–2001 cohorts as those students who took the exam in their
year of high school graduation.
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Table A2. Construction of analysis samples
(A) (B)
Main Longer-term
analysis sample analysis sample
(1998–2001 cohorts) (1998–2006 cohorts)
Total number of exam takers 2,100,424 4,269,762
Remove non 11th graders . (559,826)
Missing exam scores (10,195) (2,699)
Missing high school information (126,966) (11,301)
Fewer than five pre-reform obs. in Xi (84,464) (448,473)
Full sample 1,878,799 3,247,463
College enrollees 714,071 1,332,751
Notes: See the text for descriptions of the sample restrictions in each row.
My sample includes all exam takers with non-missing test scores whose high school identi-
fier I observe in the data. In addition, I make a sample restriction that allows me to calculate
a socioeconomic index, Xi, for each student. The index Xi is defined as the mean pre-reform
exam score in cells defined by three characteristics:53 1) a dummy for a student’s mother
having a secondary education or above;54 2) dummies for a student’s high school; and 3) a
dummy for gender. I exclude students with values of Xi that are calculated based on fewer
than five observations in the pre-reform cohorts (1998–1999).
Table A2 shows the effect of these restrictions on sample size. In both samples, the
restrictions eliminate roughly ten percent of all exam takers in the ICFES records, although
I also remove 559,826 non-11th graders from my longer-term analysis sample from the 1998–
2001 cohorts. The full sample includes 1,878,799 exam takers from the 1998–2001 cohorts for
my main analysis, and 3,247,463 exam takers from the 1998–2006 cohorts for my longer-term
analysis. However, most of my analyses are restricted to those who enrolled in college, as
shown in the last row of Table A2. I test for and find no evidence of selection into college
enrollment.
53 This index is the average score across all exam subjects. I use a leave-one-out mean for each 1998–1999
exam taker so that Xi is not mechanically correlated with the outcomes examined below.
54 Missing values of mother’s education are counted as a value of zero for this dummy.
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Table A3. Higher education institutions in Ministry of Education records
(A) (B) (C)
Number of Prop.
Number of exit exam of colleges
colleges takers/year in records
University 122 134,496 1.00
University Institute 103 53,338 0.88
Technology School 3 2,041 1.00
Technology Institute 47 15,092 0.82
Technical/Professional Institute 35 11,408 0.99
Total 310 216,375 0.96
Notes: Column (A) depicts the number of colleges that have Saber Pro exit exam takers in 2009–2011 using ad-
ministrative records from the testing agency. Colleges are categorized into the Ministry of Education’s five higher
education institution types. Column (B) shows the number of 2009–2011 exam takers per year. Column (C) shows the
proportion of colleges that appear in the Ministry of Education records, where colleges are weighted by the number
of exit exam takers.
The second dataset includes enrollment and graduation records from the Ministry of Ed-
ucation. The Ministry’s records include almost all colleges in Colombia, although it omits a
few schools due to their small size or inconsistent reporting. To describe the set of colleges
that are included in the Ministry of Education records, I use another administrative dataset
from a college exit exam called Saber Pro (formerly ECAES). This national exam is admin-
istered by the same agency that runs the ICFES entrance exam. The exit exam became a
requirement for graduation from any higher education institution in 2009.
Column (A) in Table A1 the depicts the 310 colleges that have any exit exam takers in
these administrative records in 2009–2011. These colleges are categorized into the Ministry
of Education’s five types of higher education institutions, which are listed in descending
order of their normative program duration.55 Column (B) shows the number of exit exam
takers per year. The majority of exam takers are from university-level institutions, with
fewer students from technical colleges.
Column (C) shows the fraction of these 310 colleges that appear in the Ministry of Ed-
ucation records that I use in my analysis. These proportions are weighted by the number
of exam takers depicted in column (B). Column (C) shows that the Ministry of Education
55 Most programs at universities required 4–5 years of study, while programs at Technical/Professional
Institutes typically take 2–3 years.
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records include all Universities but are missing a few colleges that provide more technical
training.56 Overall, 96 percent of exit exam takers attend colleges that appear in the Ministry
of Education records.
I define my main measure of observable college quality, Wc, as the mean pre-reform exam
score in each college c.57 For the 20 colleges with fewer than ten pre-reform enrollees, I define
Wc as the mean exam score of the students at all 20 of these colleges.
My last data source is from the Ministry of Social Protection. These data provide monthly
earnings for any college enrollee employed in the formal sector in 2008–2012. From these
records I calculate average daily earnings by dividing monthly earnings by the number of
formal employment days in each month and averaging across the year. In addition, I test
for and find no evidence of selection into formal sector employment.
I merge these three datasets using national ID numbers, birth dates, and names. Nearly
all students in these records have national ID numbers, but Colombians change ID numbers
around age 17. Most students in the admission exam records have the below-17 ID number
(tarjeta), while the majority of students in the college enrollment and earnings records have
the above-17 ID number (cédula). Merging using ID numbers alone would therefore lose a
large majority of students. Instead, I merge observations with either: 1) the same ID number
and a fuzzy name match; 2) the same birth date and a fuzzy name match; or 3) an exact
name match for a name that is unique in both records.
38 percent of the 1998–2001 exam takers appear in the enrollment records, which is broadly
comparable to the higher education enrollment rate in Colombia during the same time pe-
riod.58 A better indicator of merge success is the percentage of college enrollees that appear
56 The largest omitted institutions are the national police academy (Dirección Nacional de Escuelas) and
the Ministry of Labor’s national training service (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje).
57 This measure is the average score across all exam subjects.
58 The gross tertiary enrollment rate ranged from 22 percent to 24 percent between 1998 and 2001 (World
Bank World Development Indicators, available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia in October
2016). This rate is not directly comparable to my merge rate because not all high school aged Colombians
take the ICFES exam. Roughly 70 percent of the secondary school aged population was enrolled in high
school in this period. Dividing the tertiary enrollment ratio by the secondary enrollment ratio gives a number
roughly comparable to my 38 percent merge rate.
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in the admission exam records because all domestic college students must take the exam.
Among enrollees who took the admission exam between 1998 and 2001, I match 88 percent.59
A.3. The 2000 admission exam reform. This section provides further details on the 2000
reform of the Colombian college admission exam and the exam subjects that were offered
between 1998 and 2006.
The goal of the 2000 exam overhaul was to design an exam that supported the dual goals
of measuring high school quality and aiding in college admissions. The pre-reform exam was
thought to primarily test intellectual ability and rote memorization, and was thus poorly
suited for measuring the contribution of high schools to students’ educational development.
Furthermore, the exam was criticized for being biased toward certain students depending on
their gender or family background.
To achieve this goal, the testing agency rewrote the exam with the aim of testing “com-
petencies” rather than “content.” The focus of the new was to test “know-how in context,”
which means that students should be able to apply a given piece of information to different
situations. Examples of such competencies include interpreting a text, graphic, or map in
solving a problem, and assessing different concepts and theories that support a decision. The
post-reform exam therefore placed a greater emphasis on communication skills, as it asked
students to interpret, argue, and defend their answers.
Figures A2–A5 present sample questions from the biology, language, math, and social sci-
ences components of the pre-reform and post-reform exams. The sample questions reinforce
the central motivation of the overhaul. Questions from the pre-reform exam are briefer and
require more memorization. The post-reform sample questions are longer and typically in-
clude a figure or passage that the student must interpret. Further, some pre-reform questions
59 The enrollment records contain age at time of the admission exam for some students, which allows me
to calculate the year they took the exam. Approximately 16 percent of students in the enrollment dataset
have missing birth dates, which accounts for the majority of observations I cannot merge. Some duplicate
matches arise because students took the admission exam more than once, though I erroneously match a
small number of students with the same birth date and similar names.
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Panel A. Pre-reform sample question





(A) If 1 and 2 are correct, fill in oval A
(B) If 2 and 3 are correct, fill in oval B
(C) If 3 and 4 are correct, fill in oval C
(D) If 2 and 4 are correct, fill in oval D
(E) If 1 and 3 are correct, fill in oval E
Panel B. Post-reform sample question
The diagram shows a cell that is exchanging substances with its environment through the cell membrane.
If at a certain time it is observed that the number of molecules A entering the cell is greater than the number coming
out of it, it can be assumed that within the cell there is
(A) A higher concentration of molecules than outside
(B) A lower concentration of molecules than outside
(C) A molecule concentration equal to that outside
(D) An absence of molecules A
Figure A2. Biology sample questions
Notes: Correct answers are in italics. The sample question from the pre-reform exam was obtained
from a version of the ICFES testing agency’s website that was archived in January 1997 (available at
https://web.archive.org/web/19980418191357/http://acuario.icfes.gov.co/12/122/1222/12223/Tipos.html in Octo-
ber 2016). The sample question from the post-reform exam was obtained from a September 2008 ICFES re-
port entitled “State Assessment Tests in Colombia” (“Evaluación con Pruebas de Estado en Colombia”) (available
at http://www.ieia.com.mx/materialesreuniones/1aReunionInternacionaldeEvaluacion/PONENCIAS18Septiembre/
ConferenciasMagnas/MargaritaPenaBorrero.pdf in October 2016).
have a complicated answer structure, while the post-reform questions are all straightforward
multiple choice.
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Panel A. Pre-reform sample question
The phrase:
“¿Estará Pedro en la casa?”
is used to ask about the location of Pedro:
(A) At the moment when the question is asked
(B) At a future moment
(C) At any moment
(D) At the moment when the answer is given
Panel B. Post-reform sample question
Me parece que no es preciso demostrar que la novela policial es popular, porque esa popularidad es tan flagrante que
no requiere demostración. Para explicarla—aquellos que niegan al género su significación artística—se fundan en la
evidencia de que la novela policial ha sido y es uno de los productos predilectos de la llamada “cultura de masas,”
propia de la moderna sociedad capitalista.
La popularidad de la novela policial sería, entonces, sólo un resultado de la manipulación del gusto, sólo el fruto
de su homogeneización mediante la reiteración de esquemas seudoartísticos, fácilmente asimilables, y desprovistos,
claro, de verdadera significación gnoseológica y estética; sazonados, además, con un puñado de ingredientes de mala
ley: violencia, morbo, pornografía, etcétera, productos que se cargan, casi siempre, de mistificaciones y perversiones
ideológicas, tendientes a la afirmación del estatus burgués y a combatir las ideas revolucionarias y progresistas del
modo más burdo e impúdico.
Pero hay que decir que ello constituye no sólo una manipulación del gusto en general, sino también una manipulación
de la propia novela policial, de sus válidas y legítimas manifestaciones, una prostitución de sus mecanismos expresivos
y sus temas. Los auténticos conformadores del género policial (no hay que olvidarlo) fueron artistas de la talla de
Edgar Allan Poe y Wilkie Collins. Y desde sus orígenes hasta nuestros días, el género ha producido una buena porción
de obras maestras.
From “La novela policial y la polémica del elitismo y comercialismo”
In Ensayos Voluntarios, Guillermo Rodríguez Rivera.
Havana, Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1984.
The theme of the previous text is:
(A) The pseudo-artistic nature of detective novels is devoid of epistemological and aesthetic significance
(B) The detective novel is a favorite product of the so-called “mass culture”
(C) The popularity of the detective genre is not necessary to show through evidence
(D) Detective novels and their manifestations can manipulate tastes
Figure A3. Language sample questions
Notes: Correct answers are in italics. The sample question from the pre-reform exam was obtained
from a version of the ICFES testing agency’s website that was archived in January 1997 (available at
https://web.archive.org/web/19980418191357/http://acuario.icfes.gov.co/12/122/1222/12223/Tipos.html in Octo-
ber 2016). The sample question from the post-reform exam was obtained from a September 2008 ICFES re-
port entitled “State Assessment Tests in Colombia” (“Evaluación con Pruebas de Estado en Colombia”) (available
at http://www.ieia.com.mx/materialesreuniones/1aReunionInternacionaldeEvaluacion/PONENCIAS18Septiembre/
ConferenciasMagnas/MargaritaPenaBorrero.pdf in October 2016).
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Panel A. Pre-reform sample question
It is known that the result of multiplying a number by itself several times is 256. You can identify this number if it
is known
I. Whether the number is positive or negative
II. How many times the number is multiplied by itself
(A) If fact I is enough to solve the problem, but fact II is not, fill in oval A
(B) If fact II is enough to solve the problem, but fact I is not, fill in oval B
(C) If facts I and II together are sufficient to solve the problem, but each separately it is not, fill in oval C
(D) If each of facts I and II separately are sufficient to solve the problem, fill in oval D
(E) If facts I and II together are not enough to solve the problem, fill in oval E
Panel B. Post-reform sample question
To test the effect of a vaccine applied to 516 healthy mice, an experiment was performed in a laboratory. The goal
of the experiment is to identify the percentage of mice that become sick when subsequently exposed to a virus that
attacks the vaccine. The following graphs represent the percentage of sick mice after the first, second, and third hours
of the experiment.
With regard to the state of the mice, it is NOT correct to say that
(A) After the first hour there are only 75 healthy mice
(B) After the first hour there are 129 sick mice
(C) After two and a half hours there are more healthy mice than sick mice
(D) Between the second and third hour the number of sick mice increased by 6.25 percentage points
Figure A4. Math sample questions
Notes: Correct answers are in italics. The sample question from the pre-reform exam was obtained
from a version of the ICFES testing agency’s website that was archived in January 1997 (available at
https://web.archive.org/web/19980418191357/http://acuario.icfes.gov.co/12/122/1222/12223/Tipos.html in Octo-
ber 2016). The sample question from the post-reform exam was obtained from a September 2008 ICFES re-
port entitled “State Assessment Tests in Colombia” (“Evaluación con Pruebas de Estado en Colombia”) (available
at http://www.ieia.com.mx/materialesreuniones/1aReunionInternacionaldeEvaluacion/PONENCIAS18Septiembre/
ConferenciasMagnas/MargaritaPenaBorrero.pdf in October 2016).
These communication and interpretation skills were tested in the context of subjects from
the core secondary education curriculum. To better align the test with the high school
curriculum, the reform also altered the specific subjects that were tested. Table A4 shows
the subject components that were included in the admission exam between 1998 and 2006.
The 2000 reform combined two math exams—one designed to measure aptitude and another
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Panel A. Pre-reform sample question
Assertion: The only factor that determined the abolition of slavery in Colombia in the mid-nineteenth century was
the economy.
Reason: In the mid-nineteenth century the formation of regional markets and the development of agriculture in our
country made it necessary to establish freedom of labor.
(A) If the assertion and reason are true and the reason is a correct explanation of the claim, fill in oval A
(B) If the assertion and reason are true, but the reason is not a correct explanation of the claim, fill in oval B
(C) If the assertion is true but the reason is a false proposition, fill in oval C
(D) If the assertion is false but the reason is a true proposition, fill in oval D
(E) If both assertion and reason are false propositions, fill in oval E
Panel B. Post-reform sample question
In South America, archaeological finds of pottery—used for food preparation and storage of grain—have been inter-
preted as evidence of the strengthening of agriculture between the Andean cultures before the Inca Empire. These
findings are indicative of agricultural and sedentary cultures because
(A) They reflect the broad expanse of corn, cacao, and vegetables
(B) There are no findings of hunting weapons made of stone
(C) Nomadic activities, in contrast, require little ceramic production
(D) Large irrigation systems are part of the same findings
Figure A5. Social sciences sample questions
Notes: Correct answers are in italics. The sample question from the pre-reform exam was obtained
from a version of the ICFES testing agency’s website that was archived in January 1997 (available at
https://web.archive.org/web/19980418191357/http://acuario.icfes.gov.co/12/122/1222/12223/Tipos.html in Octo-
ber 2016). The sample question from the post-reform exam was obtained from a September 2008 ICFES re-
port entitled “State Assessment Tests in Colombia” (“Evaluación con Pruebas de Estado en Colombia”) (available
at http://www.ieia.com.mx/materialesreuniones/1aReunionInternacionaldeEvaluacion/PONENCIAS18Septiembre/
ConferenciasMagnas/MargaritaPenaBorrero.pdf in October 2016).
designed to test knowledge—into a single component. The reform also split the social sciences
component into separate tests for history and geography. Further, the 2000 reform added
components in philosophy and foreign language, which was English for the large majority of
students.
In Section 3 I focus on the six subject groups listed in the leftmost column of Table A4:
biology, chemistry, language, math, physics, and social sciences. I average the pre-reform
math aptitude and math knowledge components into a single math score. I also average the
post-reform history and geography components into a single social sciences score. I exclude
the verbal component, which appears only in the pre-reform exam, and the philosophy and
foreign language components, which appear only in the post-reform exam. I also exclude the
elective component, which was rarely used by colleges to determine admissions.
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Table A4. Mean admission score by exam component and cohort
Subject Exam cohort
groups Exam components 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Biology Biology 47.6 48.1 45.1 44.6 45.0 45.3 46.0 47.3 47.0
Chemistry Chemistry 46.1 51.0 45.0 45.2 44.3 43.5 42.3 43.6 45.2
Language Language 48.6 50.9 46.5 46.4 48.3 48.9 52.4 46.4 48.4
Math aptitude 49.1 50.5
Math Math knowledge 49.0 49.0
Math 43.0 41.1 42.7 41.8 41.0 44.5 45.7
Physics Physics 47.3 47.1 45.3 46.7 45.3 46.2 42.9 46.7 45.9
Social sciences 47.9 48.6 44.9
S. sciences Geography 44.4 43.0 43.4 42.9 49.6 41.3
History 43.5 43.5 43.4 43.3 44.2 42.5
Verbal aptitude 48.3
Excluded Philosophy 44.8 43.9 44.7 44.9 45.4 43.6 47.1
components Foreign language 41.0 42.3 42.1 41.7 39.6 43.4 43.1
Elective 49.5 50.9 52.3 55.4 52.4 48.5 48.7 47.5 48.0
Mean (all components) 48.2 49.5 45.1 45.2 45.2 44.7 45.2 44.7 46.2
St. dev. (all components) 10.2 10.2 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.4 8.0 8.0 8.0
Notes: The sample includes only students who took the exam in the year of their high school graduation.
Table A4 also shows that the reform affected the mean and the variance of exam scores.
The bottom rows show that the mean score across all subjects was approximately 50 in the
pre-reform cohorts, and approximately 45 in the post-reform cohorts. Further, the standard
deviation across all components fell from approximately ten to 7.5. My interest is in students’
relative performance, and so for all my analysis I normalize exam scores to be mean zero
and standard deviation one within each exam cohort.
A.4. Characteristics measured by the post-reform exam. Figure 3 in Section 3 shows
that low SES students scored relatively higher on the post-reform exam. This result is
consistent with the testing agency’s goal to design an admission exam with less socioeconomic
bias, though it raises an additional question: what characteristics did the new exam measure?
Another objective of the reform was to design a better measure of the competencies that
predict success in college, but the decrease in correlation of scores with SES could arise if
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Figure A6. Explanatory power of the pre- and post-reform exam for students who took both
Notes: The sample includes students in my sample who took both the pre-reform exam and the post-reform exam
once. Dark blue bars show the R2 values from regressions of each listed dependent variable on linear terms for the
pre-reform exam subject scores. Light orange bars show the R2 values from regressions of each dependent variable
on linear terms for the post-reform subject scores. The bottom block displays R2 values from regressions in which
the dependent variable is the residual from regressing each listed variable on indicators for mother’s education, high
school, and gender..
Although is hard to distinguish between these two possibilities without detailed measures
of individual skills, Figure A6 presents suggestive evidence that the redesigned exam captured
characteristics that matter for college success. For this figure I analyze the small fraction
of students who took both the pre- and post-reform exams.60 I then ask which exam scores
explain more of the variance in these students’ characteristics and college outcomes.
Specifically, the dark blue bars show theR2 values from regressions of each listed dependent
variable on linear terms for the pre-reform exam subject scores. The lighter orange bars
depict regressions on linear terms for each post-reform subject score.61 Note that the two
regressions for each dependent variable include the same individuals, and thus variation in
R2 values reflects only changes in explained variance and not differences in the sample.62
60 Approximately five percent of 1998–1999 exam takers in my sample also took the 2000–2001 admission
exam.
61 Formally, I compare the R2 values from the regressions yi = θ′[Pre-reform scores]i + ui and yi =
φ′[Post-reform scores]i + vi.
62 The population does vary across dependent variables due to missing values or conditional outcomes.
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The top block of Figure A6 shows four characteristics related to students’ gender, socioe-
conomic status, and high school. The pre-reform exam scores explain more of the variance in
each of these student traits than the post-reform scores. This is consistent with the decline
in the correlation of exam scores with socioeconomic characteristics evident in Figure 3.
The dependent variables in the middle block of Figure A6 measure four post-high-school
outcomes: enrollment in college, graduation from college, scores on a national college exit
exam, and labor market earnings ten years after taking the admission exam. Examining these
outcomes gives a sense of whether the new exam is a better predictor of “success” in college,
which was a stated intent of the exam overhaul. As with the observable characteristics, the
pre-reform scores explain more of the variance in these outcomes than the new scores. This
might seem to imply that the old exam does a better job at predicting college outcomes,
but each of these outcomes also depends on students’ backgrounds. Thus the decline in the
correlation of exam scores with student traits is likely to affect the correlation of scores with
student outcomes.
To address this issue, the last block of Figure A6 examines these four outcomes net of
students’ background characteristics. Specifically, it uses the residuals from regressions of
each outcome variable on mother’s education, high school, and gender dummies.63 After
netting out these socioeconomic characteristics, the post-reform exam scores explain more
of the variance in college outcomes than the pre-reform scores.
The “horse race” depicted in Figure A6 is not a perfect test of the skills measured by
the admission exams; in particular, the outcomes are potentially endogenous to the scores.64
Further, the differences in R2 values for the outcome residuals are small and not statistically
different in most cases. Nonetheless, the combined evidence from Figures 3 and A6 is con-
sistent with the major stated objectives of the exam overhaul: the redesigned exam led to
63 These are the same characteristics used to define the socioeconomic index, Xi.
64 For example, the new exam may be a better predictor of college outcomes because its scores played a
larger role in determining where students went to college. However, if I examine students who repeated the
old exam twice, or the new exam twice, the relationship between exam scores, student characteristics, and
outcomes show different patterns from those in Figure A6. This suggests that the results in Figure A6 are
driven by the admission exam reform rather than a repeat examination effect.
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a dramatic reduction in the correlation of admission scores and SES without substantially
reducing its predictive power for college success.
A.5. Flagship universities and their admission methods. Table A5 shows the flagship
universities in Colombia, and it describes how I define treated and control regions. Column
(A) lists the 33 administrative departments in Colombia that I call regions, and column (B)
shows the average number of national exam takers per year in the 1998–1999 cohorts.
I define flagships as the largest public university in each region. “Largest” is defined by
the total number of students for all cohorts in my enrollment records, and the restriction
to “universities” excludes colleges that the Ministry of Education classifies as “university
institutes” or “technical institutes.” In addition, I make two modification to this definition
of flagships. First, I consider Universidad Nacional de Colombia—which is the most presti-
gious public college in the country—to be the flagship school in Bogotá even though there
are several other public universities with more enrollees.65 Second, in the region of Norte
Santander, I consider Universidad Francisco de Paula Santander to be the flagship since it
is located in the capital city of Cúcuta, even though the public university in the city of
Pamplona has more enrollees.66 Column (C) lists the flagship universities in each region
under this definition, and column (D) shows the cities in which they are located. In three
regions, the largest public college is not a university (see column (E)), so I classify these
regions as not treated. This classification captures the fact that non-university level colleges
are typically open enrollment, and thus the exam reform is not likely to affect admission to
these colleges.
Column (F) lists the admission method that each flagship used before the 2000 reform.
I collected information on pre-reform admission methods by searching through historical
student regulations at each college, or by tracking down information from historical college
or newspaper websites using the website archive.org. The majority of flagships used only
65 Bogotá is the capital of Colombia and is its own administrative region.
66 This does not affect the classification of Norte Sandander as a treated region as both colleges used only
national exam scores for admissions.
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Table A5. Flagship universities and definition of treated regions
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
No. of
exam Admission Closest Treated
Region takers College name City Type method other region region?
Bogota 89,995 Universidad Nacional de Colombia Bogota D.C. University Other
Antioquia 61,338 Universidad de Antioquia Medellin University Other
Valle 54,760 Universidad del Valle Cali University National exam X
Atlantico 28,814 Universidad del Atlantico Barranquilla University Other
Santander 26,167 Universidad Industrial de Santander Bucaramanga University National exam X
Cundinamarca 24,486 Universidad de Cundinamarca Fusagasuga University National exam X
Bolivar 18,340 Universidad de Cartagena Cartagena University Other
Boyaca 17,956 Universidad Pedagogica y Tecnologica de Colombia Tunja University National exam X
Tolima 16,439 Universidad del Tolima Ibague University National exam X
Cordoba 16,344 Universidad de Cordoba Monteria University Other
Narino 15,002 Universidad de Narino Pasto University National exam X
Norte Santander 14,010 Universidad Francisco de Paula Santander Cucuta University National exam X
Cauca 13,942 Universidad del Cauca Popayan University National exam X
Caldas 12,637 Universidad de Caldas Manizales University National exam X
Huila 11,986 Universidad Surcolombiana Neiva University National exam X
Magdalena 11,462 Universidad del Magdalena Santa Marta University Other
Risaralda 11,064 Universidad Tecnologica de Pereira Pereira University National exam X
Cesar 9,666 Universidad Popular del Cesar Valledupar University National exam X
Meta 8,947 Universidad de Los Llanos Villavicencio University National exam X
Sucre 7,472 Universidad de Sucre Sincelejo University National exam X
Quindio 6,964 Universidad del Quindio Armenia University National exam X
La Guajira 5,656 Universidad de la Guajira Riohacha University Other
Choco 3,532 Universidad Tecnologica del Chocodiego Luis Cordoba Quibdo University Other
Caqueta 3,020 Universidad de la Amazonia Florencia University National exam X
Casanare 2,304 Fundacion Univ. Internacional del Tropico Americano Yopal Univ. Inst.
Arauca 1,958 Norte Santander X
Putumayo 1,822 Inst. Tecnologico del Putumayo Mocoa Tech. Inst.
San Andres 774 Inst. Nacional de Formacion Tech. Prof. de San Andres San Andres Tech. Inst.
Amazonas 548 Caqueta X
Guaviare 304 Meta X
Vichada 164 Norte Santander X
Vaupes 114 Meta X
Guainia 91 Meta X
Notes: The number of exam takers is the average number per year calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
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national exam scores for admission. Eight flagships used other admission methods, which
most commonly meant that they required applicants to take the university’s own admission
exam. In some cases these flagships also considered other information such as high school
GPA or personal interviews.
Six regions of Colombia do not contain any colleges in my records. To classify treatment,
I assign these regions to the closest region with a flagship using the distance between capital
cities. Column (G) shows the closest assigned region for these six regions without any
colleges.
Finally, column (H) of Table A5 shows my classification of regions as treated or control.
Treated regions are those with flagship universities that use only the national exam for
admissions, or those regions without colleges whose closest region has a national exam flag-
ship. Control regions are those with flagship universities that use other admission methods,
or those regions whose largest college is not a flagship. Summary statistics on the college
markets and student populations in treated and control regions are in Table 1.
A.6. Robustness tables. The remainder of this appendix contains Tables A6–A12 and
Figure A7, which present robustness and heterogeneity results as described in Sections 3–6.
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Table A6. Exam reform effects on the SES/score correlation
Dependent variable: Normalized average exam score (τit)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Alternative definitions of Xi
Main Only Mean Only
definition mother’s Only mother’s 1998
Post-reform cohorts × . . . of Xi education gender edu. in HS cohort
Socioeconomic index (Xi) −0.080∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
N 1,878,799 1,878,799 1,878,799 1,878,799 1,831,902
R2 0.347 0.122 0.076 0.235 0.330
# regions 33 33 33 33 33
Mean SES/score correlation 0.617 0.258 0.147 0.450 0.594
Notes: This table reports results from a regression of average exam scores, τit, on an interaction of the socioeconomic
index, Xi, with a dummy for the post-reform cohorts (2000–2001). The regression also includes dummies for cohort-
region cells and interactions of the socioeconomic index with region dummies. Column (A) uses the benchmark
definition of Xi, while columns (B)–(E) use the alternate definitions listed in each column header. Both τit and
Xi are normalized to mean zero and standard deviation one in all regressions. Parentheses contain standard errors
clustered at the region level. Mean SES/score correlation is calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A7. Assortativity with major-level definition
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Major definition
Treated regions and College Area Category Name
cohorts (δrt) × . . . level (10 grp.) (55 grp.) (1000+ grp.)
Socioeconomic index × δrt −0.025∗∗∗ 0.004 0.005 −0.009
(0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010)
N 714,071 714,071 714,071 714,071
# regions 33 33 33 33
Mean assortativity 0.429 0.205 0.271 0.408
Notes: This table reports results from regressions identical to those in Table 3, except they use different definitions
of the dependent variable Wc. Column (A) in this table is identical to column (A) in Table 3. Columns (B)–(D)
define Wc as the mean pre-reform exam score in different major categories as defined by the Ministry of Education.
Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the region level. Mean assortativity is calculated from the 1998–1999
cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A8. Formal labor market employment
(A) (B)
Dependent variable
Employed in Employed in
Treated regions and formal sector, formal sector,
cohorts (δrt) × . . . 10 yrs later 11 yrs later
All students −0.007 −0.011
(0.008) (0.008)
Xi top quartile −0.017 −0.021
(0.014) (0.015)
Xi quartile 3 0.005 0.002
(0.008) (0.006)
Xi quartile 2 −0.001 −0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
Xi bottom quartile −0.003 −0.014∗
(0.007) (0.007)
N 714,071 714,071
# regions 33 33
Dependent var. mean 0.502 0.511
Notes: The top row reports estimates of β from equation (19). The bottom four rows report βq coefficients from
a version of (19) that is fully interacted with dummies for quartiles q of the socioeconomic index, Xi. The column
header shows the dependent variable for each regression. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the region
level. Dependent variable means are calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A9. Clustered and wild t bootstrap p values
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Dependent variable
Enrolled Graduated Log daily Log daily
Treated regions and one year from earnings, earnings,
cohorts (δrt) × . . . after entry college 10 yrs later 11 yrs later
All students −0.014 −0.014 −0.014 −0.013
(0.006) (0.059) (0.021) (0.029)
[0.036] [0.082] [0.030] [0.054]
Xi top quartile −0.017 −0.022 −0.013 −0.016
(0.001) (0.003) (0.121) (0.058)
[0.028] [0.016] [0.102] [0.096]
Xi quartile 3 −0.010 −0.004 −0.002 0.003
(0.104) (0.581) (0.725) (0.678)
[0.140] [0.632] [0.750] [0.718]
Xi quartile 2 −0.006 −0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.382) (0.898) (0.861) (0.911)
[0.484] [0.886] [0.890] [0.852]
Xi bottom quartile −0.022 −0.022 −0.016 −0.013
(0.007) (0.018) (0.063) (0.027)
[0.022] [0.024] [0.128] [0.026]
Notes: This table presents regression coefficients identical to in Table 6. Parentheses contain p values from standard
errors clustered at the region level, as reported in Table 6. Brackets contain p values from a wild t bootstrap imposing
the null hypothesis, as recommended in Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008).
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Table A10. Effects for top quartile of Xi by pre-reform college choices
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Enrollment outcomes Persistence, graduation, & earnings outcomes
Enrolled Gradu- Log daily Log daily
College Xi rank one year ated earnings, earnings,
Treated regions and quality relative after from 10 yrs 11 yrs
cohorts (δrt) × . . . (Wc) to class entry college later later
Chose high quality −0.059∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.023∗
(0.024) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011)
Chose low quality −0.009 0.014∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.013 −0.005 −0.014
(0.041) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
N 292,209 292,209 292,209 292,209 153,648 157,132
R2 0.080 0.074 0.004 0.008 0.041 0.038
# regions 32 32 32 32 32 32
Chose high mean 0.662 0.695 0.695 0.482 10.430 10.545
Chose low mean 0.191 0.790 0.679 0.448 10.358 10.470
Notes: The sample includes all college enrollees from the 1998–2001 exam cohorts in the top quartile of the socioe-
conomic index Xi. The regression displays coefficients from the standard differences in differences regression (19)
using the dependent variable in each column header, but in which all control variables are interacted with a dummy
for whether students are likely to choose top colleges or to choose lower-ranked colleges. “Chose high quality” means
that the average value of college quality, Wc, within a student’s Xi cell was greater than or equal to the predicted
value of Wc from a local linear regression of Wc on Xi. “Chose low quality” means that the average value of Wc
within a student’s Xi cell was below this predicted value. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the region
level. Dependent variable means for each student type are calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A11. Unexplained effects under double randomization
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Dependent variable: Total − distribution effect (Yic − Ŷic)
Enrolled Graduated Log daily Log daily
Treated regions and one year from earnings, earnings,
cohorts (δrt) × . . . after entry college 10 yrs later 11 yrs later
All students −0.013∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.004 −0.003
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Xi top quartile −0.016∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.006
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Xi quartile 3 −0.010 −0.005 −0.004 0.001
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
Xi quartile 2 −0.008 −0.004 0.002 0.003
(0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Xi bottom quartile −0.023∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.016∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
N 714,071 714,071 354,034 361,044
# regions 33 33 33 33
Notes: The dependent variable for this regression is the difference between the observed outcome, Yic, listed in each
column header and the predicted outcome, Ŷic, as defined in Section 5.3. The top row reports estimates of β from
equation (19). The bottom four rows report βq coefficients from a version of (19) that is fully interacted with dummies
for quartiles q of the socioeconomic index, Xi. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the region level.
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Figure A7. SES distribution in flagship universities with national exam admissions
Notes: This figure plots the distribution of the socioeconomic index, Xi, at flagship universities in treated regions.
The dark solid line shows the distribution of Xi at these flagships in the two cohorts prior to the exam reform. The
light-colored dashed line plots this distribution for the first two cohorts after the reform. 5.
84





score (τit) quality (Wc)
2000−2001 cohorts −0.079∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008)
2002−2003 cohorts −0.078∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗
(0.003) (0.014)




# regions 33 33
Mean correlation 0.602 0.431
Notes: The sample for column (A) includes all 11th grade exam takers from the 1998–2006 exam cohorts. This column
reports coefficients from a regression of average exam scores, τit, on interactions of the socioeconomic index, Xi, with
dummies for the three listed cohort groups: 2000–2001, 2002–2003, and 2004–2006. This regression also includes
dummies for cohort-region cells and interactions of Xi with region dummies. The sample for column (B) includes all
college enrollees from the 1998–2006 exam cohorts. This column reports coefficients from a regression analogous to
specification (18), but in which the treatment variable is defined separately for the three cohort groups. Parentheses
contain standard errors clustered at the region level. Mean correlations are calculated from the 1998–1999 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Chapter 2. The Big Sort: College Reputation and Labor Market Outcomes
(with W. Bentley MacLeod, Juan E. Saavedra, and Miguel Urquiola)
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1. Introduction
Each year, millions of high school graduates choose a college with the hope of a good
career. The problem they face is daunting. Each potential college they consider may provide
them with a different set of skills. Moreover, the labor market may use the identity of their
college as a signal of ability. We call the process by which students choose a college, and find
their first job, the “big sort.” This paper provides evidence on the role of college identity in
the big sort using unique data and a natural experiment from the country of Colombia.
We introduce a simple measure of a college’s reputation: the mean admission score of
its graduates. Our data allow us to observe which college individuals attended, as well
as their subsequent performance in the labor market. We show that their earnings are
positively correlated with the reputation of their colleges after controlling for individual
characteristics, including their own admission scores. This correlation may arise because
high-reputation colleges provide more skill, or because college identity signals graduates’
ability. To differentiate between these mechanisms we exploit the staggered introduction of
a national college exit exam that provided employers with a new signal of individual skill. A
competitive labor market model predicts that the exit exam should reduce the correlation of
earnings with college reputation if reputation serves to signal ability. The empirical evidence
is consistent with this prediction, suggesting that college identity plays an informational role.
Finally, we measure the effect of college reputation upon subsequent earnings growth. We
find that the correlation between reputation and log earnings is not constant, but rather
increases with a worker’s labor market experience. This descriptive result contrasts with a
large literature on the Mincer wage equation, which finds that the correlation of log wages
with workers’ years of schooling does not vary with experience (Lemieux, 2006). Thus
differences in educational attainment are an initial but stable source of inequality (Katz and
Murphy, 1992; Autor, 2014). Our result shows that sorting across different types of colleges
may be a further source of inequality—one that grows in importance over the course of
workers’ careers.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model that guides our empirical
analysis. The big sort is a complex process, and preferences over colleges may depend upon
who else chooses to attend (Rothschild and White, 1995). Moreover, there are multiple sort-
ing equilibria depending upon colleges’ selection strategies (MacLeod and Urquiola, 2015).
Rather than attempting to model this complexity, we build on the standard competitive
model of wage formation (Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979).
We make two assumptions that yield clear predictions regarding the effect of school rep-
utation on wages. First, colleges select students based on their scores on a standardized
admission test, as is the case in Colombia. Hence the most desirable colleges tend to enroll
the highest scoring students. This allows us to propose a simple definition of a college’s
reputation: the mean admission score of its graduates. Second, we assume employers ob-
serve graduates’ college of graduation, but not their individual admission scores. Thus, in
setting wages employers use college reputation to infer graduates’ ability as measured by the
admission test.
We explore the implications of these assumptions for the introduction of an individual-
specific measure of skill that employers do observe—a college exit exam score. The key
prediction is that in earnings regressions that include both college reputation and individual
admission scores, the availability of the exit exam reduces the return to reputation and
increases the return to individual scores.
In Section 3 we explore the empirical evidence on this prediction using administrative data
that link, for all college graduates: scores on a standardized national admission exam, college
of graduation, and labor market outcomes. During the period we study, Colombia introduced
national college exit exams, and many students began listing their exit scores on their CVs.
These exams were gradually rolled out across 55 fields of study such as accounting, dentistry,
economics, and law. This allows us to implement an approach analogous to Card and Krueger
(1992) who analyze how time-varying state policies (e.g., class size levels) affect a slope—the
relation between years of schooling and wages. In our case the question is how time-varying
college major characteristics (e.g., the existence of an exit exam in a related field) affect
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two slopes—the earnings return to reputation and the earnings return to admission scores.
Consistent with the assumption that employers use college reputation to infer individual
ability, we find that the new signal of skill reduced the return to reputation and increased
the return to admission scores.
In addition, we find that the exit exams increased average earnings, a result that is con-
sistent with improved employer-employee match quality.67 The exit exams also prompted
student behavioral responses in the form of delayed graduation and preference for colleges
and programs with better exit exam performance. In short, these results provide evidence
that college identity transmits information on ability, and that the reliance upon reputation
fell in the presence of a better performance signal.
In Section 4 we ask whether college reputation relates to earnings exclusively through
an informational channel. The competitive labor market model predicts that employers
update their evaluation of a worker’s skill based upon performance on the job (Harris and
Holmstrom, 1982). Thus wages should become more correlated with ability as workers gain
experience. Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) use this result to
show that over workers’ careers, observable characteristics like years of schooling become
less correlated with wages in regressions that include unobserved measures of ability.68 In
our model, the fact that we define a college’s reputation as the mean admission score of
its graduates yields a clean prediction for regressions that also include individual scores. If
reputation is solely a signal of ability as measured by admission scores, the correlation of
earnings and reputation should decrease with experience conditional on individual scores.
The evidence is inconsistent with this prediction. We find that conditional on individual
admission scores, the correlation between earnings and reputation increases with worker
experience. This contrasts with Altonji and Pierret (2001), who find that the correlation
67 Sahin et al. (2014) suggest that there is a role for policies that improve such matches. They point out that
occupational mismatch in the U.S. has become more severe for college graduates since the great recession.
68 Farber and Gibbons’ and Altonji and Pierret’s results suggest that schooling signals ability, while other
factors correlated with schooling have a deterministic effect on wages. In related work, Lange (2007) finds
that errors regarding worker skill decline markedly after a few years of employment, although Kahn and
Lange (2014) find greater persistence.
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of earnings and years of schooling decreases with experience conditional on measures of
unobserved ability. This result suggests that college reputation may also affect earnings
through channels other than signaling. We cannot disentangle which of several competing
hypotheses might explain this finding. Students and parents likewise cannot measure the
counterfactual effects of college reputation on earnings. However, they may observe the
correlation of reputation and career prospects, which likely increases the demand for the
most reputable colleges.
Our findings relate to four distinct literatures on: reputational markets, college choice,
the impact of selective schools, and costly signaling.
1.0.1. Reputational markets. Nelson (1970a) introduced the idea that consumer goods are
either inspection or experience goods. The quality of an inspection good can be determined
before purchase; that of an experience good can only be determined after. Work in industrial
organization (Melnik and Alm, 2002, Hubbard, 2002, Jin and Leslie, 2003, Cabral and
Hortacsu, 2010, and Dranove, 2010) observes that with experience goods the reputation of
the seller affects the price; for example, a bottle from a good winery commands a high price
even if it ultimately proves to be corked. We show that a similar effect arises in education:
employers are sensitive to college reputation, and this sensitivity is reduced when better
information becomes available (as recommended by Bishop, 2004). Further, consistent with
college being a complex, composite good (e.g., Black and Smith, 2006), we find that students
in turn respond to employers’ changing perception of college reputation.
1.0.2. College choice. Hoxby (1997, 2009) shows that stratification by ability has increased
significantly among U.S colleges. Thorough sorting may account for the fact that Arcidia-
cono, Bayer and Hizmo (2010) find that college identity in the U.S. fully reveals Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT) scores. In contrast, we find that college identity only partially
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reveals admission scores in Colombia. This discrepancy may reflect that college stratifica-
tion in Colombia, although increasing, is not as thorough as in the U.S.69 This suggests that
college preferences, and hence reputations, are endogenous and may change over time. In
particular, the introduction of college exit exams affected the labor market return to college
reputation and preferences of college applicants. The endogeneity of preferences is relevant
to theoretical work on matching in college and other markets (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor,
1989; He, 2014).70 These models assume that students have clear exogenous preferences over
the colleges they wish to attend. Future research could explore if peer effects impact optimal
market design.
1.0.3. The effects of attending a selective college. Our work complements studies that esti-
mate the wage effects of attending a selective college. Using U.S. data, Dale and Krueger
(2002, 2014) find a positive effect, but one that is concentrated among minorities (see also
Hoekstra, 2009b). Using Chilean data, Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2013a) find ev-
idence of significant variation in effects across colleges and majors, and less heterogeneity
across family background (see also Urzua et al., 2015). Our contribution is to explore the
mechanisms underlying these effects by explicitly measuring reputation in an entire market.
While our results suggest that information-related channels may account for some of the
effects in this literature, they do not foreclose other mechanisms like peer effects (Epple et
al., 2006) and network externalities (Zimmerman, 2013; Dustmann et al., 2016; Kaufmann,
Messner and Solis, 2013). If such externalities are more important for high level managerial
jobs, then this may explain the effect of college reputation upon wage growth.
1.0.4. Costly signals. The celebrated Spence (1973) model shows that if schooling is a signal
whose cost is declining in ability, a college wage premium can exist even if college has no
value added. Our focus is on which college students attend rather than whether they attend.
As MacLeod and Urquiola (2015) show, students may care about college identity even if
69 In addition, Hoxby and Avery (2013a) show that even controlling for ability, individuals from disadvantaged
backgrounds are less likely to apply to reputable colleges. Their results are generally consistent with a role
for “brand name” reputations.
70 See Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2013) for a recent review of the large literature on this issue.
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college value added does not vary with college reputation. Informational concerns alone can
lead to ability sorting and stratification.
Finally, such informational channels cannot explain our finding of a positive correlation
between reputation and earnings growth. Greater traction might arise from models with peer
effects (e.g., Epple and Romano, 1998a) especially if peer interactions provide networks that
become more valuable with experience. Alternately, graduates from high reputation colleges
might be more likely to obtain positions in firms with higher levels of on-the-job human
capital investment. For example, larger firms sometimes set pay bands for positions they
wish to fill with applicants of certain characteristics (this is known as the Hay compensation
system; see Milkovich, Newman and Gerhart, 2011). Those characteristics might include
college identity, leading to a correlation between reputation and investment in human capital
that results in a superstar-type effect (Rosen, 1981).
2. College reputation, signaling, and wages
This section adds college reputation to the standard Bayesian model of wage formation
(Jovanovic, 1979). It presents two propositions that we take to the data in Sections 3 and
4. A full derivation of the model and these propositions is in Appendix A.
2.1. Ability, admission scores, and college reputation. Let αi denote the log ability of
student i, where by ability we mean the type of aptitude measured by pre-college admission
tests. We define two measures of ability from our data. First, we observe each student’s
score on a college admission exam, τi, and we assume it provides a noisy measure of ability:
τi = αi + ετi .
The second measure is college reputation. Reputation may incorporate many aspects
of college quality, such as peer composition and faculty research output. We define the
reputation of a college s to be the mean admission score of its graduates, and denote it by
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Rs:






where ns is the number of graduates from college s. This measure has two analytical advan-
tages. First, in settings where selective schools use test scores to determine admission, Rs
will be mechanically related to other attributes that lead students to prefer certain colleges.
Second, as we discuss below, this reputation measure delivers clear predictions in regressions
that also include individual admission scores.
2.2. Employers’ information and wage setting process. We let θi denote the log skill
of student i and suppose it is given by:
θi = αi + vsi .
Skill includes both pre-college ability, αi, and vsi , which we will interpret as attributes related
to an individual’s membership at college si. These may include factors that contribute
to skill formation at school, such as teaching or peer effects, as well as access to alumni
networks. These may also include individual traits (not perfectly correlated with αi) along
which individuals sort into colleges, such as family income or motivation.
We suppose that the market sets log wages, wit, equal to expected skill given available
information, Iit, regarding worker i in period t:
wit = E {θi|Iit}+ hit,
where hit is time-varying human capital growth due to experience and on the job training.
We consider Mincer wage equations that net out human capital growth to focus on the time-
invariant component of skill that is generated by education and revealed over time to the
employer (see Lemieux, 2006):
ŵit = wit − hit = E {θi|Iit} .
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We suppose that employers’ information set, Iit, includes college reputation, Rsi .71 While
employers likely care about individuals’ pre-college ability as captured by Rsi , they also care
about other attributes related to graduates’ post-college skill. We therefore define a college’s
labor market reputation as the expected skill of its graduates: Rs = E{θi|i ∈ s}. It follows
that θi∈s ∼ N(Rsi , 1ρR ), where ρ
R = 1
σ2R
denotes the precision of Rs.72
Our data do not contain Rs, and it may differ from Rs if colleges with higher reputation
provide more value added or select students based upon dimensions of ability that we do
not observe. For instance, if colleges prefer motivated students, and students prefer more
value added, Rs and vs will be positively correlated. To allow for this we suppose vs satisfies
E {vs|Rs} = v0 + v1Rs, where v1 is the reputation premium, i.e., the return to reputation
beyond that captured by admission scores. If this premium is positive (v1 > 0) then a college
with a better reputation provides higher value added, broadly understood.
To summarize, employers observe a signal of worker i’s skill given by the labor market
reputation of her college of origin:
Rsi = E {αi + vsi |Rsi}
= E {αi|Rsi}+ v0 + v1Rsi .
In words, labor market reputation captures employers’ expectations of ability, αi, and at-
tributes related to college membership, vs, under the assumption that they observe our
measure of reputation, Rs.
At the time of hire, employers observe other signals of skill that we do not see (Farber
and Gibbons, 1996). We denote these by:
yi = αi + vs + εi,
71 Employers likely observe college identity, but they may not perfectly observe our measure of reputation.
Below we discuss how our definition helps to address the possibility that this assumption does not hold.
72 We assume all variables are mean zero and normally distributed, and we characterize their variability
using precisions. The precision, ρR, could also be indexed by s and hence be school-specific. We did not find
robust evidence that the variance has a clear effect on earnings, and so set this aside for further research.
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with associated precision ρy. Importantly, yi does not include τi because we assume that
employers do not observe graduates’ individual admission test scores. This is consistent
with the standard assumption in the employer learning literature that AFQT scores are
unobserved, and with anecdotal evidence that in our setting graduates’ CVs rarely feature
their college admission exam score (we present evidence supporting this assumption below).
Lastly, employers observe signals related to worker output after employment begins:
yit = αi + vs + εit,
where εit includes human capital growth and other fluctuations in worker output. These are
observed after setting wages in each period t (where t = 0 is the year of graduation). Let
ȳit = 1t+1
∑t
k=0 yik denote mean worker output and let ρȳ be the time-invariant precision of
yit.73
The market’s information set in period t is thus Iit = {Rsi , yi, yi0, ..., yi,t−1}. Assuming all
variables are normally distributed, log wages net of human capital growth are:















ρR+ρy+tρȳ . Note that
πRt , π
y
t → 0 as wages incorporate new information from worker output.
Equation (1) describes employers’ wage setting process given available information, Iit. We
do not observe Iit, and instead derive the implications of the wage equation for regressions on
characteristics in our data. Below we estimate regressions that include controls for experience
and graduation cohort to capture the time-varying effects (recall that ŵit = wit − hit). Here
we focus upon the implications for the relationship between the signals of individual ability
and wages net of human capital growth.
73 The assumption that the precision of yit is time stationary also follows Farber and Gibbons (1996). We
note that this assumption implies that any human capital growth included in εit is not serially correlated.
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We define the return to reputation at time t, rt, and the return to ability, at, as the
coefficients from the regression:
ŵit = rtRsi + atτi + eit,(2)
where eit is the residual. The return to reputation, rt, is the wage impact of a change in Rs
for students with similar admission scores, τi. The return to ability, at, is the wage impact
of a change in τi for students from colleges with similar reputations.
2.3. Predictions for the introduction of a college exit exam. While the returns to
reputation and ability are not causal, changes in these parameters are informative as to the
signaling role of reputation. In Section 3 we ask how these returns were affected by the
introduction of a new measure of individual skill—a college exit exam. We suppose that the
exit exam increases the amount of information contained in yi; its precision is ρy,exit > ρy
when the exit exam is offered. This could arise because students list exit exam scores on
their CVs, receive reference letters as a result of their performance, or modify job search
behavior after learning their position in the national distribution of exam takers.
The increase in the precision of yi reduces the weight on reputation in wage setting, πRt .
Let δi = 1 if and only if a student is exposed to the possibility of writing the exit exam. We
can rewrite regression (2) as follows:
ŵit = (1− δi) (rtRsi + atτi) + δi
(
rexitt Rsi + aexitt τi
)
+ eexitit
= (rtRsi + atτi) + δi (βrtRsi + βat τi) + eexitit ,(3)
where βrt = rexitt − rt and βat = aexitt − at. Appendix A.D shows that βrt < 0 and βat > 0.74
Thus we have:
74 Since our regressions use log wages, the experience profiles reflect the reduction in uncertainty as infor-
mation about the worker accumulates. Experience profiles can therefore differ for individuals with di = 1
and δi = 0. To account for such effects, our regressions will include controls for experience that vary with
individuals’ potential access to the exit exams.
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Proposition 1. If wages are set to expected skill given the available information (equation
(1)), then the introduction of an exit exam reduces the return to college reputation (βrt < 0)
and increases the return to ability (βat > 0).
Proposition 1 yields a prediction regarding the role of college reputation in transmitting
information on ability. If employers do not use reputation to set wages, a new signal of skill
should have no effect on the relative weights of reputation and admission scores. If instead
the exit exam causes employer to rely less on labor market reputation, Rs, and more on
other signals of worker skill, yi, this reduces the effect of Rs (which is a better predictor of
Rs) and increases the effect of the admission score (which is a better predictor of yi).
Though one could measure college reputation in many ways, our definition isolates a
signaling mechanism because Rs contains no additional information on αi given a student’s
individual score, τi. Proposition 1 thus captures how the introduction of new information
shifts the weight in wage determination from the group to the individual level measure of
ability. In contrast, other measures of reputation may be correlated with αi even conditional
on individual scores.
Our definition also helps distinguish a signaling channel from competing hypotheses such
as accountability effects. For example, in our context there is anecdotal evidence of colleges
adding test-preparation sessions after the exit exam introduction. The exit exams may
also have prompted colleges to change their curricula, or students to work harder. Such
changes would affect skill formation while at college, included in vs; they would not affect
pre-college ability, αi, the focus of our analysis. Thus, while accountability-related responses
can explain changes in the return to reputation, they cannot explain a shift in the weight
from Rs to individual admission scores. We describe the empirical evidence on signaling and
accountability effects in Section 3.
It is worth emphasizing that reputation as defined above is an equilibrium phenomenon
(MacLeod and Urquiola, 2015). It depends upon the more desirable colleges selecting indi-
viduals based on their observed ability rather than on other factors. Such an equilibrium is
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self-enforcing in the sense that students have an interest in working hard to get into the best
college. However, a consequence of this effect is that it makes it difficult for the market to
observe the quality of education. This happens because the market only observes the overall
skill of graduates, and thus cannot easily disentangle college value added from selection. Our
results will provide some direct evidence of this effect.
2.4. Predictions for wage growth. In Section 4, we describe how the returns to reputation
and ability change with experience, t, thereby comparing college reputation to other signals
of ability studied in the literature. Previous research makes a distinction between conditional
returns, given by equation (2), and unconditional returns, given by:
ŵit = rutRsi + eRit(4)
ŵit = aut τi + eτit.(5)
The unconditional returns to reputation, rut , and to ability, aut , are the coefficients on reputa-
tion and the admission exam score in these separate regressions. In Appendix A.E we show
that the evolution of the regression coefficients from (2), (4), and (5) satisfy Proposition 2:
Proposition 2. If wages are set equal to expected skill given the available information then:
(1) The unconditional return to reputation, rut , does not change with experience.
(2) The unconditional return to ability, aut , rises with experience.
(3) The conditional return to reputation, rt, is smaller than the unconditional return,
and with experience falls to v1, the reputation premium.
(4) The conditional return to ability, at, is smaller than the unconditional return, and
rises with experience.
Parts (1)-(2) of Proposition 2 mirror Farber and Gibbons’ (1996) predictions that observ-
able characteristics are fully incorporated in initial wages, while employers gradually learn
about unobservable traits. Reputation, Rs, has a constant effect because it is observed at
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the time of hire, and signals from worker output, yit, merely confirm employers’ expecta-
tions. The effect of the admission score, τi, grows with experience because it is initially
unobservable to employers and correlated with yit.
Parts (3)-(4) predict a declining conditional return to reputation, and an increasing condi-
tional return to ability. These match Altonji and Pierret’s (2001) predictions for observable
and unobservable characteristics, but our measure Rs makes for a clean test of the role of
reputation in signaling. Since reputation is mean college admission score, τi is a sufficient
statistic for ability, αi, in regression (4). Thus, part (3) of Proposition 2 holds even if em-
ployers imperfectly observe Rs, or if αi is correlated with human capital growth; all of these
effects are captured in the admission score coefficients in (2).75 The return to reputation
should decline unless there is a time-varying effect of other college membership attributes,
vs, and these attributes are correlated with reputation (v1 > 0).
Thus Proposition 2 allows us to explore whether the return to reputation arises solely
because college identity signals ability as measured by admission scores. Rejection by the
data would suggest that other college membership attributes lead reputation to be correlated
with wage growth. We examine these hypotheses in Section 4.
3. The college exit exam
Proposition 1 provides predictions for the introduction of an exit exam under a competitive
labor market model. This section explores the empirical evidence related to these predictions.
We first discuss institutional background and our measure of reputation. We then turn to
the exit exam, sample, empirical specifications, and results.
3.1. Background and data sources. Colombia’s higher education system consists of pub-
lic and private institutions that award various types of degrees. In this paper, we refer to
“colleges” as institutions that award the equivalent of U.S. bachelor’s degrees after four or
75 The assumption that Rs contains no information for αi conditional on τi may not hold if αi affects
individuals’ choice of college beyond their admission scores. In this case, the optimal predictor of αi could
also include Rs since τi is a noisy measure of ability. We discuss this possibility in Section 4.3, where we
explore sorting into colleges on other dimensions.
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five years of study. Colombia also has institutions that specialize in two or three year degrees.
We set these aside to focus on institutional identity within a single schooling level.76
To apply to college, students are required to take a standardized exam, the Icfes.77 The
Icfes is generally analogous to the SAT, but it is taken by the vast majority of high school
seniors regardless of whether they intend to apply to college.78 The Icfes plays a major role
in college admissions: many schools extend admission offers based solely on students’ Icfes
performance; others consider additional factors, and a handful administer their own exams.
We use student names, birthdates, and national ID numbers to link individual-level ad-
ministrative datasets from three sources:
(1) The Colombian Institute for Educational Evaluation provided scores for all high
school seniors who took the Icfes between 1998 and 2012. It also provided college
exit exam fields and scores for all exam takers in 2004–2011 (discussed below).
(2) The Ministry of Education provided enrollment and graduation records for students
entering college between 1998 and 2012. These include enrollment date, graduation or
dropout date, program of study, college, and aggregate percentile on the Icfes exam.
These data cover roughly 90 percent of all college enrollees; the Ministry omits a
number of smaller colleges due to poor and inconsistent reporting.
(3) The Ministry of Social Protection provided monthly earnings records for formal sector
workers during 2008–2012. These come from data on contributions to pension and
health insurance funds. We calculate average daily earnings by dividing base monthly
earnings for pension contributions by the number of formal employment days in each
76 The Ministry of Education classifies institutions into five types: universities, university institutes, technol-
ogy schools, technology institutes, and technical/professional institutes; we define the first two as colleges.
We also focus on the Ministry’s “university-level” majors, which have normative durations of 4-5 years.
77 Icfes stands for Institute for the Promotion of Higher Education, the former acronym for the agency that
administers the exam. The agency is now the Colombian Institute for Educational Evaluation, and the exam
is called Saber 11°. We use the name Icfes to match the designation during the period covered by our data.
78 Angrist, Bettinger and Kremer (2006) and our personal communications with the Colombian Institute
for Educational Evaluation suggest that more than 90 percent of high school seniors take the exam. The
test-taking rate is high in part because the government uses Icfes exam results to evaluate high schools.
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month and averaging across months.79 This agency also provided four-digit economic
activity codes for the first job in which a worker appears in their records.
3.2. Ability and college reputation. We define two measures of ability that correspond
to those in the theory (Section 2). The first is student i’s score on the Icfes admission exam,
which we denote by τi. Throughout, we express Icfes scores as percentiles relative to all high
school seniors who took the exam in the same year. The second is the reputation of a college
s, denoted by Rs, defined as the mean Icfes score of its graduates.80 To avoid capturing any
effects from the exit exam rollout on reputation, we calculate Rs using graduates who took
the Icfes exam in 2000–2003.
Icfes and reputation are divided by ten so that both measures range from 0–10 and one
unit is ten percentile points. One unit of reputation is about one standard deviation in this
measure, and it is roughly sufficient to move from either the 75th to the 100th percentile, or
from the 50th to the 75th. Anecdotally, a student applying to a very top college might also
apply to one with one point lower in reputation as a “safety school.”
Figure 1 shows that there is substantial variation in ability both across and within colleges.
The horizontal axis depicts the reputation of 136 colleges that have at least ten graduates per
cohort. The height of the black dots indicates the median Icfes percentile among graduates
from each school, while the vertical bars show 25th–75th percentile ranges. There is a mass
of colleges near the middle of the reputation distribution and fewer near the extremes. In
addition, graduates from the same college differ significantly in ability. For example, the
interquartile range at the median institution is 32 percentile points, which extends beyond
the mean Icfes values of more than 80 percent of all colleges.
79 Our theoretical predictions are for log wages, but our records only allow us to calculate earnings per day,
not per hour. Colombian labor market survey data shows that hours are relatively constant early in college
graduates’ careers, which suggests that our results are not due to the use of daily earnings.
80 In Colombia, students apply not just to a college but to a college/major pair. We define reputation at
the college level to focus on the signaling component of a student’s choice of institution. Major choice may
also convey information about a student’s ability. Below we show that our main results are similar when we
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Figure 1. College reputation and individual ability
Notes: The sample for this figure includes all high seniors who took the Icfes in 2000–2003 and graduated from one
of the 136 colleges with 40 or more graduates from the 2000–2003 Icfes cohorts (i.e., not less than ten per cohort).
We define Icfes percentiles based on students’ performance relative to all 11th grade exam takers in their same year.
Percentiles are calculated using the average of eight core component scores: biology, chemistry, geography, history,
language, mathematics, philosophy, and physics. College reputation is the mean Icfes percentile among graduates
from each of the 136 colleges. Black dots are the median Icfes percentiles among graduates from each school, and
vertical lines are the 25th–75th Icfes percentile ranges.
3.3. The exit exam. In 2004 the agency that administers the Icfes test began another major
initiative by introducing field-specific college exit exams. These exams are standardized and
administered in every college that offers a related program. Exam fields range from relatively
academic in orientation (e.g., economics and physics) to relatively professional (e.g., nursing
and occupational therapy). The stated intent of this effort was to introduce elements of
accountability into the college market. School-level aggregate scores were made available
and used by news outlets as part of college rankings.
Rather than focus on its accountability dimension, we analyze the exit exam as potentially
affecting students’ capacity to signal their skill. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence
that many students list exit exam scores on their CVs or on online profiles.81 The exit exam
81 It may be puzzling that, anecdotally, some students list their exit but not their Icfes exam scores on
their CVs. One potential explanation is that the Icfes scores are more difficult to interpret. The Icfes exam
yields scores on eight or more different subjects, and during the period we analyze the testing agency did
not provide an aggregate score to students. By contrast, during the period of our analysis the exit exams
yielded a single score in a subject related to a student’s major.
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may also affect faculty recommendations or students’ search behavior after learning their
position in the national distribution of exam takers.
3.4. Identification. To identify the effects of this new signal of skill, we exploit the gradual
rollout of the exam fields in an “intent to treat” spirit. Exams were introduced in 55 fields
between 2004 and 2007. The initial fields were those related to popular majors such as
economics and industrial engineering; fields corresponding to less common degrees were
introduced later (Appendix B.A lists all fields and their introduction year). During this
time the exams were not required, although they were taken by the majority of students in
related majors. In 2009, the exit exam became mandatory for graduation, and a “generic
competency” exam was made available for majors without a corresponding field.
Although the exit exams were field-specific, during the period we study there was no formal
system assigning college majors to exam fields. This match is necessary to determine which
majors were treated. We therefore perform this assignment ourselves using the Ministry of
Education’s 54 major groups, which we label programs.82 We assign each of the 54 programs
to one of the 55 exam fields if the program name appears in the name of the field exam.
We assign programs without matching names to the generic competency exam introduced in
2009. Appendices B.A and B.B describe this matching procedure and show that our main
results are robust to several alternative matching methods.
Table 1 summarizes the resulting match. For each year it lists the number of matched
programs and the program areas they originate in. Programs related to agronomy, business,
education, and health received exam fields almost exclusively in 2004, while natural science
programs did so in 2005. Programs related to fine arts had no corresponding field until the
introduction of the generic exam in 2009. Some programs in engineering and social sciences
received fields in 2004, while others had none up to 2009. Most of our identification comes
82 These programs aggregate approximately 2,000 college major names that vary across and within schools.
For instance, the Ministry might combine a major named Business Administration at one college with one
labeled Business Management at another if it considers that these have similar content.
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Table 1. Introduction of exit exam fields and matched college programs
Exit exam Matched
fields programs Program area College programs
2004 fields 30 Agronomy Agronomy Animal husbandry Veterinary medicine
Business Accounting Administration Economics
Education Education
Engineering Agricultural eng. Architecture Chemical eng.
Civil eng. Electrical eng. Electronic eng.
Environmental eng. Food eng. Industrial eng.
Livestock eng. Mechanical eng. Systems eng.
Health Bacteriology Dentistry Medicine
Nursing Nutrition Optometry
Physical therapy
Social sciences Communication Law Psychology
Sociology
2005 fields 5 Natural sciences Biology Chemistry Geology
Math/statistics Physics
2006 fields 1 Health Surgical tools
2007 fields 1 Social sciences Physical education
2009 generic 17 Engineering Administrative eng. Biomedical eng. Mining eng.
exam Other eng.
Fine arts Advertising Design Music
Plastic/visual art Representative art Other fine arts
Health Public health
Social sciences Anthropology Geography/history Language/literature
Library science Philosophy Political science
Total 54
Notes: This table displays the match of college programs to the exit exam field and generic exam years. Programs
are the Ministry of Education’s 54 core knowledge groups, which are further categorized into the listed eight program
“areas.” Appendix B.A lists the exam fields and details how we match them to programs.
from a comparison of 2004 programs and 2009 programs. Engineering and social science
programs potentially provide a compelling comparison because they appear in both groups.
We define a binary treatment variable δpc, which equals one if students in program p
and graduation cohort c had an available exit exam in the matched field. Because students
typically take the exam one year before graduating, the first treated cohort is that which
graduated one year after the introduction of the field assigned to its program.83 For example,
δpc = 1 for psychology students who graduated in 2005 or later because the psychology field
83 Across all cohorts in our sample, approximately 58 percent of test takers took the exam one year before






























Figure 2. Proportion of students taking exit exam by program group
Notes: Lines represent program groups defined by the year in which the program’s assigned exit exam field was
introduced (see Table 1). The figure includes 2003–2011 graduates from all programs in our data, even those excluded
from our main analysis sample for reasons described below.
exam was introduced in 2004. δpc = 0 for all anthropology students who graduated before
2010 because the testing agency did not produce a related exam field.
Figure 2 shows that the introduction of exit exam fields led to sharp increases in the
fraction of students taking the test. For example, the test taking rate in 2004 programs
jumped from 10 to 55 percent with the 2005 cohort, the first we define as treated for this
program group. Students in 2009 programs rarely took the exam until the cohort following
the exit exam mandate in 2009.84
To summarize, we define a treatment indicator, δpc, at the program-cohort rather than at
the individual level. Thus we analyze the introduction of the exams in an “intent to treat”
spirit. This reflects that beyond the fact that students were not required to take exit exams
during the period we study, they had no obligation to disclose their performance if they
did (although not doing so might in itself convey information). Thus, while we can assert
that the introduction of the exam into a student’s field potentially affected the information
84 The existence of exam takers in the 2003–2004 cohorts indicates that a small number of students took
the exam in their final year or after graduating. The 75 percent test-taking rate in the 2010–2011 cohorts
suggests that compliance with the exam mandate was not universal.
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Table 2. Summary statistics for exit exam sample
Year program received exit exam
Variable 2004 2005 2006 2009 All
# graduates in 2003–2009 131,962 2,014 1,043 11,033 146,052
# earnings obs. in 2008–2012 528,435 7,418 4,516 41,433 581,802
# programs 27 1 1 10 39
# colleges 94 5 5 21 94
Reputation 7.45 8.50 5.88 8.26 7.52
(1.21) (0.66) (0.42) (0.96) (1.21)
Icfes 7.66 9.04 6.36 8.60 7.74
(2.29) (1.09) (2.27) (1.71) (2.26)
Log average daily earnings 10.87 10.71 10.66 10.84 10.87
(0.70) (0.66) (0.51) (0.76) (0.70)
Return to reputation 0.138 0.041 -0.224 0.031 0.133
(0.019) (0.040) (0.063) (0.049) (0.020)
Return to ability 0.028 0.009 0.015 0.049 0.029
(0.003) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.003)
Notes: Log average daily earnings are for the year 2012. Parentheses contain standard deviations except for the
returns to reputation and ability. These rows display coefficients on reputation and Icfes from a regression of log
average daily earnings in 2008–2012 on these two variables, program-cohort dummies, and a quadratic in experience
(defined as calendar year minus graduation cohort) interacted with program dummies. We run these regressions
separately for each program group using only 2003–2004 graduates. The parentheses under these coefficients contain
standard errors clustered at the college level.
available in that individual’s labor market, we do not know precisely how it affected what
firms observed about her.85
3.5. Sample. We analyze the effects of the exit exam using the 2003–2009 graduation co-
horts. With these we can focus cleanly on the period in which signals of skill were introduced
into a subset of fields.86 Table 2 presents summary statistics separately for program groups
defined by the year each program received its assigned exit exam field. Approximately 90
percent of students graduate from programs that received an exam field in 2004; most of the
remaining graduates had no corresponding field until the 2009 generic exam.
85 The potential endogeneity of exam taking also explains why we do not use the exit exam scores in our main
analysis, either to define reputation or as a measure of graduates’ skill. It is also possible that employers’
perceptions of students from programs without exit exams were altered by information on programs in the
same colleges that received exams. However, such spillover effects would bias our results toward finding no
effects of the exit exams.
86 This is no longer clearly the case after the 2009 cohort due to several structural changes in the exit exams.
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We observe earnings for these graduates in 2008–2012. This means that we only observe
earnings several years after graduation for cohorts prior to the exit exam introduction (2003–
2004), while we observe earnings closer to graduation for cohorts after. The next section
describes how we address this data constraint.
Our sample includes 39 programs offered at 94 colleges. These numbers are smaller than
the total number of programs defined by the Ministry of Education (54) and the number of
colleges in our records (136). We exclude programs and colleges that have too few observa-
tions to precisely estimate a return to reputation among graduates from the same program—a
necessity for our empirical specification below. Appendices B.C and B.D provide details on
the sample selection and show that our main results are robust to the key restrictions.
All colleges in the sample offer at least one of the 27 programs with a 2004 exam field,
while only 25 schools offer one or more of the 12 programs with post-2004 programs. The
distribution of Icfes scores is right-skewed with mean around the 77th percentile—or 7.7
points. This reflects the fact that less than half of all high school graduates eventually enroll
in college and, of those, about 50 percent graduate. Colleges that offer 2009 programs have
reputations that are about eight percentile points higher on average than colleges that offer
2004 programs, but their graduates have slightly lower average daily earnings.
The last two rows in Table 2 report the returns to reputation and ability (Icfes) within
each program group. These are analogous to the r and a coefficients from equation (2) in
Section 2, except that these are averages across the multiple years of earnings we observe
(2008–2012). In Table 2 we use only the two pre-exit exam cohorts (2003–2004) to estimate
these returns; this provides a useful benchmark for the results below. 2004 programs have
higher returns to reputation than the other program groups; a ten percentile increase in
college reputation is associated with a 14 percent increase in earnings for 2004 programs,
but only a three percent increase for 2009 programs.87
87 The negative return to reputation for the 2006 program illustrates the empirical challenge of trying to
estimate a return to reputation within each program. Not only can these returns be noisy when only a
few schools offer a program, but the value of going to a higher-ranked school depends on the labor market
that students from the program commonly enter (in this case, the program trains surgical instruments
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These differences in program characteristics and returns raise questions as to whether
delayed exit exam programs are a good counterfactual for early exit exam programs. We
adopt several strategies to address these in our empirical analysis below.
3.6. Empirical specifications and results. This section estimates a benchmark specifi-
cation that tests the effects of the exit exam on the returns to reputation and ability. We
complement these results with four types of robustness checks. First, we add further controls
for labor market experience and graduation cohort to address issues related to the structure
of our data and to the years for which we observe earnings. Second, we restrict identification
to programs with similar characteristics to address the non-random rollout of exam fields.
Third, we explore the sensitivity of our results to competing hypotheses and other measures
of college reputation. Fourth, we use balance and placebo regressions to test for differential
sorting or concurrent macroeconomic trends.
3.6.1. Benchmark specification. We follow Card and Krueger (1992), who ask how state-
level policies affect the rate of return to education. Note that the return to education is a
slope—the impact of years of schooling on earnings. The issue we tackle is analogous—we
ask how the exit exams affected the impacts of college reputation and Icfes on earnings.
Our benchmark specification relates changes in the returns to reputation and ability to the
staggered rollout of the exam fields. Consider the regression:
(6) wipct = dpc + fp(t) + rpcRsi + apcτi + eipct,
where wipct is the log average daily earnings for student i in program p, graduation cohort
c, and with potential labor market experience t, defined as calendar year minus graduation
cohort. dpc are dummies for program-cohort cells and fp(t) is a quadratic in experience
interacted with program dummies. This “first-step” specification estimates returns to college
reputation, rpc, and to ability, apc, separately for each program-cohort cell.
technicians). For related issues see Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2013a) and Urzua, Rodriguez and
Reyes (2015).
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A second-step regression relates these returns to our treatment variable δpc, which equals
one for students with exit exam fields assigned to their program and cohort. For example,
the second-step specification for the return to reputation is:
(7) r̂pc = µp + µc + βrδpc + υpc,
where µp and µc are program and cohort dummies and υpc is the residual. This is a standard
differences in differences specification applied to slopes rather than to levels—it controls for
average program and cohort differences in the returns to reputation (via the fixed effects µp
and µc) and identifies the effect of the exit exam, βr, through changes in returns across both
programs and cohorts.
Card and Krueger (1992) use a two-step procedure. We opt for a single-step specification to
identify changes in the relative weights of college reputation and Icfes on earnings. Plugging
(7) and a similar equation for âpc into (6) yields our benchmark specification:
(8) wipct = dpc + fp(t) + (µp + µc + βrδpc)Rsi + (νp + νc + βaδpc)τi + eipct.
Specification (8) is analogous to equation (3) from Section 2, but it uses differences in
differences variation in treatment. It controls for program-specific experience effects and
level differences in daily earnings across program-cohort cells, and it allows each program
and cohort to have different returns to reputation and Icfes through the µ and ν dummies.
The coefficients of interest, βr and βa, are identified off variation in exposure to the exit
exam across both programs and cohorts, defined by our treatment variable δpc.
Proposition 1 predicts βr < 0 and βa > 0. This comes from the assumption that employers
use both labor market reputation, Rs, and other signals of worker skill, yi, in setting initial
wages. We assume that the exit exam increases the precision of yi, for example, through the
appearance of scores on CVs. Our measure of reputation, Rs, is a better predictor of Rs,
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while Icfes scores, τi, are a better predictor of yi. Thus as the market relies less on Rs and
more on yi, the return to reputation falls (βr < 0) and the return to ability rises (βa > 0).88
Column (A) of Table 3 estimates benchmark specification (8). Like all other columns in
Table 3 it reports only the βr and βa coefficients on the interactions of reputation and Icfes
with our treatment variable δpc. The results suggest that relative to students in programs and
cohorts without exams, students exposed to the exit exams see their daily earnings become
more correlated with incoming collegiate ability and less correlated with college reputation.
The reputation effect is slightly lower than one third of the mean return to reputation in
Table 2; the Icfes coefficient is slightly higher than one half of the mean return to Icfes.89
Figure 3 illustrates the benchmark results in column (A) using only 2004 and 2009 pro-
grams. Panel A displays the linear relationship between reputation and residuals from a
regression of log earnings on Icfes, experience, and program-cohort cells. The light-red lines
depict programs with 2004 exit exam fields (Table 1) and the black lines contain programs
that did not receive a field until 2009. In each case the solid lines describe students who
graduated prior to the introduction of all exit exams, and the dashed lines students who
graduated after the introduction of the initial exam fields. In 2004 programs, earnings are
less correlated with reputation in cohorts following the exit exam introduction. In 2009
programs, the correlation between reputation and earnings is similar in all cohorts.
Panel B displays the analogous linear relationship between Icfes and log earnings residu-
als that control for reputation. The correlation between Icfes and earnings declines across
cohorts in both program groups, but the decline is more pronounced in programs without
an exam field. This is consistent with a stronger correlation between earnings and ability in
early exit exam programs in the presence of an aggregate decline in the return to Icfes.
88 Although this prediction results from higher precision in employers’ initial information set, the changes in
the relative returns to reputation and Icfes are also evident (but less pronounced) at periods t > 0 because
wages continue to reflect initial information. Our data do not allow us to observe early career earnings for
pre-exit exam cohorts (2003–2004), so our estimates reflect changes in returns at higher experience levels.
89 Appendix B.E presents the program-cohort level returns to reputation and Icfes from the first-step equation
(6). Averaging and differencing these returns yields estimates similar to column (A) of Table 3.
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Table 3. Exit exam effects on returns to reputation and ability
Dependent variable: log average daily earnings
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Experience & Restriction to
cohort controls similar programs
Benchmark Within Linear S. sciences & Within Within
specification experience trends engineering r̂p quartiles âp quartiles
Reputation × δpc −0.041 −0.033 −0.034 −0.046 −0.018 −0.053
(0.017) (0.015) (0.028) (0.026) (0.010) (0.017)
Icfes × δpc 0.017 0.018 0.012 0.038 0.018 0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004)
N 581,802 267,924 267,924 273,590 581,802 581,802
R2 0.258 0.224 0.224 0.266 0.258 0.258
# programs 39 39 39 22 39 39
Experience levels 0–9 4–7 4–7 0–9 0–9 0–9
Notes: All columns report coefficients on the interactions of reputation and Icfes with the treatment variable δpc.
Regressions in columns (A) and (C)-(F) include a quadratic in experience interacted with program dummies, dummies
for program-cohort cells, and interactions of both reputation and Icfes with program and cohort dummies. Column
(B) includes dummies for program-cohort-experience cells and interactions of both reputation and Icfes with program-
experience and cohort-experience dummies. The sample for each regression is restricted to the experience levels listed
in the bottom row. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the program level.
Column (C) adds interactions of both linear experience and cohort terms with college reputation and Icfes for each
program. Column (D) restricts the sample to social sciences and engineering program areas and adds interactions of
dummies for social-science-area-cohort cells with both reputation and Icfes. Column (E) adds interactions of both
reputation and Icfes with dummies for cells defined by cohort and each program’s quartile of the returns to reputation
estimated from 2003–2004 cohorts. Column (F) adds interactions of both reputation and Icfes with dummies for cells
defined by cohort and each program’s quartile of the returns to Icfes estimated from 2003–2004 cohorts.
There are two sources of caution in interpreting the results from (8)—one related to data
constraints and one related to identification. The first arises because our data cover only
seven cohorts with earnings observed over five years; hence we do not observe pre-treatment
cohorts at very early experience levels. The second relates to possible violations of the usual
assumption of parallel trends implicit in differences in differences estimation; evidence that
such violations may be important comes from Table 2 and from the different pre-exit exam
slopes in Figure 3. We now describe robustness checks that address these two issues.
3.6.2. Experience and cohort controls. Our sample includes 2003–2009 cohorts with earnings
measured in 2008–2012. This means we cannot disentangle a first-period effect of the exit
exam from an effect that varies with experience because we do not observe initial earnings for
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Figure 3. Exit exam effects—2004 and 2009 programs
Notes: In Panel A, the dependent variable is the residual from regressing log average daily earnings on Icfes, an
experience quadratic interacted with program dummies, and program-cohort cell dummies separately for each program
and cohort group. Lines depict the linear relationship between these earnings residuals and college reputation for
each program and cohort group. Dots are the mean earnings residual at each college, calculated separately for each
program and cohort group.
In Panel B, the dependent variable is the residual from regressing log average daily earnings on reputation, an
experience quadratic interacted with program dummies, and program-cohort cell dummies separately for each program
and cohort group. Lines depict the linear relationship between these earnings residuals and Icfes percentiles for each
program and cohort group. Dots are the mean earnings residual in each of 20 equally-spaced Icfes percentile bins,
calculated separately for each program and cohort group.
pre-exit exam cohorts. As a result, our benchmark results are based on returns to reputation
and ability that average across experience levels.
Our data structure raises concerns if there is variation across programs in how college
reputation or ability correlate with the returns to experience. For example, suppose that the
return to reputation rises more quickly with experience in programs with early exit exam
fields. This could mechanically generate a βr < 0 estimate since the post-exam cohorts
(2005–2009) have lower potential experience than the pre-exam cohorts (2003–2004).
To address this we add further controls for experience to the benchmark specification. To
illustrate, suppose we estimated (8) using only earnings at five years of potential experience,
thus ensuring that we are comparing exposed and unexposed cohorts at the same seniority.
This regression could only include 2003–2007 cohorts because we do not observe earnings five
years out for 2008–2009 graduates. We could repeat this estimation for any level of potential
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experience at which we observe cohorts prior to the introduction of all exit exams, which is
between four (using 2004–2008 graduates) and seven (using 2003–2005 graduates) years of
experience.90 This procedure would yield four college reputation treatment effects and four
Icfes treatment effects, one for each year of potential experience. We combine these into a
single estimate by removing the experience quadratics from (8), restricting observations to
those between four and seven years of experience, and fully interacting all fixed effects with
experience dummies:
(9) wipct = dpct + (µpt + µct + βrδpc)Rsi + (νpt + νct + βaδpc)τi + eipct,
where dpct are fixed effects for program-cohort-experience cells, and µ and ν are fixed effects
for program-experience and cohort-experience cells. The coefficients βr and βa are thus
averages of the experience-specific estimates, identified only off variation within experience
levels. If unobserved program-level variation in the interaction of reputation and experience
mechanically biases our estimate of βr downward, including these experience controls should
move the estimated coefficient toward zero.
The addition of experience controls decreases the magnitude of the reputation effect only
slightly (Column (B), Table 3). Program differences in the returns to experience do not
appear to drive the reduction in the return to reputation. This is also true for the return to
Icfes; the estimates in columns (A) and (B) are nearly identical.
A related test is to allow the returns to reputation and ability to follow program-specific
linear trends in both experience t and cohort c. For this we add linear trend interactions with
reputation (µptRs and µpcRs) and with Icfes (νptτi and νpcτi) to the benchmark specifica-
tion.91 Including experience trends alone yields similar estimates to those from specification
(9) since we limit the sample to earnings between four and seven years of experience. Adding
90 In principle, we can identify treatment effects using post-2004 cohorts since two programs in our sample
received the exit exam in 2005 and 2006. In practice, over 90 percent of our sample is comprised of students
from 2004 programs, so regressions that exclude the 2003–2004 cohorts yield noisy estimates.
91 The full specification with linear trends in experience and cohort is:
wipct = dpc + fp(t) + (µp + µpt+ µpc+ µc + βrδpc)Rsi + (νp + νpt+ νpc+ νc + βaδpc)τi + eipct.
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cohort trends is the typical differences in differences test of adding linear terms in the “time”
dimension. Cohort trends absorb linear program-specific paths in the returns to reputation
and ability that predate the exit exam and should have a measurable impact on our point
estimates if these paths are important.92
The results appear in column (C) of Table 3. The coefficient on the reputation effect is
nearly identical to column (B), while the Icfes effect falls only slightly. The consistency of
these magnitudes argues against the hypothesis of divergent trends across programs, although
the estimates in column (C) are substantially less precise. This loss in precision suggests
the effects of exit exam were not immediate but rather materialized over several years—an
intuitive result if the market processed the tests gradually.
3.6.3. Restriction to similar programs. Our key identifying assumption is that in the absence
of the exit exams, there would have been parallel trends in the returns to reputation and
ability among programs exposed and not exposed to the exams. One fact that might cast
doubt on this is that programs that received exams early have higher returns to reputation
(Table 2). To address this we focus on comparable programs. We do so in three ways: i)
restricting attention to social sciences and engineering, areas that have multiple programs
in different exam year groups (see Table 1);93 ii) stratifying programs by quartiles of the
pre-exit exam returns to reputation, and iii) stratifying programs by quartiles of the pre-
exam returns to Icfes. In each case we define program groups G and supplement equation
(8) with dummies for group-cohort cells interacted with reputation and Icfes (e.g., µGcRs
and νGcτi).94 Thus, βr and βa are only identified by variation in exposure to the exit exam
within groups of programs that have common characteristics.
92 Our ability to control for pre-existing cohort trends is limited, however, because we only observe two
cohorts prior to the exit exam introduction (2003–2004).
93 The health program area also includes a single program with a delayed exit exam field (surgical tools).
Estimates analogous to column (D) that include health programs yield similar coefficients, but they are not
significant because identification in the health program area comes from this single program.
94 The full specification with program group controls is:
wipct = dpc + fp(t) + (µp + µc + µGc + βrδpc)Rsi + (νp + νc + νGc + βaδpc)τi + eipct.
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Column (D) in Table 3 uses only programs in social sciences and engineering. The rep-
utation effect is similar in magnitude to those in previous columns, while the Icfes effect is
more than double. Both are statistically significant at the ten percent level despite the fact
that the program restriction substantially reduces precision.
In column (E) we define program groups by pre-exit exam returns to reputation. We first
estimate a return to reputation for each of the 39 programs in our sample using 2003–2004
graduates (i.e., r̂p,2003−2004).95 We then define program groups G by quartiles of these returns,
with 9–10 programs per group. This directly addresses the concern that 2004 programs have
higher returns to reputation—in this case we compare delayed exam programs with low
reputation returns only to the subset of 2004 programs with similarly low returns. The
reputation effect in column (E) is smaller than in earlier specifications, consistent with some
inflation in our estimates due to pre-treatment differences; but it is still significant because
the standard error decreases. This suggests that the effects in this specification are identified
off more similar programs because there is less noise in estimating treatment effects.
Column (F) is similar to column (E), but we define program groups as quartiles of pre-exit
exam returns to Icfes (i.e., âp,2003−2004). This specification tests the influence of pre-treatment
program differences in returns to ability. The resulting Icfes effect is also smaller than in the
benchmark specification but more precisely estimated.
3.6.4. Competing hypotheses. The results in Table 3 are consistent with the exit exams trans-
mitting information on ability, but the exams may have had other non-informational con-
sequences. For example, school-mean exit exam scores were publicized, which may have
altered employers’ perceptions of colleges’ labor market reputations. The exit exams may
also have prompted colleges to change curricula or add test-preparation sessions, or individ-
uals to work harder in preparation for the exams. Such accountability-related reforms may
also have affected the observed returns to reputation and ability.
95 For this we estimate equation (6) using only 2003–2004 graduates and replace the rpc and apc coefficients
with rp and ap. Appendix B.E presents these program-specific returns to reputation (and returns to ability).
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In Appendix A.F we develop theoretical predictions that help distinguish between the
informational and accountability-related impacts of the exit exams. The key insight is that
accountability responses affect individuals’ skill accumulation while in college—which is cap-
tured by the vs term in our model—and not their pre-college ability, αi. This generates dif-
ferent predictions as to how the exam introduction affects the returns to college reputation
and to ability.
For example, in regressions that include both Rs and τi, an informational mechanism
predicts a decrease in the return to reputation and an increase in the return to Icfes scores.
However, accountability mechanisms predict no effect on the conditional return to τi because
Rs is a better measure of college membership attributes, vs. Thus while accountability
responses could potentially explain the reputation effects in Table 3, they cannot explain the
Icfes effects.
Further, signaling and accountability mechanisms generate different predictions regarding
the unconditional returns to Rs and τi—that is, the coefficients in regressions that include
only one of these characteristics. Under a signaling hypothesis, the exit exams should have
no effect on the unconditional return to reputation if Rs is observed by employers, since in-
formation from individuals’ exit exam scores merely confirms the labor market’s expectations
on average. Further, the exit exams should lead to an increase in the unconditional return to
τi, but this increase should be smaller than when one also includes Rs in the regressions. By
contrast, the main prediction from an accountability hypothesis is that the unconditional
returns to Rs and to τi should have the same sign; this arises because any effects of the
exams on vs that are correlated with Rs will also, by definition, be correlated with τi.
Columns (A) and (B) in Table 4 present these unconditional returns to reputation and to
ability by replicating our benchmark specification with only reputation terms (column (A))
or only Icfes terms (column (B)) included. As predicted by the signaling hypothesis, the
unconditional return to reputation is not statistically different from zero, and the uncon-
ditional return to ability is positive but smaller than the conditional return (column (A),
Table 3). Further, the unconditional returns to reputation and ability are oppositely signed.
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Table 4. Exit exam effects under other reputation measures and hypotheses
Dependent variable: log average daily earnings
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Unconditional returns Other reputation measures
Mean Icfes 1 − Mean log
Rs Icfes at college- admit rate earnings
only only program at college at college
Reputation × δpc −0.029 −0.038 −0.122 −0.044
(0.018) (0.022) (0.066) (0.080)
Icfes × δpc 0.005 0.019 0.012 0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
N 581,802 581,802 581,802 581,802 581,802
R2 0.253 0.231 0.258 0.236 0.274
# programs 39 39 39 39 39
Mean return to reputation 0.161 0.132 0.098 0.700
Mean return to ability 0.069 0.027 0.064 0.035
Notes: All columns report coefficients on the interactions of reputation and Icfes with the treatment variable δpc.
Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the program level.
Regressions in columns (A)-(B) are identical to column (A) in Table 3, except column (A) excludes Icfes and all
its interaction terms, and column (B) excludes reputation and all its interaction terms.
Regressions in columns (C)-(E) are identical to column (A) in Table 3, except they use different reputation
measures. Column (C) defines reputation as in our benchmark procedure (i.e., mean Icfes), but at the college-
program level rather than the college level. Column (D) defines reputation as one minus the college admission
rate (i.e., 1− admitted/applied) using aggregate admission data from the Ministry of Education. We include only
university-level programs with a positive number of applicants and admitted students in a given cohort, and we
average across all cohorts for which we have data (2007–2013). Column (E) defines reputation as the mean log daily
earnings at each college using 2003–2004 graduates in our sample. We include only earnings at five years of potential
experience, the earliest we can observe for both cohorts.
The mean returns to reputation and ability are calculated from specifications similar to those in each column, but
they use only 2003–2004 graduates and include only a single reputation and Icfes term.
Thus, although the standard errors on these unconditional returns are too large to draw
definitive conclusions, the results are more consistent with a signaling mechanism than with
an accountability-related mechanism.
Taken together, the effects of the exit exams on the conditional and unconditional returns
show that the strongest empirical result is the shift in weight from a group-level measure
of ability—reputation—to an individual measure—Icfes scores. This is the effect captured
by our benchmark specification, and it is harder to explain through channels other than
signaling.
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3.6.5. Other reputation measures. Our measure of reputation, Rs, captures the expected
“admission exam” ability of graduates from a given college. The exit exams may also have
provided information to employers on other dimensions of graduates’ skill. Table 4 explores
some of these. Columns (C)-(E) present results that use different measures of college repu-
tation but are otherwise identical to our benchmark specification (Table 3, column (A)).
Column (C) defines reputation as mean Icfes at the college-program level rather than the
college level, which allows schools to have strengths that vary by major. This is relevant be-
cause Colombian students apply to college/major pairs. We use a school-level definition for
our main analysis to focus on the information conveyed by a student’s choice of institution,
but major choice may provide additional information on an individual’s ability. The magni-
tudes of the results in column (C) are nearly identical to those for our benchmark results,
though the standard errors are larger. This likely reflects the fact that the college-program
reputations are calculated from smaller samples.96
Column (D) defines a college’s reputation as one minus its admission rate (this measure is
thus positively correlated with Rs). The results mirror those in our benchmark specification.
The similarity of these results reflects the fact that Rs is mechanically correlated with other
desirable school attributes when colleges use admission scores to select students.
Column (E) defines reputation as the average log earnings of a college’s graduates.97 This
yields our best measure of labor market reputation, Rs, which includes both pre-college
ability, αi, and attributes related to college membership, vs. The exit exams led to an
increasing return to Icfes and a lower return to reputation, though the reputation effect is
statistically insignificant. Reputation measures like average earnings do not provide a clean
test of signaling, however, because they may be correlated with ability even conditional on
individual Icfes scores.
96 Appendix B.L replicates all the robustness tests in Table 3 using college-program level reputation. The
point estimates for both the reputation effects and the Icfes effects are similar to our main results across all
specifications. The standard errors are typically larger, however, and thus the reputation effects correspond-
ing to columns (B) and (D) of Table 3 are not statistically significant.
97 We calculate this using only pre-exit exam cohorts (2003–2004) and earnings measured five years after
graduation, the earliest we can observe for these cohorts. Results are similar when we use earnings measured
in the year of graduation for cohorts exposed to the exit exams.
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A related alternative hypothesis is that the exit exams enhanced the transmission of in-
formation on characteristics other than college reputation. This could explain the pattern of
results in Table 3 if these characteristics are correlated with college reputation. To explore
this hypothesis, in Appendix B.F we replicate our benchmark regressions including other
individual characteristics—gender, mother’s education, and family income—instead of rep-
utation. These alternative specifications show that the returns to other characteristics also
fell with the exit exams, but none of the results are statistically significant. Further, in a
specification that includes all characteristics jointly, only the reputation effects are signifi-
cant. Although we cannot rule out signaling effects on characteristics not included in our
data, this provides evidence that the strongest effects of the exit exams were on the return
to college reputation.
3.6.6. Placebo and balance tests. A further placebo test replicates our main analysis using
college drop-outs rather than graduates. Drop-outs are a compelling placebo group because
they enrolled in the same colleges and programs as graduates but exhibited little change in
exam taking. Columns (A) and (B) in Table 5 document this by regressing an indicator for
taking the exit exam on program dummies, cohort dummies, and our treatment variable, δpc.
For graduates, exposure to the exit exam is associated with a 50 percentage point increase
in the likelihood of taking the exam; for drop-outs it is unrelated.
Column (C) replicates our benchmark result for graduates from specification (8) (Table 3,
column (A)). Column (D) estimates the same specification using drop-outs. There is little
evidence that changes in drop-outs’ returns to reputation and ability are correlated with the
introduction of the exit exams. If anything, the return to reputation for drop-outs increases
with the exam rollout, although the coefficient is noisily estimated. The point estimate on
the Icfes effect is close to zero. To the extent that drop-outs and graduates are subject to
similar enrollment or macroeconomic trends, this finding supports the notion that our main
results are attributable to the exit exams.
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Table 5. Placebo test using college drop-outs
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Took the exit exam Log average daily earnings
Graduates Drop-outs Graduates Drop-outs
Exposed to exit exam (δpc) 0.500 0.025
(0.054) (0.020)
Reputation × δpc −0.041 0.011
(0.017) (0.032)
Icfes × δpc 0.017 −0.002
(0.006) (0.011)
N 146,052 77,586 581,802 259,258
R2 0.335 0.026 0.258 0.118
# programs 39 39 39 39
Mean exam taking rate 0.070 0.162
Mean return to reputation 0.133 0.040
Mean return to ability 0.029 0.032
Notes: The sample for columns (A) and (C) includes college graduates and their earning observations (i.e., the same
sample as in Table 2). The sample for columns (B) and (D) includes students from the same colleges and programs
who dropped out in 2003–2009, and their earnings observations.
The dependent variable in columns (A) and (B) is an indicator for taking the exit exam. The regressions include
program dummies and cohort dummies, where cohorts are defined by graduation year for college graduates and drop-
out year for college drop-outs. We report the coefficient on the treatment variable δpc, which we define identically
for graduation and drop-out cohorts.
The dependent variable in columns (C) and (D) is log average daily earnings. We report coefficients on the
interactions of reputation and Icfes with the treatment variable δpc. Column (C) is identical to column (A) in Table
3. The specification includes a quadratic in experience interacted with program dummies, dummies for program-
cohort cells, and interactions of both reputation and Icfes with program and cohort dummies. Column (D) uses the
same specification with cohorts and experience defined by drop-out year.
The means at the bottom of the table are calculated using only 2003–2004 graduates.
In all regressions, parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the program level.
Drop-outs are not a perfect counterfactual for graduates for several reasons. First, as
shown in Table 5, drop-outs have smaller pre-treatment returns to reputation, although
these returns are positive on average. Thus the information conveyed by drop-outs’ college
identities may differ from that of graduates. Further, drop-outs spent less time in college, and
thus have less exposure to any potential accountability responses induced by the exit exam.
However, if our main results were driven by accountability reforms rather than signaling,
one would expect to see that drop-outs who stayed in college longer have treatment effects
more similar to those of graduates. We find no evidence of this.
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The drop-out placebo test is also consistent with balance regressions reported in Appen-
dix B.G, which ask whether the exit exam rollout was correlated with changes in graduates’
observable characteristics. If the field-specific introduction of the exit exams were correlated
with trends in school or program choice, this should appear as changes in average reputation
or Icfes scores across programs. There is little evidence of this channel. Changes in reputa-
tion and Icfes scores in programs with access to the exit exams are small and statistically
insignificant.98
Appendix B.G also explores the effect of the exit exams on the probability of formal
employment—a potential sample selection concern since we do not observe earnings for non-
employed or informal workers. The estimated effect is not statistically significant and small
relative to the mean formal employment rate.
In sum, the introduction of a new signal of skill—the field-specific college exit exams—
reduced the return to reputation and increased the return to ability. These results are most
consistent with an informational effect of the exit exams, and they provide evidence that
college reputation signals individual ability to the labor market.
3.7. Complementary effects of the exit exam. There is suggestive evidence that the
exit exam affected other outcomes. For example, Column (A) in Table 6 shows its impact
on time to graduation. This estimate is from a standard differences in differences regression
that includes program dummies, cohort dummies, and our treatment variable, δpc. The
result suggests that individuals in programs with exam fields took about one quarter of a
year longer to graduate. This is consistent with increased student effort, or with colleges
taking steps to prepare students for the test. For instance, there is anecdotal evidence of
colleges seeking to influence their students’ performance, with activities ranging from “boot
camp” preparation to more overt “gaming” via exclusion of certain students.99
98 These results likely reflect high costs to switching programs in Colombia and the fact that our sample
predominantly includes students who enrolled prior to the existence of any exit exams. Colombian colleges
do not make it easy for students to change majors; switching essentially requires applying de novo.
99 These results suggest that graduation cohort may be endogenous. We address this concern by estimating
(8) with cohorts defined by predicted rather than actual graduation date, where predicted graduation is
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Table 6. Complementary effects of the exit exam
(A) (B) (C)
Dependent variable
Years Log daily Enrollees’
in college earnings Icfes scores
Exposed to exit exam (δpc) 0.237 0.070
(0.110) (0.019)
Icfes reputation × δpc̃ −0.162
(0.053)
Exit exam reputation × δpc̃ 0.147
(0.063)
N 146,052 581,802 485,350
R2 0.132 0.201 0.277
# programs 39 39 39
Notes: The dependent variable in column (A) is graduation year minus enrollment year. The sample includes all
students from Table 2. We report the coefficient on our treatment variable, δpc. The regression also includes program
dummies and cohort dummies.
The dependent variable in column (B) is log average daily earnings for all observed experience levels (0–9 years).
The sample includes all earnings observations from Table 2. In addition to δpc, the regression includes program
dummies, cohort dummies, and a quadratic in experience interacted with program dummies.
The dependent variable in column (C) is individual Icfes percentile. The sample includes all students who enrolled
in one of the 94 colleges and 39 problems in Table 2 between 2003 and 2009. We calculate Icfes and exit exam
reputation using students who took the Icfes in 2000–2008, took the exit exam in 2009–2011 (when the exam was
mandatory), and graduated from one the school-programs in our sample. We convert Icfes and exit exam scores into
percentiles relative to this sample and within exit exam fields and years. We calculate reputation as means at the
school-program level and normalize both measures so one unit represents ten percentile points in this distribution of
exam takers. We define the treatment variable δpc̃ using enrollment cohorts c̃, with δpc̃ = δpc for c̃ = c. We report
coefficients on the interactions of Icfes reputation and exit exam reputation with the treatment variable, δpc̃. The
regression includes dummies for program-cohort cells and interactions of both reputation measures with program
dummies and cohort dummies.
In all regressions, parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the program level.
Using a similar specification, column (B) presents evidence that earnings increased by
seven percent more in programs with early exam fields. This could have occurred if the
exam improved match quality, raising overall productivity. It could also reflect students
with access to the exam getting higher paying jobs at the expense college drop-outs and
vocational school students, who are excluded from our sample.
Finally, we ask whether the exit exams altered individuals’ school or program choices.
This would be consistent with the government’s stated intent. Column (C) explores how the
based on the year of enrollment. Appendix B.D shows that the results from this regression are similar to
our benchmark specification; this suggests that selective graduation timing is not driving our main results.
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ability of incoming students changed with the exit exam introduction. For this regression we
define two measures of reputation using a population of graduates who took the exit exam in
2009–2011, when it was required of all graduates. We define Icfes reputation as mean Icfes
percentile at the school-program level. Similarly, exit exam reputation is the school-program
mean exit exam percentile. We convert Icfes and exit exam scores to percentiles within this
population so that both reputation measures are on the same scale.
Icfes and exit exam reputations are highly correlated but not perfectly so. We suppose
that the exit exam reputation contains new information, and that this information gradually
became available to students entering college starting with the 2005 enrollment cohort.
Column (C) presents a specification analogous to the benchmark (8) with two key differ-
ences. First, the sample includes 2003–2009 enrollees rather than graduates, and we define
students as treated by the exit exam (δpc̃ = 1) if they began a program p in an enrollment
cohort c̃ after the introduction of the assigned field. Second, the dependent variable is the
Icfes percentile of entering students, and we replace the independent variables Rs and τi with
the school-program measures of Icfes and exit exam reputation. The reported coefficients
in column (C) reflect how the correlations of Icfes and exit exam reputation with incoming
students’ Icfes scores changed with the exit exam rollout.100
The results show that in programs with exams, the ability of incoming students became
more correlated with exit exam reputation, and less correlated with Icfes reputation. In other
words, school-programs whose exit exam performance exceeded their average Icfes perfor-
mance saw increases in the ability of their incoming classes. This suggests students selected
different programs and/or colleges as new information on their quality became available.
4. College reputation and earnings growth
The previous section showed that college reputation plays a signaling role. This section
asks whether college reputation serves only to signal ability as measured by admission scores.
100 The full specification, of which column (C) reports only the γτ and γexit coefficients, is:
τipc̃ = dpc̃ + (µp + µc̃ + γτδpc̃)[Icfes reputation]sip + (νp + νc̃ + γ
exitδpc̃)[Exit exam reputation]sip + eipc̃.
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To do so, it explores the predictions from Proposition 2 (Section 2) on how college reputation
correlates with initial earnings and with earnings growth.
4.1. Sample. We follow Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) in study-
ing individuals making their initial transition to the labor force. We restrict our sample to
individuals who: i) graduated in 2008 or 2009 (this allows us to observe earnings in the year
of graduation and the next three years), and ii) entered the labor market immediately upon
graduation and remained during four consecutive years (i.e., they did not attend graduate
school or leave the formal labor force).101 The results are thus not attributable to movements
into and out of the labor market.
4.2. Empirical specifications and results. Our basic specification is:
(10) wit = dcit + r0Rsi + r (Rsi × t) + a0τi + a (τi × t) + eit.
The dependent variable, wit, is log daily earnings for student i measured at potential experi-
ence t, which as before is employment year minus graduation year; dcit are graduation cohort
ci by experience t cell dummies; college reputation, Rsi , and Icfes score, τi, are as before;
r0 is the return to reputation in the year of graduation, and r is the average change in the
return to reputation from an additional year of potential experience; a0 is period-zero return
to ability, and a is the average yearly change in this return.102 We report only coefficients on
reputation, Icfes, and their interactions with experience, where the latter two are estimated
using earnings only up to three years after graduation, the maximum we can observe for our
sample of 2008–2009 graduates.
In estimating (10), our goal is not to identify the causal effect of reputation or admission
scores. Our interest is in how their returns change with worker experience—the r and a
coefficients—and whether these changes match the predictions from our signaling model.
101 Appendix B.H provides further details on the sample.
102 Formally, we parametrize the experience-specific rt (and at) coefficients in equation (2) as rt = r0 + r× t.
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Table 7 estimates (10) both excluding and including Icfes terms, which yields the un-
conditional return to reputation and the conditional returns to reputation and Icfes. This
corresponds to regressions (4) and (2) from Section 2 and the various subparts of Proposition
2.103 We discuss results from each of these regressions separately in the subsections below.
4.2.1. Unconditional return to reputation. Column (A) of Table 7 estimates equation (10)
including reputation but not Icfes terms, such that the estimates represent the unconditional
return to reputation, ru. The period-zero estimate shows that a one point increase in college
reputation is associated with a ten percent increase in daily earnings in the year of graduation
(ru0 ≈ 0.10). Proposition 2 predicts that the unconditional return to reputation should not
change with experience, implying a zero coefficient on the interaction of reputation and
experience. This arises because initial wages fully incorporate information employers observe,
including college reputation. Thus reputation cannot predict innovations in wages; this is
identical to wages being a martingale in Farber and Gibbons (1996).
Column (A) strongly rejects this prediction; the return to reputation increases with ex-
perience. Taken at face value, the coefficient implies that the advantage of having gone to
a college with a one point greater reputation increases by about 50 percent within the first
four years of employment. This contrasts with the results in Farber and Gibbons (1996) and
Altonji and Pierret (2001), who find no evidence of an increasing effect of years of schooling,
another educational trait workers might use to signal ability.
The contrast between the reputation and years of schooling results can also be depicted
using earnings-experience profiles. Mincer (1974) noted that the wage profiles of workers
with different schooling levels are approximately parallel throughout the earnings lifecycle.
Panel A of Figure 4 replicates this finding using 2008–2012 household survey data from
Colombia.104 It plots the mean log hourly real wage among workers with two schooling
103 Proposition 2 also contains predictions for regressions that include Icfes but not reputation terms. Ap-
pendix B.I shows that the results match the predictions: the unconditional return to Icfes increases with
experience. This is consistent with findings in Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001).
104 In Figure 4, we define potential labor market experience as min(age − years of schooling − 6, age − 17).
This definition differs from the one we use elsewhere in the paper (earnings year minus graduation year)
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Table 7. Returns to reputation and ability, and experience interactions
Dependent variable: log average daily earnings
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Reputation 0.101 0.071 0.079 0.055
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Reputation × t 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Icfes 0.033 0.024 0.017
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Icfes × t 0.006 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
N 83,492 83,492 83,492 83,492
R2 0.179 0.189 0.190 0.306
# colleges 130 130 130 130
Extra controls Y
Notes: The dependent variable is log average daily earnings. The sample includes students in column (D) of Appendix
Table B8 and earnings in the four years after graduation. Columns (A)-(C) estimate equation (10) excluding and
including Icfes terms. In addition to the reported variables, both regressions include dummies for cohort-experience
cells.
Column (D) adds the following controls to column (C): age at graduation, a gender dummy, dummies for eight
mother’s education categories, dummies for missing age and mother’s education values, college program dummies,
and dummies for college municipalities. Each control is interacted with a quadratic in experience.
Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the college level.
levels—completed high school and completed college—i.e., the gap between the two profiles
is the college premium. This gap remains roughly constant across forty years of potential
experience, consistent with results in the U.S. (Lemieux, 2006).105
Panel B uses our administrative data to plot earning profiles by college reputation. To
match the cross-sectional analysis in Panel A, Panel B includes 2008–2012 earnings from all
2003–2012 college graduates. We plot mean log daily real earnings separately for graduates
from high and low reputation colleges, defined by the median reputation. The earnings gap
between the two profiles roughly doubles over the first ten years of experience, as indicated
by the divergence of the high reputation profile from the light grey dashed line that is parallel
to the low reputation profile.
because the Colombian household survey does not include school completion dates. However, the age and
schooling definition matches those in Mincer’s original analysis and in Altonji and Pierret (2001).
105 The constant relationship between years of schooling and earnings in Colombia also holds in standard


















0 10 20 30 40
Experience

















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Experience
Panel B. College reputation
Figure 4. Earnings-experience profiles
Notes: Panel A includes high school and college graduates from the 2008–2012 monthly waves of the Colombia
Integrated Household Survey (Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares). Lines depict the mean log hourly real wage
(in 2008 pesos) for each schooling group, where we calculate means using survey weights. High school graduates are
workers with exactly 11 years of schooling; college graduates have exactly 16 years of schooling. We define experience
as min(age− years of schooling− 6, age− 17). The dashed light grey line is parallel to the high school profile starting
from the college intercept.
Panel B includes 2003–2012 graduates from the 136 colleges represented in Figure 1 with earnings observations in
2008–2012. Lines depict the mean log daily real earnings (in 2008 pesos) for graduates from high and low reputation
colleges, which we define by the unweighted median reputation of the 136 colleges. We define experience as age−16−6
and omit levels of experience above nine years because they appear only for workers who took especially long to
graduate. The dashed light grey line is parallel to the low reputation profile starting from the high reputation
intercept.
These results thus suggest that the slope of workers’ earnings-experience profiles increases
with reputation. One potential explanation for this is that reputation may be imperfectly
observed. Employers likely observe college identity, but they may not have access to our
measure of reputation defined by mean Icfes scores. In this case employers would further
learn about reputation through workers’ output, resulting in a return to reputation that rises
with experience. To address this possibility, we consider a stronger signaling prediction on
regressions that also include individual admission scores.
4.2.2. Conditional returns to reputation and ability. Columns (B) and (C) of Table 7 add
Icfes terms to the regression from column (A). We first add only Icfes scores, and then add
an interaction term between Icfes and potential experience. Thus column (C) estimates
equation (10) as written. In these joint specifications, the coefficients reflect the conditional
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returns to reputation and to ability from equation (2). As Proposition 2 predicts, the period-
zero reputation coefficient in column (B) falls relative to its unconditional return in column
(A). Consistent with employer learning about ability, column (C) also shows a positive and
significant coefficient on the interaction of Icfes and experience.106
The main coefficient of interest is on the interaction of reputation with experience. Propo-
sition 2 states that the conditional return to reputation should fall over time. This is similar
to the Altonji and Pierret (2001) prediction for observable traits like race or schooling, but
our definition of reputation yields a clean test of signaling. Since reputation is a group-level
mean of Icfes, Icfes scores are a sufficient statistic for “admission exam” ability, αi; condi-
tional returns to reputation mechanically do not reflect the transmission of information on
αi. The conditional return to reputation should, therefore, decline with experience even if
employers do not perfectly observe our measure of reputation; learning about reputation is
reflected in the Icfes coefficients. Unlike Altonji and Pierret (2001), our model predicts a
negative coefficient on Reputation×t even if there are interactions between ability, αi, and
human capital growth, hit. These effects are also captured by the Icfes×t term.
In sum, if college reputation serves purely as a signal of ability, Proposition 2 predicts
a negative coefficient on the interaction of reputation and experience. Column (C) clearly
rejects this. The reputation-experience interaction, although smaller in magnitude than in
column (A), is still positive and significant.
The increasing correlation of reputation and earnings is a descriptive result, but it is ro-
bust to a wide range of specifications and samples. For example, Column (D) of Table 7
adds controls for graduates’ gender, age, socioeconomic status, college program, and regional
market. All controls are interacted with a quadratic in potential experience to allow earnings
106 The positive coefficient on the Icfes-experience interaction is similar to the Farber and Gibbons (1996) and
Altonji and Pierret (2001) findings using Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores as an unobserved
characteristic. However, it is in contrast with findings in Arcidiacono, Bayer and Hizmo (2010), who also
study AFQT scores but make a distinction between graduates who enter the labor market after high school
and those who do so after college. For college graduates, they show that AFQT is strongly related to wages
in the year of graduation, and this relationship changes little over the next ten years. Their conclusion is
that AFQT revelation is complete for college graduates, and they suggest that this revelation occurs through
college identity. Appendix B.I discusses one potential explanation for the difference in findings: sorting by
ability in Colombia—although increasing—appears to be less extensive than in the U.S.
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trajectories to vary with each characteristic. The coefficient on the reputation-experience
interaction decreases slightly, but it is still highly significant and roughly of the same magni-
tude. Appendix B.K shows that this interaction term remains positive with further controls,
different definitions of labor market experience, and in alternate samples. Appendix B.L also
shows that the interaction term is positive when we define reputation at the college-program
level rather than at the college level.
4.3. Potential explanations for the increasing return to reputation. The above re-
sults reject a model in which reputation relates to wages only as a signal of ability, αi,
and instead suggests that other attributes related to college membership influence earnings
growth. In our model, these attributes are denoted by vsi , which we define to include both
sorting on traits like socioeconomic status, and factors that contribute to skill acquisition at
school such as teaching or peer effects. We suppose that employer expectations are given by
E {vsi |Rsi} = v0 + v1Rsi , where v1 is the reputation premium. If v1 is positive, an increasing
return to reputation could arise for two reasons. First, if the market does not perfectly
observe our measure of reputation, it may become increasingly correlated with wages as em-
ployers learn about other college membership attributes. Second, the return to reputation
may rise if college membership attributes are related to human capital growth.
Figure 5 provides suggestive evidence that both of these channels may be at work. First,
Panel A considers one potential component of vsi : socioeconomic status as measured by
whether a student’s mother has a college degree.107 The x-axis contains reputation when
observations are colleges, and Icfes when observations are individuals (the scale is the same).
The solid line shows that as one moves from the college with the lowest reputation to that
with the highest, the mean percentage of students with college-educated mothers increases
from below 20 to above 50. The dashed line describes the individual-level relationship
between students’ Icfes scores and their mother’s education, i.e., this is the relationship
that would exist if sorting into colleges were by Icfes only. Socioeconomic sorting is less
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Panel B. Industry’s earnings growth
Figure 5. College membership attributes and their time-varying effects
Notes: The sample for Panel A is identical to Figure 1. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a student’s
mother has a college/postgraduate degree.
The sample for Panel B includes any student in Panel A with a four-digit economic activity code from the
Ministry of Social Protection. For each four-digit industry, we calculate the mean 2008 log daily earnings for 2005
college graduates and for 2008 college graduates. The dependent variable is the difference between the 2005 and 2008
cohort averages for the industry of each graduate’s first job.
Dashed lines are local linear regressions of the dependent variable on Icfes percentile. Solid lines are local linear
regressions of school means of the dependent variable on college reputation with weights equal to the number of
graduates.
pronounced in this hypothetical scenario than in the actual one; i.e., there is more sorting
across colleges on mother’s schooling than is predicted by Icfes scores alone.108 This is
consistent with a positive reputation premium (v1 > 0); sorting on mother’s education is
positively correlated with reputation. This could lead to a rising return to reputation if
employers imperfectly observe both reputation and mother’s education.
Second, Panel B shows that the reputation premium, v1, may be correlated with human
capital investment. The y-axis depicts the average three-year earnings growth in the industry
of each graduate’s first job. We define industries using four-digit codes, and we calculate
earnings growth rates within industry as the mean difference in 2008 log earnings between
2005 and 2008 graduates. The dashed line shows the population-level relationship between
industry earnings growth and Icfes scores. Graduates with 50th percentile Icfes scores have
108 The fact that Colombian financial aid markets are less developed suggests that straightforward ability to
pay—beyond the lack of information or ability to take advantage of financial aid opportunities highlighted
by Hoxby and Avery (2012) and Hoxby and Turner (2013a)—may account for some of the substantial role
that socioeconomic status plays in college choice.
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first jobs in industries where earnings increase by 27 percent within four years, and this
growth rate rises by 1.5 percentage points across the Icfes distribution. The solid line shows
that the relationship between earnings growth and college reputation is more pronounced.
On average, graduates from colleges with reputations at the 50th percentile enter industries
in which earnings increase by only 25 percent within four years. Mean earnings growth is
4.5 percentage points higher in the industries that employ graduates from top colleges. In
short, graduates from higher-ranked colleges obtain jobs in industries with greater earnings
growth, and this relationship holds even for students with similar ability.
Table 8 further illustrates this point by displaying examples of these industries. For this
table, we regress college reputation on individual Icfes scores and calculate the residuals. We
display the top 10 and bottom 10 industries according to the average value of these residuals.
This indicates whether graduates are sorting into industries beyond what their Icfes scores
predict. For example, the top-ranked industry by this metric—securities trading—has a
reputation residual of 0.52. This indicates that graduates whose first job is in securities
trading come from colleges with 5.2 percentile points higher reputation than is predicted
by their Icfes scores alone. Further, workers in securities trading experience rapid earnings
growth, with earnings increasing by 67 percent within the first four years.
Many of the other industries that disproportionately employ graduates from top colleges
are related to engineering, and they also tend to have high early-career earnings growth. By
contrast, the mean earnings growth in the bottom 10 industries by reputation residual is 17
percentage points lower than that in the top 10. Many of these low-ranked industries are in
the public sector, offering careers in government administration or elementary education.
These results suggest that the increasing return to reputation may reflect a career effect
(Topel and Ward, 1992) in which better college reputation allows some individuals to be
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Securities trading 0.52 0.67
Higher education 0.41 0.27
Oil and gas extraction 0.31 0.50
Specialized animal breeding 0.30 0.15
Chemical manufacturing 0.28 0.52
Petroleum and natural gas extraction 0.28 0.47
Pharmaceutical products wholesale 0.27 0.42
Rubber products manufacturing 0.27 0.20
Cleaning products manufacturing 0.26 0.45
Radio and television 0.26 0.54





Public transportation -0.45 0.20
Financial cooperatives -0.41 0.17
Social security services -0.37 0.21
Preschool education -0.34 0.22
Intermediate products wholesale -0.33 0.19
Basic primary education -0.32 0.19
Gambling services -0.31 0.23
Public services and administration -0.30 0.08
Elementary education facilities -0.29 0.17
Soda and mineral water production -0.27 0.32
Bottom 10 average -0.34 0.19
Notes: This table includes industries with at least 100 graduates from the sample for Figure 5. We define industries
and calculate earnings growth as in that figure. Reputation residuals are from a regression of college reputation on
Icfes. We display only the top and bottom 10 industries ranked by the mean of these residuals. Averages for the top
10 and bottom 10 are weighted by the number of graduates in each industry.
matched to jobs with steeper wage profiles, or to firms that facilitate more on-the-job train-
ing. Higher reputation schools might also provide better networks (e.g., Kaufmann, Messner
and Solis, 2013; Zimmerman, 2013) that ultimately make individuals more productive.109
109 Other candidate explanations for the increasing return to reputation arise from violations of the assump-
tions of the competitive model itself. For example, labor contracts may be such that there is compression in
starting wages. In U.S. law firms, for instance, it is not uncommon to observe entering associates being paid
the same regardless of their law school of origin. Compensation may later diverge in a way correlated with
an LSAT-based reputation measure (Heisz and Oreopoulos, 2002).
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Our setting and data do not reveal whether the correlation between college reputation
and earnings growth is due to unobserved dimensions of sorting or due to a causal effect
of college identity. In particular, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that college reputation
is merely serving as a signal for unobservable characteristics that themselves are related
to human capital accumulation. Further, even if sorting into colleges occurs only on the
ability dimension (αi in our model), the increasing conditional return to reputation could
arise because admission scores are imperfect measures of ability. Nonetheless, the widening
of earnings profiles across Colombian colleges is starkly different from the parallel nature
of earnings profiles across schooling levels. This may lead students to suspect that their
choice of college quality matters for their earnings trajectories in a way that their choice of
educational attainment might not.
5. Conclusion
Debates like those surrounding affirmative action suggest that college plays a key role in
determining the distribution of opportunity. As a consequence a large literature studies the
implications of college attendance. Some papers (e.g., Card, 1995) ask if college has a causal
return, while others (e.g., Goldin and Katz, 2008a) consider the evolution and determinants
of the college wage premium.
Such work does not address the dilemma faced by the millions of students who—having
decided to go to college—must choose one. The size of the test preparation industry, for
example, suggests that students and parents believe that college choice is important, and
that life opportunities are better if one goes to a better college. We call the process by which
students are matched to colleges and subsequently to jobs, “the big sort.”
This paper has explored the role that college reputation plays in the big sort. Specifically,
we have shown that if colleges are selective and more able students choose more “reputable”
colleges, then one can produce a single dimensional measure of college reputation. We chose
a particular measure—the average admission test score of a college’s graduates—because it
allows a clean examination of signaling mechanisms.
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We showed that, consistent with work on other markets, employers use college reputation
to make inferences about individual graduates. Specifically, while the cross-sectional data are
consistent with this, we exploited a natural experiment in Colombia to show that providing
more information about student skill reduces the importance of reputation. Thus college
identity performs a signaling function, and students may be right to worry about which
college in addition to whether college. In other words, we find support for MacLeod and
Urquiola’s (2015) assumption that labor markets do not immediately observe all individual
characteristics (such as Icfes or AFQT scores), and college membership may transmit some
of them.
However, we also find that signaling is not the whole story. Even after controlling for
admission scores, a graduate’s starting earnings and earnings growth are positively correlated
with her college’s reputation. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that colleges
add to skill, and that their value added varies systematically with their reputation. Although
we cannot establish that this is a causal link, these correlations matter because they are
observable—students may notice that individuals from better schools seem to get careers
with higher earnings trajectories, which may lead them to prefer more reputable schools.
The purpose of the big sort is to match individuals to jobs. A literature documents
significant differences in compensation across firms and occupations that cannot be explained
by worker ability (Krueger and Summers, 1988; Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Abowd et al.,
1999). Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that college choice is partially driven
by what students believe is the consequence of choice. We find evidence that in Colombia,
as in the United States, students prefer colleges that are more selective; this in turn leads
employers to offer higher wages to the graduates of such colleges. These results illustrate
that increasing access to college will not necessarily reduce wage and income inequality. The
big sort is a complex system that moves moves individuals from high school to their first job.
Our finding that the exit exams reduced the reputation premium suggests other countries
could use analogous policies to address wage inequality.
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A. Theoretical Appendix
This appendix presents a complete version of the theory in Section 2, which incorporates
college reputation into the literature on information and wage formation (Jovanovic, 1979;
Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001). We define a measure of reputation,
specify a model of wage setting, and conclude with derivations of propositions that are the
basis for our empirical analyses in Sections 3 and 4.
A.1. Ability, admission scores, and college reputation. We let αi denote the log ability
of student i, where we use the term ability to represent the type of aptitude measured by
pre-college admission tests. We suppose αi ∼ N(0, 1ρα ), where ρ
α = 1
σ2α
is the precision of
αi. For simplicity we assume all variables are mean zero and normally distributed, and we
characterize their variability using precisions.
We define two measures of αi. First, we observe each student’s score on a college admission
exam. We denote it by τi and assume it provides a noisy measure of ability:
τi = αi + ετi ,
where ρτ is the precision of τi. Second, we define the reputation of a college s to be the mean
admission score of its graduates, and denote it by Rs:






where ns is the number of graduates from college s. Note that this definition implies that
for student i randomly selected from college si, we can view reputation as a signal of the
individual admission score and write:
(A1) Rsi = τi + ε
R,τ
i ,
where ρR,τ is the precision of εR,τi . We define college reputation in this way because it
provides a clear benchmark against which to test various hypotheses on how reputation
relates to wages. Since reputation is a noisy measure of the admission score, then τi is a
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sufficient statistic for reputation in the following sense:
(A2) E{αi|τi, Rsi} = E {αi|τi} .
If colleges were perfectly selective, then all students at school s would have the same admis-
sion score, such that ρR,τ = ∞. In practice colleges are never perfectly selective; hence we
can suppose that our measure of reputation is less precise than admission scores: ρR,τ <∞.
Given (A1) we can write:
Rsi = αi + ετi + ε
R,τ
i ,
and let ρR < ρτ be the precision of the error term ετi + ε
R,τ
i . Given these definitions for
the signals of student ability, we use Bayes’ rule to derive three structural parameters that
depend on the precisions of ability, admission scores, and reputation:110
E {αi|τi} =
ρτ




ρα + ρRRsi = π
α|RRsi(A4)
E {Rsi |τi} =
ρR,τ
ρτ + ρR,τ τi = π
R|ττi.(A5)
Since 0 < ρR < ρτ < 1, the first two parameters satisfy 0 < πα|R < πα|τ < 1. The extent to
which colleges are selective is given by πR|τ ∈ [0, 1], where πR|τ = 0 if students are randomly
allocated to colleges, and πR|τ = 1 if students perfectly sort by admission scores. Since
the number of colleges is less than the number of students, the assumption of normally
distributed ability and test scores is sufficient to ensure πR|τ < 1.
A.2. Employers’ information and wage setting process. We let θi denote the log skill
of student i and suppose it is given by:
θi = αi + vsi .




ρα+ρτ E {αi} , but we have set E {αi} = 0.
136
Skill includes both pre-college ability, αi, and vsi , which we will interpret as attributes
related to an individual’s membership at college si. These can include factors that contribute
to skill formation at school, such as teaching or peer effects, as well as access to alumni
networks. They can also include individual traits (not perfectly correlated with αi) along
which individuals select into colleges, such as family income or individual motivation.
We suppose that the market sets log wages, wit, equal to expected skill given the informa-
tion, Iit, available regarding worker i in period t:
wit = E {θi|Iit}+ hit.
hit is time-varying human capital growth due to experience and on the job training; it may
also vary with graduation cohort and other time-invariant control variables. We follow the
literature on the Mincer wage equation (see Lemieux, 2006) and net out human capital
growth to consider equations of the form:
ŵit = wit − hit = E {θi|Iit} .
We use log wages net of human capital growth, ŵit, to focus on the time-invariant component
of skill that is generated by schooling and revealed over time. Farber and Gibbons (1996)
observe that this leads to a martingale representation for wages. In particular, it implies
that for t ≥ 1, innovations in wages cannot be forecasted with current information:
E {ŵit − ŵi,t−1|Ii,t−1} = 0.
We suppose that employers’ information set, Iit, includes college reputation, Rsi .111 While
employers likely care about individuals’ pre-college ability as captured by Rsi , they also care
about other attributes related to graduates’ post-college skill. We therefore define a college’s
111 Employers likely observe college identity, but they may not perfectly observe our measure of reputation.
Below we discuss how our definition helps to address the possibility that this assumption does not hold.
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labor market reputation as the expected skill of its graduates: Rs = E{θi|i ∈ s}. It follows
that θi∈s ∼ N(Rsi , 1ρR ), where ρ
R denotes the precision of Rs.112
Our data do not contain Rs, and it may differ from Rs if colleges with higher reputation
provide more value added or select students students based upon dimensions of ability that
are not observable to us. For instance, if colleges prefer motivated students, and students
prefer more value added, there will be a positive correlation between our measure of rep-
utation, Rs, and other college membership attributes, vs. To allow for this possibility we
suppose vs satisfies E {vs|Rs} = v0 + v1Rs, where v1 > 0 is the reputation premium.
Thus, employers observe a signal of worker i’s skill given by the labor market reputation
of her college of origin:
Rsi = E {αi + vsi |Rsi}
= πα|RRsi + v0 + v1Rsi .(A6)
In other words, labor market reputation captures employers’ expectations of ability, αi, and
attributes related to college membership, vs, under the assumption that they observe our
measure of reputation, Rs.
Following Farber and Gibbons (1996), firms observe other signals of worker skill—not
including labor market reputation—that are available at the time of hiring but are not
visible to us. For instance, employers might obtain such information by conducting job
interviews or obtaining references. We denote this information by:
(A7) yi = αi + vs + εi,
with associated precision ρy. Importantly, we assume yi does not include τi; that is, employers
do not observe a graduate’s individual admission test score. This is consistent with the
assumption in the employer learning literature that AFQT scores are unobserved.
112 The precision, ρR, could also be indexed by s and hence be school-specific. We did not find robust
evidence that the variance has a clear effect on earnings, and so set this aside for further research.
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Lastly, employers observe signals related to worker output after employment begins:
(A8) yit = αi + vs + εit,
where εit includes human capital growth and other fluctuations in worker output. We suppose
these are observed after setting wages in each period t, where t = 0 stands for the year of
college graduation. We let ȳit = 1t+1
∑t
k=0 yik denote mean worker output and suppose that
the precision of yit is time invariant and denoted by ρȳ.113
The market’s information set regarding student i in period t is thus Iit = {Rsi , yi, yi0, ..., yi,t−1}.
Bayesian learning implies that log wages net of human capital growth satisfy:









where the weights on the signals are given by:
πRt =
ρR
ρR + ρy + tρȳ(A10)
πyt =
ρy
ρR + ρy + tρȳ .
Note that πRt , π
y
t → 0 as wages incorporate the new information from worker output.
A.3. Regressions on characteristics in our data. Equation (A9) describes employers’
wage setting process given the information they observe, Iit. We do not observe Iit, and
instead derive the implications of the wage equation for regressions on characteristics in
our data. We use regressions that include controls for experience and graduation cohort to
capture the time-varying effects (recall from above that ŵit = wit−hit). Here we focus upon
the implications of the model for the relationship between the signals of individual ability
113 The assumption that the precision of yit is time stationary also follows Farber and Gibbons (1996). We
note that this assumption implies that any human capital growth included in εit is not serially correlated.
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and wages net of human capital growth. In particular, we consider three regressions:
ŵit = rutRsi + eRit(A11)
ŵit = aut τi + eτit(A12)
ŵit = rtRsi + atτi + eit,(A13)
where the eit variables are residuals. We define the coefficient on reputation in (A11), rut , as
the unconditional return to reputation at time t. The coefficient on the admission score in
(A12), aut , is the unconditional return to ability. Specification (A13) estimates the conditional
return to reputation, rt, and the conditional return to ability, at.
To derive the values of these coefficients, we plug the definitions for Rs, yi, and ȳi,t−1 from
(A6)-(A8) into the wage equation (A9):
ŵit = πRt
(
πα|RRsi + v0 + v1Rsi
)
+ πyt (αi + vs + εi)
+
(




(αi + vs + ε̄i,t−1)









(vs − v0 − v1Rsi + ε̄i,t−1) + π
y
t (εi − ε̄i,t−1) .
To generate predictions for our three regressions, we take expectations of (A14) with re-
spect to reputation, Rs, and the admission score, τi. For this we use the structural parameters
defined by (A3)-(A5). Regression (A11) is given by:










Regression (A12) is given by:












Finally, regression (A13) requires taking expectations of (A14) with respect to both Rsi and
τi, and it uses the sufficient statistic assumption (A2):











πα|τ − πRt πα|τ
)
τi.(A17)
From equations (A15)-(A17) we can define the coefficients on reputation and the admission
score in the regressions (A11)-(A13):
rut = v1 + πα|R(A18)





rt = v1 + πRt πα|R(A20)
at = πα|τ − πRt πα|τ .(A21)
These coefficients form the basis for Propositions 1 and 2.
A.4. Predictions for the introduction of a college exit exam. In Section 3 we ask
how the conditional returns to reputation and ability were affected by the introduction of
another measure that graduates could use to signal their ability—a college exit exam. We
suppose that the exit exam increases the amount of information regarding the skill of student
i contained in yi, such that its precision is ρy,exit > ρy when the exit exam is offered. This
could originate in multiple channels, including students listing exit exam scores on their CVs,
receiving reference letters as a result of their performance, or modifying job search behavior
after learning their position in the national distribution of exam takers.




t for every t,
where πR,exitt is the weight on labor market reputation in the presence of the exit exam. Let
δi = 1 if and only if a student is exposed to the possibility of writing the exit exam. We can
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rewrite the joint regression (A13) as follows:
ŵit = (1− δi) (rtRsi + atτi) + δi
(
rexitt Rsi + aexitt τi
)
+ eexitit
= (rtRsi + atτi) + δi (βrtRsi + βat τi) + eexitit ,(A22)
where:














The simplifications of βrt and βat follow from the values of the conditional returns to reputation
and ability in (A20) and (A21).114 This in turn implies:
Proposition 1. If wages are set to expected skill given the available information (equation
(A9)), then the introduction of an exit exam reduces the return to college reputation (βrt < 0)
and increases the return to ability (βat > 0).
We examine the empirical evidence related to Proposition 1 in Section 3.
A.5. Predictions for earnings growth. In Section 4, we describe how the returns to
reputation and ability change with experience, t, thereby comparing college reputation to
other signals of ability studied in the literature. The coefficient values given by equations
(A18)-(A21) imply the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If wages are set equal to expected skill given the available information
(equation (A9)), then:
114 Since our regressions use log wages, the experience profiles reflect the reduction in uncertainty as infor-
mation accumulates about the worker. Experience profiles can therefore differ for individuals with di = 1
and δi = 0. To account for such effects, in the regressions below we include controls for experience that vary
with individuals’ potential access to the exit exams.
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(1) The unconditional return to reputation, rut , does not change with experience.
(2) The unconditional return to ability, aut , rises with experience.
(3) The conditional return to reputation, rt, is smaller than the unconditional return,
and with experience falls to v1, the reputation premium.
(4) The conditional return to ability, at, is smaller than the unconditional return, and
rises with experience.
Part (1) holds because rut does not depend on t. Part (2) holds because −πRt is increasing
with t, πα|τ > πα|R, and πR|τ < 1. Part (3) follows from πRt decreasing with t, πRt < 1, and
πα|R > 0. Part (4) holds if v1, πα|τ , πα|R, πR|τ , πRt > 0.
Note that if reputation is imperfectly observed, its unconditional return should rise with
experience, mirroring the prediction for admission scores in part (2). The possibility that
employers do not perfectly observe reputation does not alter the prediction in part (3),
however, as any employer learning about reputation should be reflected in the conditional
admission score coefficients.
We take the predictions from Proposition 2 to the data in Section 4 and Appendix B.9.
A.6. Signaling vs. accountability effects of the exit exam. In this section we develop
three additional propositions that we discuss but do not present formally in the paper. This
provides a way of testing for effects of the exit exams other than those related to signaling.
For example, the exams may have prompted colleges to undertake accountability-related
reforms, such as modifying their curricula or adding test-preparation sessions. Individuals
may also have worked harder in preparation for the exams.
Such accountability effects would affect the skills a student developed while in college,
rather than their pre-college ability. In our model, such post-enrollment attributes are given
by vs, which satisfies E {vs|Rs} = v0 + v1Rs. Thus to test how the exit exams affected the
return to reputation, we allow the v1 term to differ between students with and without access
to the exams. Specifically, we let vexit1 denote college membership attributes for students
with access to exit exams, while v1 represents such traits for students without access to
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exams. With this extra notation we can derive predicted effects on the conditional returns
to reputation and ability using equations (A20), (A21), and (A22):


















Note that the reputation effect of the exit exams, βrt , has an extra term (vexit1 − v1) relative
to that in (A23), but the ability effect, βat , is identical. This arises because reputation, Rs,
is a better predictor of college membership attributes than individual admission scores, τi.
Now suppose that the introduction of the exit exams had accountability effects but no
implications for signaling based on college reputation. In terms of the model, this means
that vexit1 6= v1 but π
R,exit
t = πRt . Equations (A25) and (A26) thus yield a non-zero effect
on the conditional return to reputation, βrt , and a zero effect on the conditional return to
ability, βat . This result is summarized in the follow proposition:
Proposition 3. If the introduction of an exit exam has accountability effects (vexit1 6= v1)
but no signaling effects (πR,exitt = πRt ), then the conditional return to college reputation
should change (βrt 6= 0) and the conditional return to ability should be unaffected (βat = 0).
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It is also useful to explore the effects of the exit exams on the unconditional returns to
reputation and ability. Using equations (A18) and (A19), we have:
βu,rt = ru,exitt − rut
= vexit1 − v1,(A27)














If we assume that the exit exams had signaling effects (πR,exitt < πRt ) but no accountability
effects (vexit1 = v1), then we should observe β
u,r
t = 0 and βu,at > 0. Note also that under
these assumptions the effect of the exit exams on the unconditional return to ability in (A28)
should be smaller than that on the conditional return to ability in (A26). This is summarized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If the introduction of an exit exam has signaling effects (πR,exitt < πRt ) but
no accountability effects (vexit1 = v1), then the unconditional return to college reputation
should not change (βu,rt = 0) and the unconditional return to ability should increase but be
smaller than the conditional return (0 < βu,at < βat ).
If instead we assume that the introduction of the exit exams had accountability effects
(vexit1 6= v1) but no signaling effects (π
R,exit
t = πRt ), then we should find a non-zero effect on
both the unconditional return to reputation, βu,rt , and to ability, βu,at . Importantly, these
effects should have the same sign, as the changes in v1 can be measured by either Rs or τi
when we include these terms individually. This yields the proposition:
Proposition 5. If the introduction of an exit exam has accountability effects (vexit1 6= v1)
but no signaling effects (πR,exitt = πRt ), then the unconditional returns to reputation and
ability should change (βu,rt 6= 0, βu,at 6= 0) and should have the same sign.
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Propositions 3, 4, and 5 provide a rich set of predictions that allow us to explore whether
the exit exam effects are likely to be the result of signaling or accountability mechanisms.
We discuss the empirical evidence related to these predictions in Section 3.6.4.
B. Empirical Appendix
This appendix provides details on the samples and further robustness checks for the em-
pirical analyses in Sections 3 and 4.
B.1. Matching college programs to exit exam fields. This section describes the match-
ing of exit exam fields to college programs, which allows us to define a treatment variable
for Section 3. Columns (A) and (B) in Table B1 (and the table notes) list the 55 field exams
that were introduced between 2004 and 2007. In 2009, a “generic competency” (competencias
genéricas) exam was made available for programs without a corresponding field.
Although the exit exams were field-specific, during the period we study there was no
formal system assigning college majors to exam fields. This match is necessary to determine
which majors were treated. We therefore perform this assignment ourselves, using three
different approaches. In our benchmark approach, we consider all college majors belonging
to the Ministry of Education’s 54 core knowledge groups. These groups—which we label
programs—aggregate approximately 2,000 college major names that vary across and within
schools. For instance, the Ministry might combine a major named Business Administration
at one college with one labeled Business Management at another if it considers that these
have similar content. We assign each of the 54 programs to one of the 55 exam fields if one
of the key words in the program name appears in the name of the field exam. We assign
programs without any matching key words to the generic competency exam introduced in
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Table B1. Exit exam fields, college programs, and sample selection
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Year Exit exam field College program Program area Graduates Colleges Included
2004 Medicina veterinaria Medicina veterinaria Agronomy 2,055 2 Y
Zootecnia Zootecnia Agronomy 1,144 1
Ingeniería agronómica y agronomía Agronomía Agronomy 84
Administración Administración Business 28,406 46 Y
Contaduría Contaduría pública Business 15,712 36 Y
Economía Economía Business 8,646 21 Y
Licenciatura exams (seven in total) Educación Education 16,910 21 Y
Ingeniería industrial Ingeniería industrial y afines Engineering 12,331 25 Y
Ingeniería de sistemas Ingeniería de sistemas, telematica y afines Engineering 11,312 25 Y
Ingeniería civil Ingeniería civil y afines Engineering 7,347 19 Y
Ingeniería electrónica Ingeniería electrónica, telecomunicaciones y afines Engineering 7,385 14 Y
Arquitectura Arquitectura y afines Engineering 4,400 12 Y
Ingeniería mecánica Ingeniería mecánica y afines Engineering 4,639 9 Y
Ingeniería ambiental Ingeniería ambiental, sanitaria y afines Engineering 3,804 8 Y
Ingeniería de alimentos Ingeniería agroindustrial, alimentos y afines Engineering 1,443 5 Y
Ingeniería química Ingeniería química y afines Engineering 3,439 4 Y
Ingeniería eléctrica Ingeniería eléctrica y afines Engineering 1,490 3 Y
Ingeniería agronómica y agronomía Ingeniería agronómica, pecuaria y afines Engineering 1,474 3 Y
Ingeniería agrícola Ingeniería agrícola, forestal y afines Engineering 903 1
Enfermería Enfermería Health 7,927 19 Y
Medicina Medicina Health 7,767 8 Y
Fisioterapia Terapias Health 5,126 8 Y
Odontología Odontología Health 2,616 7 Y
Bacteriología Bacteriología Health 2,211 6 Y
Nutrición y dietética Nutrición y dietética Health 1,019 3 Y
Optometría Optometría, otros programas de ciencias de la salud Health 629 3 Y
Psicología Psicología Social sciences 11,726 24 Y
Derecho Derecho y afines Social sciences 15,934 21 Y
Comunicación e información Comunicación social, periodismo y afines Social sciences 6,441 16 Y
Trabajo social Sociología, trabajo social y afines Social sciences 4,201 7 Y
2005 Biología Biología, microbiología y afines Natural sciences 3,257 5 Y
Química Química y afines Natural sciences 1,712 1
Matemática Matemática, estadística y afines Natural sciences 551 1
Física Física Natural sciences 396 1
Geología Geología, otros programas de ciencias naturales Natural sciences 379
2006 Instrumentación quirúrgica Instrumentación quirúrgica Health 1,416 5 Y
2007 Educación física, recreación, deportes y afines Deportes, educación física y recreación Social sciences 405
2009 Competencias genéricas Ingeniería administrativa y afines Engineering 2,225 5 Y
Ingeniería de minas, metalurgia y afines Engineering 1,554 2 Y
Otras ingenierías Engineering 720 2 Y
Ingeniería biomédica y afines Engineering 358 1
Diseño Fine arts 4,609 7 Y
Publicidad y afines Fine arts 1,320 5 Y
Artes plásticas, visuales y afines Fine arts 2234 4 Y
Música Fine arts 462
Artes representativas Fine arts 55
Otros programas asociados a bellas artes Fine arts 15
Salud pública Health 225 1
Ciencia política, relaciones internacionales Social sciences 2,641 4 Y
Lenguas modernas, literatura, lingüística y afines Social sciences 841 4 Y
Antropología, artes liberales Social sciences 668 3 Y
Geografía, historia Social sciences 647 2 Y
Bibliotecología, otros de ciencias sociales y humanas Social sciences 97 1
Filosofía, teología y afines Social sciences 548
Notes: Columns (A) and (B) list exit exam fields and their year of introduction. Licenciatura includes seven exams covering pedagogical training intended for
school teachers of preschool education, natural sciences, social sciences, humanities, math, French, and English. Column (C) shows the Ministry of Education’s
54 core knowledge groups that we call programs. We match exam fields to programs using the method described in footnote 115. Thirteen fields did not match
any program: 2004) Fonoaudiología, medicina veterinaria y zootecnia, terapia ocupacional; 2005) Ingeniería agroindustrial, ingeniería forestal, ingeniería de
petróleos, técnico en electrónica y afines, técnico en sistemas y afines, tecnológico en electrónica y afines, tecnológico en sistemas y afines; 2006) Normalistas
superiores, técnico profesional en administración y afines, tecnología en administración y afines. Column (D) shows eight program “areas” the Ministry of
Education uses to categorize these 54 programs. Column (E) lists the number of 2003–2009 graduates with non-missing Icfes scores that appear in the earnings
records. Column (F) reports the number of colleges offering each program after trimming and balancing the sample. A “Y” in column (G) indicates programs
included in our final sample. See Appendix B.3 for details on trimming, balancing, and selecting programs.
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2009.115 Column (C) in Table B1 shows the resulting match of programs and exit exam
fields. This is a more detailed version of the match displayed in Table 1 of Section 3.
A second approach is to match programs to fields based on the most common exam stu-
dents in each program took in 2009, when all fields and the generic exam were available.
In this alternate procedure, we compute the percentage of 2009 test takers in each program
that took a field exam introduced in 2004, 2005, 2006, or 2007, and the percentage that
took the generic exam. We assign each program to an exit exam year using the maximum of
these five percentages. This procedures differs from the name-matching method in only four
programs: mathematics (matemáticas, estadística y afines), chemistry (química y afines),
agricultural and forest engineering (ingeniería agrícola, forestal y afines), and mining and
metallurgical engineering (ingeniería de minas, metalurgia y afines).116 Mining and metal-
lurgical engineering is the only one of these four programs that appears in our final sample.
In 2011, the agency that administers the exit exam began assigning programs from each
college to one of 17 “reference groups,” and they required each group to take different com-
ponents. For a third procedure for matching programs to fields, we obtained these reference
groups for the 2013 exam, but this test is significantly different from the 2004–2009 tests
covered in Table B1; it contains numerous subject-specific modules and several common
components. We assume reference groups that took the generic exam module in 2013 had no
exit exam field for the 2003–2009 cohorts. We assume all other reference groups received an
115 We define a “key word” as one that appears in only one of the 54 program names, ignoring articles and
removing plural endings. If a program has no key word because its name is duplicated in other programs,
we set the key word to the entire program name, ignoring the words “and related” (“y afines”). If we match
a program to multiple fields, we use the field with an identical name if possible or the field with the earliest
introduction date otherwise. In the Ministry of Education’s classification, educación is the program group
for all education degree (licenciatura) programs, so we assign educación to the seven licenciatura exams
introduced in 2004 and exclude these exams for matching with other programs.
116 This procedure matches mathematics and chemistry to the generic exam rather than the mathematics and
chemistry fields because the exit exam fields were less widely adopted in these programs. Agricultural and
forest engineering is assigned to the 2005 exam group rather than the agricultural engineering field because
2009 test takers most commonly took the forest engineering field exam. Lastly, mining and metallurgical
engineering is assigned to the 2005 exam group rather than the generic exam because students most commonly
took the petroleum engineering field (ingeniería de petróleos).
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Table B2. Sensitivity of exit exam effects to field-program matching
Dependent variable: log average daily earnings
(A) (B) (C)
Most Reference
Benchmark frequent groups for
specification 2009 field 2013 exam
Reputation × δpc −0.041 −0.040 −0.026
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020)
Icfes × δpc 0.017 0.017 0.014
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
N 581,802 581,802 681,077
R2 0.258 0.258 0.234
# programs 39 39 17
Notes: All columns report coefficients on the interactions of reputation and Icfes with the treatment variable δpc. All
regressions include a quadratic in experience interacted with program dummies, dummies for program-cohort cells,
and interactions of both reputation and Icfes with program and cohort dummies. The sample for each regression
includes experience 0–9. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the program level.
Column (A) is identical to column (A) in Table 3. All other columns estimate this same specification with different
definitions of the treatment variable δpc. Column (B) defines treatment using the most common exam field taken by
students from each program in 2009. Column (C) defines treatment using the Colombian Institute for Educational
Evaluation’s 2013 “reference groups.” See Appendix B.1 for details.
exit exam field starting with the 2005 cohort except for the natural sciences group, which re-
ceived an exit exam field starting with the 2006 cohort. We then select the sample following
all procedures described in Appendix B.3 with reference groups as our program variable.
B.2. Sensitivity of exit exam effects to field-program matching. Table B2 tests the
sensitivity of our exit exam results to the three field-program matching procedures described
in Appendix B.1. In column (A), we replicate our benchmark results from Table 3, which
matches exit exam fields to college programs based on their names.
In column (B), we match fields to programs based on the most common exam students in
each program took in 2009. In our final sample, the assignment of programs to exit exam
fields under this procedure differs from that in the name-matching method for only one pro-
gram. The estimated effects in column (B) are thus similar to our benchmark specification.
We use the name-matching procedure for our main results, however, because students’ exam
choices are potentially endogenous.
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Column (C) uses the exam agency’s 17 “reference groups” as our definition of programs.
Our results are qualitatively similar under this procedure, though the reputation effect is
smaller in magnitude with this coarser definition of treatment. We prefer using the Ministry
of Education’s programs to define treatment because they align better with the granularity
of the 2004–2009 exam fields.
B.3. Section 3 sample. In this section we describe how we select the cohorts, programs,
and colleges we include in our empirical analysis in Section 3.
Our sample includes the 2003–2009 graduation cohorts. While our dataset covers students
who enrolled in 1998–2012, there are few graduates before 2003 because students typically
take at least five years to graduate. Further, we drop the 2010–2012 graduates in order to
focus cleanly on the period in which signals of field-specific skill were introduced into a subset
of fields. This is no longer clearly the case after the 2009 cohort due to several structural
changes in the exit exams.117
We define potential labor market experience, t, as calendar year minus graduation cohort,
and drop any earnings observations prior to graduation. Our final sample therefore includes
2008–2012 earnings for 2003–2008 graduates and 2009–2012 earnings for 2009 graduates.
Two factors motivate how we select programs and colleges for our sample. First, our
empirical specification will estimate the return to reputation for students in the same program
and cohort. This return is imprecisely estimated when there are few students in the same
school, program, and cohort, or when few colleges offer a given program. Second, our
identification comes from the staggered introduction of the exit exam fields. Columns (D)
and (E) in Table B1 show the Ministry of Education’s categorization of programs into eight
“program areas,” and the number of 2003–2009 graduates in each program. Exam fields
for most large programs in business, health, and engineering were introduced immediately
in 2004. Field exams were delayed or never created for mostly smaller programs in natural
117 In 2009 common components in English and reading comprehension were introduced for all test takers,
and a required generic exam for those not taking a field test was made available. Furthermore, 22 of the
field exams were removed in 2010–2011 and replaced with more aggregate exam modules.
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sciences, social sciences, and fine arts. Identification thus directly counteracts precision by
requiring we include smaller programs offered by fewer colleges.
Our final sample balances these considerations. We begin with 367,526 graduates from
133 colleges.118 Roughly 25 percent of these students never appear in our earnings records,
and about 20 percent are missing Icfes scores or program variables. Excluding these leaves
225,856 graduates.
We then calculate the number of earnings observations across all experience levels for
each school-program-cohort and drop cells below the 10th percentile number of observations.
After trimming, we drop school-programs with missing cohorts to balance the composition
across all seven cohorts. Trimming eliminates ten percent of the sample with non-missing
data and balancing the sample eliminates about 25 percent more. After this step, there are
147,788 graduates from 94 colleges.
Finally, in order to identify a return to college reputation, each program must be offered
by at least two colleges. Column (F) in Table B1 shows the number of colleges that offer
each program after trimming and balancing the sample. We exclude any program offered at
a single school.
The final sample includes the 39 programs with a “Y” in column (G) and any colleges
that offer those programs after trimming and balancing. This covers 146,052 graduates from
94 colleges. We observe four years of earnings per student on average, resulting in 581,802
total observations.
Table 2 in Section 3 displays summary statistics for the final sample. Table B3 here
displays analogous summary statistics for students excluded in the process described above.
The excluded population is about 50 percent larger in size than the sample for Section 3,
but it has fewer total earnings observations. In general excluded students have only slightly
lower Icfes scores but attend colleges with reputations that are on average four percentile
118 As stated we consider only graduating students who obtained 4–5 year degrees, the equivalent of bachelor
degrees in the U.S. The sample for Section 3 begins with 136 colleges, but three of these only have 2010–2011
graduates in our records.
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Table B3. Summary statistics for Section 3 excluded students
Year program received exit exam
Variable 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 All
# graduates in 2003–2009 183,206 7,042 1,240 622 29,364 221,474
# earnings obs. in 2008–2012 440,635 18,648 2,747 1,808 74,090 537,928
# programs 30 5 1 1 18 55
# colleges 133 29 10 6 86 133
Reputation 6.97 8.25 6.33 6.59 7.63 7.09
(1.21) (1.08) (0.87) (0.66) (1.11) (1.23)
Icfes 7.52 9.03 6.18 6.20 7.80 7.61
(2.39) (1.32) (2.45) (2.34) (2.19) (2.35)
Log average daily earnings 10.83 10.96 10.62 10.33 10.76 10.82
(0.67) (0.72) (0.57) (0.45) (0.71) (0.68)
Return to reputation 0.080 0.040 0.060 1.393 0.041 0.075
(0.021) (0.055) (0.033) (0.121) (0.032) (0.017)
Return to ability 0.020 0.022 -0.020 -0.013 0.065 0.028
(0.005) (0.029) (0.012) (0.027) (0.015) (0.005)
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for 2003–2009 graduates in our records that are excluded from the
main analysis sample in Section 3 (i.e., those not included in Table 2). All variables are defined identically as in Table
2. Note that one reason we excluded these students is due to missing values on certain variables, so the statistics in
this table are averages for only students who have values of each variable.
points lower. Their average return to reputation is about six percentage points lower, but
they have a similar average return to Icfes.119
B.4. Sensitivity of exit exam effects to sample selection. Table B4 tests the sensi-
tivity of our exit exam results to the sample selection procedure described in Appendix B.3.
Column (A) of this table reprints our benchmark results from column (A) of Table 3.
In our benchmark sample, we calculate the number of observations in each school-program-
cohort cell and exclude cells below the 10th percentile. We exclude small school-program-
cohorts because our empirical specification requires that we calculate returns to reputation
and Icfes within each program and cohort, and these returns are imprecisely estimated with
few observations. After trimming, we balance the panel so that our sample includes only
school-programs that appear in all seven cohorts (2003–2009).
119 In most cases, sample sizes are large enough that we can reject equality of mean characteristics between
included (Table 2) and excluded (Table B3) students.
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Table B4. Sensitivity of exit exam effects to sample selection
Dependent variable: log average daily earnings
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
# colleges
School-program-cohort trimming in each program
Benchmark No 5th 25th 3 or more 4 or more Predicted
specification trimming percentile percentile colleges colleges cohorts
Reputation × δpc −0.041 −0.035 −0.040 −0.038 −0.042 −0.036 −0.044
(0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.031) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Icfes × δpc 0.017 0.006 0.012 0.020 0.016 0.015 0.017
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
N 581,802 671,840 618,489 452,080 575,321 563,752 650,015
R2 0.258 0.256 0.260 0.254 0.248 0.247 0.241
# programs 39 48 41 31 35 30 39
Trim percentile 10th 0th 5th 25th 10th 10th 10th
Colleges/program 2+ 2+ 2+ 2+ 3+ 4+ 2+
Grad. cohorts Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Predicted
Notes: All columns report coefficients on the interactions of reputation and Icfes with the treatment variable δpc. All regressions include a quadratic in
experience interacted with program dummies, dummies for program-cohort cells, and interactions of both reputation and Icfes with program and cohort
dummies. The sample for each regression includes experience 0–9. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the program level.
Column (A) is identical to column (A) in Table 3. All other columns estimate this same specification using different samples.
Columns (B)-(D) use different percentiles for the number of observations below which we drop small school-program-cohort cells. Our main specification in
column (A) trims school-program-cohort cells below the 10th percentile in terms of number of observations. Columns (B), (C), and (D) use no trimming, the
5th percentile, and the 25th percentile. In all cases we balance the sample after trimming so that each remaining school-program appears in all seven cohorts
in our sample. All other sample selection methods follow as described in Appendix B.3.
Columns (E) and (F) use different minimums for the number of schools that we require to offer each program. Our main specification in column (A) requires
the bare minimum necessary to identify a return to reputation within each program: each program must be offered by two or more colleges. Columns (E)
and (F) require that each program must be offered by three or more, and four or more, colleges. All other sample selection methods follow as described in
Appendix B.3.
Column (G) addresses the possible endogeneity of graduation cohort discussed in footnote 99. We create a new sample based on the year students entered
college, c̃, rather than the year they graduated, c. Most university programs in Colombia have an official duration of ten semesters, so we define predicted
graduation date as c̃ + 5. We include only students whom we predict to graduate in 2003–2009. In other words, this sample covers graduates who enrolled
in 1998–2004, regardless of when they graduated. Because selective graduation also affects labor market experience, we replace our measure of potential
experience with years since expected graduation, t̃ = y− (c̃+ 5), where y is calendar year. We modify our benchmark specification (8) by replacing graduation
cohort, c, with enrollment cohort, c̃, and potential experience, t, with predicted potential experience, t̃. We define the treatment variable δp,c̃+5 as before with
expected rather than actual graduation year—i.e., δp,c̃+5 = δpc with c = c̃+ 5.
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Columns (B)-(D) use different percentiles for the number of observations below which we
drop small school-program-cohort cells. Columns (B), (C), and (D) use no trimming, the
5th percentile, and the 25th percentile. In all cases we balance the sample after trimming so
that each remaining school-program appears in all seven cohorts. All other sample selection
methods follow as in Appendix B.3. The signs are consistent across all trimming thresholds,
though the reputation coefficient loses significance when we trim at the 25th percentile, and
the Icfes coefficient loses significance when we trim at the 5th percentile or do not trim. The
variation in statistical significance across trimming thresholds reflects the data demands of
our empirical strategy, though the consistency of the signs is reassuring.
Columns (E) and (F) use different minimums for the number of schools that we require
to offer each program. Our main specification in column (A) requires the bare minimum
necessary to identify a return to reputation within each program: each program must be
offered by two or more colleges. Columns (E) and (F) require that each program must be
offered by three or more, and four or more, colleges. All other sample selection methods
follow as in Appendix B.3. Our results are not sensitive to this choice.
Table 6 in Section 3 shows that the exit exam may have increased time to graduation. This
suggests that graduation cohort may be endogenous in the estimation of our reputation and
Icfes effects. Column (G) addresses this issue by defining a sample based on predicted grad-
uation cohort rather than actual graduation cohort. Most university programs in Colombia
have an official duration of ten semesters, so we define predicted graduation as five years after
enrollment. The sample includes students predicted to graduate in 2003–2009—i.e., those
who enrolled in 1998–2004—regardless of when they actually graduated. Because selective
graduation also affects labor market experience, we redefine potential experience as years
since predicted graduation, rather than years since actual graduation. The specification for
column (G) is otherwise identical to column (A) with cohort and potential experience defined
by predicted graduation.
Column (G) shows that the estimates from this regression are similar to our benchmark
specification, which suggests that selective graduation timing is not driving our main results.
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B.5. Returns to reputation and ability by program-cohort. Our regression analysis
in Section 3 is derived from a two-step estimation procedure. The first step equation (6)
estimates conditional returns to reputation and ability separately for each program and
cohort. The second step equation (7) relates these returns to the availability of the exit
exam, captured in our treatment variable, δpc. Our benchmark specification (8) combines
these two steps into a single regression.
To illustrate this procedure, Table B5 presents program-cohort specific returns from a
regression similar to the first-step specification (6). Columns (A)-(C) display the 39 programs
in our sample and the introduction year of the exit exam field we assigned to each program
(see Table B1). Columns (F) and (G) present the conditional returns to reputation for each
program and cohort, r̂pc, except we use only two cohort groups: students who graduated
before the introduction of any exit exams (2003–2004) and those who graduated after the
first field exams became available (2005–2009). Column (H) reports the difference between
pre- and post-exam returns for each program. Columns (I)-(K) similarly show the program-
cohort returns to ability, âpc, and their difference.
As shown in Table 2, most of our identification comes from a comparison of programs that
received exit exams in the first year (“2004 programs”) and programs that never received
an exam during our period of analysis (“2009 programs”). We can thus illustrate our main
results with a simple 2 × 2 difference in differences analysis using these two groups. The
bottom rows of Table B5 show the average pre- and post-exam returns to reputation and
ability for 2004 and 2009 programs.120 The boxed numbers report the 2 × 2 difference in
differences estimates. For example, the return to reputation declined from 13.8 to 9.8 percent
in 2004 programs, but was unchanged at 3.0 percent in 2009 programs. The difference in
differences estimate is thus roughly −4 percent, similar to our benchmark coefficient in
Table 3. The 2× 2 estimate for the return to ability is 2.1 percent, which is also close to our
benchmark result.
120 Averages are weighted by each coefficient’s inverse squared standard error from the first-step regression.
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Table B5. Returns to reputation and ability by program and cohort
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
Exam Return to reputation Return to ability
Year Program area Program N Colleges 2003–04 2005–09 Diff. 2003–04 2005–09 Diff.
2004 Agronomy Medicina veterinaria 1,808 2 -0.09 -0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.05
Business Administración 85,325 46 0.18 0.14 -0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.01
Business Contaduría pública 49,714 36 0.18 0.09 -0.09 0.03 0.03 0.00
Business Economía 25,879 21 0.21 0.11 -0.10 0.05 0.03 -0.02
Education Educación 40,195 21 0.10 0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00
Engineering Ingeniería industrial y afines 41,309 25 0.23 0.15 -0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.02
Engineering Ingeniería de sistemas, telematica y afines 28,526 25 0.19 0.15 -0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.01
Engineering Ingeniería civil y afines 24,334 19 0.10 0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01
Engineering Ingeniería electrónica, telecom. y afines 15,657 14 0.19 0.13 -0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.06
Engineering Arquitectura y afines 11,701 12 0.07 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01
Engineering Ingeniería mecánica y afines 9,659 9 0.27 0.19 -0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.03
Engineering Ingeniería ambiental, sanitaria y afines 7,251 8 0.14 0.06 -0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.02
Engineering Ingeniería agroindustrial, alimentos y afines 2,889 5 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.03 -0.05
Engineering Ingeniería química y afines 7,630 4 0.44 0.25 -0.19 0.02 0.06 0.04
Engineering Ingeniería eléctrica y afines 2,320 3 0.13 0.00 -0.13 0.01 0.03 0.01
Engineering Ingeniería agronómica, pecuaria y afines 1,559 3 0.30 0.26 -0.04 0.09 0.01 -0.07
Health Enfermería 27,824 19 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
Health Medicina 13,520 8 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02
Health Terapias 12,211 8 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.10 0.06 -0.04
Health Odontología 5,211 7 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.02
Health Bacteriología 6,304 6 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.01
Health Nutrición y dietética 3,635 3 -0.20 -0.22 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02
Health Optometría, otros prog. de ciencias de la salud 1,895 3 0.08 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.02
Social sciences Psicología 35,506 24 0.11 0.07 -0. 04 0.03 0.02 -0.01
Social sciences Derecho y afines 39,608 21 0.12 0.10 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01
Social sciences Comunicación social, periodismo y afines 19,523 16 0.18 0.13 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00
Social sciences Sociología, trabajo social y afines 7,442 7 0.08 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01
2005 Natural sciences Biología, microbiología y afines 7,418 5 0.04 0.17 0.13 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
2006 Health Instrumentación quirúrgica 4,516 5 -0.22 0.03 0.26 0.02 0.02 0.01
2009 Engineering Ingeniería administrativa y afines 3,936 5 0.16 0.12 -0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.04
Engineering Ingeniería de minas, metalurgia y afines 2,367 2 -0.01 -0.16 -0.15 0.13 0.02 -0.11
Engineering Otras ingenierías 1,558 2 0.11 0.13 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.05
Fine arts Diseño 12,641 7 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.02
Fine arts Publicidad y afines 3,412 5 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.01
Fine arts Artes plásticas, visuales y afines 6,704 4 -0.19 -0.15 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.03
Social sciences Ciencia política, relaciones internacionales 4,806 4 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.03
Social sciences Lenguas modernas, literatura, ling. y afines 3,101 4 0.18 0.13 -0.05 0.10 0.03 -0.07
Social sciences Antropología, artes liberales 2,160 3 -0.22 0.04 0.26 0.04 -0.03 -0.07
Social sciences Geografía, historia 748 2 -1.84 21.05 22.89 0.25 0.00 -0.25
2004 programs 528,435 94 0.138 0.098 -0.041 0.030 0.021 -0.009
2009 programs 41,433 21 0.030 0.030 0.000 0.048 0.018 -0.030
Difference 0.109 0.068 -0.041 -0.018 0.003 0.021
Notes: Column (A) lists the introduction year of the exit exam field assigned to each of the 39 programs in our sample, which appear in column (C). Column
(B) contains the program area of each program. Column (D) shows the number of earnings observations in our sample, and column (E) shows the number of
colleges in our sample offering each program. See Table B1 and Appendices B.1 and B.3 for details.
Columns (F) and (G) report conditional returns to reputation for each program from specification (6) using only two cohort groups: 2003–2004 and
2005–2009. In other words, the returns to reputation coefficients are from a regression of log average daily earnings on interactions of reputation and Icfes
with dummies for cells defined by programs and the 2003–2004 and 2005–2009 cohort groups. This regression includes an experience quadratic interacted
with program dummies and dummies for program-cohort cells. Column (H) displays the difference between columns (F) and (G). Columns (I) and (J) report
conditional returns to ability from the same specification, and column (K) displays their difference.
Averages at the bottom are weighted by each coefficient’s inverse squared standard errors from this regression.
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Table B5 also helps to explain the estimates in columns (E) and (F) of Table 3. These
estimates restrict identification to programs with similar pre-exit exam returns to reputation
and ability. Columns (F) and (I) in Table B5 show these pre-exam returns.121 Though 2004
programs generally have higher returns to reputation and lower returns to ability, there are
exceptions to both cases. This allows us to match 2004 programs to delayed exit exam
programs that have similar returns.
B.6. Exit exam effects on the returns to other characteristics. An alternative hy-
pothesis for our main results is that the exit exams affected signaling on observable charac-
teristics other than college reputation. To explore this hypothesis, in Table B6 we replicate
our benchmark regression (column (A) in Table 3) replacing the reputation terms with other
individual characteristics that may be at least partially observable to employers.
Column (A) replicates our benchmark results using college reputation. Columns (B)-
(D) replace reputation with indicators for gender, mother’s education, and family income,
respectively. In each regression, the return to these other characteristics declines with the
exit exam, but none of the effects are statistically significant. Further, the Icfes effects in all
these regressions are also statistically insignificant. In column (E), we include terms for all
characteristics jointly; only the Icfes and reputation effects are statistically significant.
Although we cannot rule out signaling effects on characteristics not included in our data,
the results in Table B6 provide evidence that the strongest effects of the exit exams were on
the returns to college reputation.
B.7. Balance tests. Section 3.6.6 discusses three balance tests that ask if the exit exam
rollout was correlated with sorting into colleges or programs, or with the probability of
formal employment. Table B7 shows the results from these balance tests. These estimates
are from simple differences in differences regressions that include program dummies, cohort
121 In actuality, the pre-exit exam returns in Table B5 are estimated in a regression that also includes 2005–
2009 graduates, while the pre-exit exam returns used for columns (E)-(F) of Table 3 are from a specification
including only 2003–2004 cohorts. This has little effect on the returns displayed in Table B5.
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Table B6. Exit exam effects on the returns to other characteristics
Dependent variable: log average daily earnings
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Icfes × δpc 0.017 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.018
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Reputation × δpc −0.041 −0.036
(0.017) (0.016)
Male × δpc −0.021 −0.023
(0.015) (0.015)
College mother × δpc −0.036 −0.026
(0.035) (0.036)
High income × δpc −0.039 −0.031
(0.030) (0.038)
N 581,802 581,645 576,945 576,332 574,803
R2 0.258 0.232 0.236 0.237 0.263
# programs 39 39 39 39 39
Mean return to ability 0.029 0.068 0.062 0.064 0.024
Mean return to reputation 0.133 0.125
Mean return to gender 0.038 0.038
Mean return to mother’s ed 0.123 0.076
Mean return to income 0.115 0.066
Notes: All regressions are identical to the benchmark specification in column (A) of Table 3, but they substitute the
reputation terms in this regression with other characteristics. All columns report coefficients on the interactions of
these characteristics with the treatment variable δpc. Regressions include a quadratic in experience interacted with
program dummies, dummies for program-cohort cells, and interactions of Icfes and other characteristics with program
and cohort dummies. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the program level.
College mother is an indicator for a student’s mother having a technical college or university degree. High income
is an indicator for a student’s family income being greater than 300 percent of the minimum wage.
The mean returns at the bottom of the table are calculated using only 2003–2004 graduates.
dummies, and our indicator for exposure to the exit exams, δpc. The dependent variable for
each regression is listed in the column header.
In columns (A) and (B), the dependent variables are college reputation, Rs, and Icfes
percentile, τi. If the field-specific introduction of the exit exam was correlated with trends
in school or program choice, this should appear as changes in average reputation or Icfes
scores across programs. There is little evidence of this channel. Reputation increased by
only 0.3 percentile points more in programs with access to the exit exams, while Icfes scores
increased by 0.7 percentile points relative to programs without exam fields. Neither effect is
statistically significant.
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Exposed to exit exam (δpc) 0.026 0.070 0.017
(0.051) (0.078) (0.016)
N 146,052 146,052 890,809
R2 0.204 0.146 0.044
# programs 39 39 39
Dependent variable mean 7.44 7.84 0.66
Notes: All columns report coefficients on the treatment variable δpc. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered
at the program level.
The dependent variables in columns (A) and (B) are reputation and Icfes. The sample includes all students from
Table 2. Each regression includes program dummies and cohort dummies.
The dependent variable in column (C) is an indicator for appearing in our earnings records at each year in 2008–
2012. We include multiple observations per student for any level of potential labor market experience in 0–9 years.
The sample includes all students from Table 2 plus graduates from the same programs and colleges who never appear
in the earnings records. The regression includes program dummies, cohort dummies, and a quadratic in experience
interacted with program dummies.
Column (C) expands our main sample to include students and years for which we do
not observe earnings. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the graduate
appears in our earnings records t years after graduation.122 The mean of this variable is 66
percent, and the remaining 34 percent is a composite measure of unemployment, informal
employment, non-participation in the labor market, and pursuit of further education. The
estimate suggests that formal employment increased 1.7 percentage points more in programs
with exit exam fields, but this effect is not statistically significant. The small magnitude of
this coefficient mitigates the concern that our main treatment effects are driven by sample
selection in terms of who appears in the formal labor market.
B.8. Section 4 sample. In Section 4, we follow Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji
and Pierret (2001) in studying a sample of individuals making their initial transition to the
long-term labor force. This subsection describes the construction of this sample.
122 This regression also includes a quadratic in experience interacted with program dummies to control for
program-specific time effects on the likelihood of formal employment.
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The columns of Table B8 divide 2008–2009 graduates according to their post-college labor
market paths. We choose these cohorts because our earnings records cover 2008–2012, which
allows us to observe earnings in the year of graduation and the next three years.
Column (A) includes any student who enrolled in a specialization, masters, or doctorate
program by 2011, the last year for which we have graduate education records. Columns
(B)-(D) categorize those who did not enter graduate school by the number of years for which
they have formal earnings in the first four years after graduation.123 Column (B) includes
students who never appear in our earnings records, while column (D) contains students who
have formal earnings in each of the first four years. Column (C) contains students who move
into and out of the formal labor force—those with 1–3 years of earnings.
Column (A) shows that 16 percent of 2008–2009 college graduates attend graduate school.
These students tend to be from more reputable colleges, and they have higher Icfes scores
and more educated mothers. Column (D) shows that 28 percent of students enter the formal
labor force for four consecutive years after graduation. These students are typically of higher
ability than graduates who do not transition to the long-term labor market, and they are
are slightly more likely to be male.124
Our sample for Section 4 includes only students in column (D). Our estimates are there-
fore from a population with higher ability, but importantly, they are not attributable to
movements into and out of the labor force; all results come from earnings changes within
the formal labor market.
B.9. Unconditional return to ability. This section presents results related to the Propo-
sition 2 predictions for the unconditional return to ability (Icfes).125
123 We consider workers as having formal earnings if they have at least one monthly earnings observation
in a given year.
124 F-tests for each characteristic strongly reject the hypothesis of joint equality across the four columns.
125 We note that the Icfes percentiles we use in Section 4 are conceptually similar to those in Section 3,
but they are based on different data sources. In Section 4, we compute Icfes percentiles using data from
the Colombian Institute for Educational Evaluation (see the notes to Figure 1). This yields a relatively
continuous variable. In Section 3, we use Icfes percentiles from the Ministry of Education records because
the data from the Colombian Institute for Educational Evaluation do not cover our earliest graduating
cohorts. The Ministry of Education computes Icfes percentiles in a similar manner (i.e., position relative to
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Table B8. Transition from college to the labor market
2008–2009 college graduates
(A) (B) (C) (D)
# years formally
Went to employed in the four
graduate years after graduation
Variable school Zero 1 to 3 Four
# students 11,799 19,405 22,822 20,873
Proportion of all students 0.16 0.26 0.30 0.28
Female 0.57 0.62 0.61 0.58
Age at graduation 23.90 23.71 24.16 24.20
College educated mother 0.38 0.28 0.30 0.28
Reputation 7.88 7.31 7.48 7.67
(1.12) (1.28) (1.20) (1.15)
Icfes 8.20 7.47 7.46 7.81
(1.99) (2.40) (2.38) (2.14)
Notes: The sample includes 2008–2009 graduates from the sample for Figure 1. We choose the 2008–2009 graduation
cohorts so that we observe earnings for the first four years after graduation (2008–2011 for 2008 graduates, and
2009–2012 for 2009 graduates).
Column (A) includes any student who enrolled in a specialization, masters, or doctorate program in 2007–2011,
the years for which we have graduate education records from the Ministry of Education. Column (B) contains non-
graduate school students who never appear in our earnings records in the first four years after graduation. Column
(C) contains non-graduate school students who appear in the earnings records in some but not all of the first four
years. Column (D) contains non-graduate school students who appear in our earnings records in all four years.
Parentheses contain standard deviations. College educated mother is a dummy equal to one if a student’s mother
has a college/postgraduate degree.
Column (A) of Table B9 estimates (10) including Icfes terms but not reputation terms,
such that the coefficients represent the unconditional returns to ability, au (equation (5),
Section 2). The coefficient on Icfes shows that a ten percentile increase in the student’s
score is associated with a five percent increase in daily earnings in the year of graduation
(au0 ≈ 0.05). The standard deviation of Icfes percentiles is about twice that of reputation,
and hence scaled by this measure the unconditional returns to reputation and ability are of
a similar magnitude.
Proposition 2 states the coefficient on Icfes should increase with experience, i.e., it predicts
a positive coefficient on the interaction of Icfes and experience. This follows from the as-
sumption that employers do not fully observe Icfes scores, and thus the correlation of wages
all exam takers in the same test period based on a total Icfes score), but its percentiles take only integer
values from one to 100.
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Table B9. Returns to ability and experience interactions
Dependent variable:








# colleges 130 130
Extra controls Y
Notes: The sample includes students in column (D) of Appendix Table B8 and earnings in the four years after
graduation. Column (A) estimates equation (10) excluding reputation terms. In addition to the reported variables,
the regression includes dummies for cohort-experience cells.
Column (B) adds the following controls to column (A): age at graduation, a gender dummy, dummies for eight
mother’s education categories, dummies for missing age and mother’s education values, college program dummies,
and dummies for college municipalities. Each control is interacted with a quadratic in experience.
Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the college level.
and Icfes increases as workers reveal their skill through their output. Column (A) is consis-
tent with this prediction. The point estimate on the Icfes-experience interaction implies that
the return to ability grows by roughly 60 percent in the first four years after graduation.
Column (B) adds controls for graduates’ gender, age, socioeconomic status, college pro-
gram, and regional market. All controls are interacted with a quadratic in potential expe-
rience to allow earnings trajectories to vary with each characteristic. The coefficient on the
Icfes-experience interaction decreases slightly, but it is still highly significant.
The increasing return to ability is similar to the Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji
and Pierret (2001) findings using AFQT scores as an unobserved characteristic. However, it
is in contrast with findings in Arcidiacono, Bayer and Hizmo (2010), who also study AFQT
scores but make a distinction between graduates who enter the labor market after high school
and those who do so after college. For college graduates, they show that AFQT is strongly
related to wages in the year of graduation, and this relationship changes little over the next
ten years. Their conclusion is that AFQT revelation is complete for college graduates, and
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Figure B9. Ability sorting in Colombia and the U.S.
Notes: The y-axis shows the 25th percentile math scores for entering students at U.S. and Colombian colleges. The
x-axis depicts unweighted percentile ranks using these 25th percentile math scores. U.S. SAT math percentiles are
from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System. We include 1,271 four-year degree-granting public and
private not-for-profit colleges with ten or more 2012 first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduates. Colombian
colleges are the same as in Figure 1 (except three have no 2012 enrollees). We include students who enrolled in
either 2002 or 2012 and took the Icfes no more than two years before enrolling. We calculate Icfes math percentiles
relative to the enrollment cohorts and convert them to an SAT scale using the distribution of math scores for 2011
U.S. college-bound seniors, available in January 2015 at http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/SAT-
Mathemathics_Percentile_Ranks_2011.pdf. We jitter interior 25th percentile math scores slightly to smooth out
discrete jumps in SAT scores.
The difference in findings may be explained by the fact that sorting by ability in Colombia—
although increasing—appears to be less extensive than in the U.S. Specifically, if the U.S.
experience is indicative, one might expect sorting by ability to increase in Colombia as re-
ductions in the cost of transport and information gradually move regional college markets
away from relative autarky (Bound et al., 2009; Hoxby, 2009).
Figure B9 illustrates these dynamics in Colombia and its current standing relative to the
U.S. We first plot the 25th percentile Icfes math scores in the 2002 and 2012 entering cohorts
at each college, with schools ranked on the x-axis according to this 25th percentile.126 To hold
fixed the distribution of ability across cohorts, we use Icfes math percentiles relative to the
population of college enrollees in the same year. For comparison with the U.S., we convert
Icfes percentiles to an SAT scale using the distribution for 2011 college-bound seniors in the
126 We plot the 25th math percentiles for comparability with U.S. data. Other subjects and percentiles
produce similar results.
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U.S. There is evidence of increased sorting on math ability over the course of a decade. The
top colleges in Colombia have experienced a 30 SAT point increase in their 25th percentile
scores, while the weakest have experienced a similar decline.
Despite these dynamics, by this measure Colombia’s college market features substantially
less sorting than that in the U.S. Figure B9 also shows the 25th percentile SAT math scores
for the 2012 entering cohort at U.S. four-year degree-granting public and private not-for-
profit colleges. Comparing Icfes and SAT scores requires strong assumptions, as the tests
may capture different characteristics, but 25th percentile math scores increase much more
rapidly in the U.S. While both countries have colleges with 25th percentile scores below 400
SAT points, the top-ranked U.S. colleges are above 700, and no Colombian college surpasses
600.127
A plausible explanation for the positive coefficient on the interaction of Icfes and experience
in Table B9 is thus incomplete sorting by ability across Colombian colleges. The more
substantial sorting by ability across U.S. colleges may result in a more complete reflection
of AFQT in wages upon graduation.128
B.10. Return to years of schooling in Colombia. Our main result from Section 4 is
that the return to college reputation in Colombia increases with experience. This differs
from the standard U.S. result that the return to years of schooling does not change with
experience. This subsection shows that this benchmark years of schooling finding also holds
in Colombia, as previewed in Panel A of Figure 4.
127 If we convert Icfes scores to an SAT scale using the entire population of Icfes takers—instead of only those
who entered college—the dots describing Colombia in Figure B9 shift up and become somewhat steeper, but
they still exhibit a flatter slope than exists for U.S. colleges. This renormalization, however, overstates the
amount of sorting in Colombia relative to the U.S. because Icfes test takers are less likely to enroll in college
than SAT test takers. Using only college enrollees to make this conversion is more appropriate because the
distribution of SAT scores we use is for U.S. college-bound seniors.
128 If we estimate Table B9 with Icfes scores normalized to mean zero and standard deviation one—as
Arcidiacono, Bayer and Hizmo (2010) do with AFQT—the period zero coefficient on Icfes is approximately
one half of their AFQT coefficient. Although the two tests may measure different individual characteristics,
the relative magnitudes are also consistent with partial revelation of the ability of college graduates in
Colombia.
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Table B10. Return to years of schooling and experience interaction
2008–2012 cross-sectional household survey
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Log hourly wage Log weekly earnings
0–39 years 0–9 years 0–39 years 0–9 years
experience experience experience experience
Years of schooling 0.1224 0.1239 0.1150 0.1192
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0021)
Years of schooling × t −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0006
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0003)
N 660,573 217,523 660,573 217,523
R2 0.407 0.352 0.351 0.308
Notes: Data for this table are from the 2008–2012 monthly waves of the Colombia Integrated Household Survey
(Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares). The sample includes all workers who have hourly wages in the survey and
0–39 years of potential experience, t, which we define as t = min(age−years of schooling− 6, age− 17). Columns (B)
and (D) restrict the sample to experience levels 0–9.
The dependent variable in columns (A)-(B) is log hourly wage. The dependent variable in columns (C)-(D) is log
weekly earnings, defined as log hourly wage plus log usual hours of work per week.
In addition to the reported variables, all regressions include dummies for experience-year-month cells. Regressions
are weighted by survey weights. Parentheses contain robust standard errors.
For this we use cross-sectional data from the 2008–2012 monthly waves of the Colombia
Integrated Household Survey (Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares). This survey measures
workers’ hourly wages and years of schooling, which range from 0–20 years. We calculate
each worker’s potential experience, t, as t = min(age− years of schooling− 6, age− 17), and
include workers with experience levels 0–39.129
Table B10 shows how the return to years of schooling in Colombia changes with experience.
The use of cross-sectional data differentiates Table B10 from the panel data results in Farber
and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001), and Table 7 of this paper, but it is similar
to the original Mincerian regressions that rely on U.S. survey data (e.g., Lemieux, 2006).
Column (A) displays the coefficients from a regression of log hourly wages on years of
schooling and its interaction with experience.130 The results suggest that an additional year
129 We note that this definition of potential experience differs from the one we use elsewhere in the paper
(earnings year minus graduation year) because the household survey does not include graduation dates.
However, the age and schooling definition matches those in Altonji and Pierret (2001) and Lemieux (2006).
130 Regressions in Table B10 also include controls for experience and survey date.
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of education is associated with a 12 percent increase in initial wages, and that this gap
remains roughly constant as workers gain experience. The coefficient on the interaction
term is statistically significant due to the large sample size, but it is close to zero. For
example, after ten years the return to schooling decreases by only 0.002 log points, or less
than two percent of the initial return.
Column (B) of Table B10 restricts the sample to workers with 0–9 years of potential
experience, with negligible impact on the results. This matches the experience levels we can
observe using our administrative data on Colombian college graduates, as depicted in Panel
B of Figure 4.
Columns (C)-(D) of Table B10 replicate columns (A)-(B) with log weekly earnings (rather
than log hourly wage) as the dependent variable. This is motivated by the fact that we
only observe earnings per day, not per hour, in our college administrative data. In both
regressions, the coefficient on the interaction of schooling and experience remains close to
zero. This suggests that the difference between the reputation and years of schooling findings
is not driven our inability to observe hours worked.
In sum, the results of this subsection suggest that the standard Mincerian result of parallel
earnings-experience profiles across schooling levels also holds in Colombia.
B.11. Robustness of increasing return to reputation. Table B11 documents the ro-
bustness of our main result from Section 4: the return to reputation—even conditional on
Icfes scores—increases with experience (column (B) of Table 7). As a benchmark, we repro-
duce this result in column (A) of this table. The sample for this regression includes students
from column (D) of Table B8. We regress log average daily earnings on dummies for cohort-
experience cells, reputation, Icfes, and the interactions of both variables with experience.
The point estimate on the reputation-experience interaction suggests that the effect of a one
unit increase in reputation on earnings grows by about 1.2 percentage points each year.
Columns (B)-(D) test the sensitivity of this result to the addition of controls. Column
(B) adds controls for gender, age at graduation, and socioeconomic status as measured
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Table B11. Alternate specifications for return to reputation and experience interaction
Dependent variable: log average daily earnings
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Additional controls &
experience interactions Degrees of labor market attachment
Benchmark Gender, Program & Initial Actual Full-time No prior
estimates age, & SES municipality earnings experience employment employment
Reputation 0.079 0.072 0.055 0.007 0.066 0.086 0.067
(0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.001) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020)
Reputation × t 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.019
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Icfes 0.024 0.022 0.017 0.001 0.018 0.026 0.027
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007)
Icfes × t 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
N 83,492 83,492 83,492 83,492 83,492 39,596 7,168
R2 0.190 0.203 0.313 0.627 0.242 0.230 0.230
# colleges 130 130 130 130 130 130 113
Personal traits × f(t) Y Y Y
College traits × f(t) Y Y
Initial earnings × f(t) Y
Definition of t Potential Potential Potential Potential Actual Potential Potential
Full-time restriction Y Y
Prior work restriction Y
Notes: All columns report coefficients on reputation, Icfes, and their interactions with experience. The sample includes the 2008–2009 graduates from column
(D) of Appendix Table B8 and earnings within four years after graduation. All regressions include dummies for cohort-experience cells. Parentheses contain
standard errors clustered at the college level.
Column (A) is identical to column (B) in Table 7. Columns (B)-(D) layer in additional controls, and every variable we add is interacted with a quadratic in
experience. Column (B) adds a gender dummy, age at graduation, dummies for eight mother’s education categories, and dummies for missing age and mother’s
education values. Column (C) includes all controls in column (B) plus program dummies and dummies for college municipalities. Column (D) includes all
controls in column (C) plus log average daily earnings at experience zero.
Columns (E) is identical to column (A), but all experience terms are defined using actual experience—the cumulative number of months with earnings
since graduation—rather than potential experience. Column (F) is identical to column (A), but we include only graduates who have earnings in every month
starting in the year after graduation. Column (G) includes only those students in column (F) who do not appear in our earnings records in the year prior to
graduation. This column includes only 2009 graduates, for whom we can observe pre-graduation employment.
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by mother’s education. We interact all variables with a quadratic in experience so that
controls can affect both the intercept and the slope of graduates’ earnings profiles. The
addition of these controls for personal characteristics lowers the coefficient on the interaction
of reputation and experience slightly, though it is still significant and roughly the same
magnitude in proportion to the period-zero return to reputation.
Column (C) includes all controls from column (B) and adds two characteristics of grad-
uates’ colleges. First, we add dummies for college programs (see column (C) of Table B1)
and their interaction with a quadratic in experience. These dummies are important if gradu-
ates from different programs enter occupations that vary in their potential for wage growth.
Second, we add dummies for college municipalities and the interactions of these dummies
with an experience quadratic. Location controls may matter if earnings paths differ across
regional markets. Our estimates in column (C) are thus identified off of variation in college
reputation for students in the same programs and cities. The magnitude of the reputation-
experience coefficients falls again, but it is still significant and is slightly larger in relation
to the initial return to reputation.
In addition to the controls in column (C), column (D) adds each graduate’s log earnings in
the year of graduation. The inclusion of experience-zero earnings is in the spirit of Farber and
Gibbons (1996), who use initial wages to control for other worker characteristics observable
to employers but not to the econometrician. We additionally interact initial earnings with
a quadratic in experience to control for variation in earnings trajectories across jobs with
different starting wages. The controls for initial earnings mechanically reduce the period-
zero reputation and Icfes coefficients, but the coefficient on the interaction of reputation and
experience doubles in magnitude relative to column (C).
In columns (E)-(G), we remove the controls from columns (B)-(D) and instead test the
sensitivity of our result to the degree of graduates’ labor market attachment. As discussed,
the sample for Table B11 includes only students who are employed in each of the first four
years after graduation, but graduates may still differ in the number of months they are em-
ployed in each year. In all previous specifications, we measure labor market experience using
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potential experience, defined as calendar year minus graduation year. Column (E) of Table
B11 is identical to column (A), but we replace all experience terms with actual experience,
defined as the number of months of employment since graduation.131 This alternate measure
may be important if graduates from high reputation colleges are more likely to find stable
employment, but the results in column (E) are similar to our benchmark estimates.
Column (F) is identical to column (A), but we restrict the sample to include only students
who have full-time employment after graduation. In column (A) we require that each student
have at least one monthly earnings observation in each of the first four years after graduation.
In column (F), students must have an earnings observation in every month beginning in the
year after graduation. This requirement reduces the sample size by more than 50 percent
but has little effect on the reputation-experience coefficient.
Column (G) makes a further restriction to the sample from column (F). In this column we
also require that graduates were not employed in the year before graduation. This restriction
may be important if graduates from top colleges are less likely to work while in school, and if
prior employment affects future wage growth. Since our earnings records begin in 2008, we
can only observe pre-graduation employment for 2009 graduates. Thus, column (G) includes
only 2009 graduates who have no earnings in 2008. This restriction leads to a small sample in
column (G), but if anything, the coefficient on the interaction of reputation and experience
is larger in this population.
In sum, Table B11 suggests that the increasing conditional return to reputation is not
driven by variation in earnings paths across individual characteristics, college programs,
regional markets, or levels of initial earnings. Furthermore, this result does not appear to
stem from variation across colleges in labor market attachment.
131 Papers in the employer learning literature use different measures of experience and potential experience.
Farber and Gibbons (1996) use experience based on actual employment duration, while Altonji and Pierret
(2001) principally use potential experience based on age and years of schooling. Potential experience based
on graduation year is most logical for our study of college reputation and is consistent with the primary
measure used by Arcidiacono, Bayer and Hizmo (2010).
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Table B12. Experience interactions with college-program level reputation
Dependent variable: log average daily earnings
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Reputation 0.064 0.039 0.044 0.024
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Reputation × t 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Icfes 0.045 0.034 0.023
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Icfes × t 0.007 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
N 83,492 83,492 83,492 83,492
R2 0.156 0.178 0.179 0.301
# colleges 130 130 130 130
Extra controls Y
Notes: This table is identical to Table 7 in Section 4, but it uses reputation defined as mean Icfes at the college-
program level rather than at the college level. The dependent variable is log average daily earnings. The sample
includes students in column (D) of Appendix Table B8 and earnings in the four years after graduation. Columns
(A)-(C) estimate equation (10) excluding and including Icfes terms. In addition to the reported variables, both
regressions include dummies for cohort-experience cells.
Column (D) adds the following controls to column (C): age at graduation, a gender dummy, dummies for eight
mother’s education categories, dummies for missing age and mother’s education values, college program dummies,
and dummies for college municipalities. Each control is interacted with a quadratic in experience.
Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the college level.
B.12. College-program level reputation. This section provides details on the robustness
of our main results using a college-program level definition of reputation rather than a college
level definition. Table B13 replicates the main exit exam results from Table 3 with reputation
defined as college-program mean Icfes. The results closely mirror our main findings in sign
and magnitude, although the standard errors are typically larger. This is likely due to the
fact that the college-program reputations are calculated from smaller samples. In general this
does not alter the pattern of statistical significance relative to Table 3, with the exception
of statistically insignificant reputation effects in columns (B) and (D).
Table B12 replicates the results on earnings growth from Table 7 in Section 4 with college-
program level reputation. The main findings are unaltered by this modification. In particu-
lar, the coefficient on the reputation-experience interaction is positive and highly significant
in all specifications.
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Table B13. Exit exam effects with college-program level reputation
Dependent variable: log average daily earnings
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Experience & Restriction to
cohort controls similar programs
Benchmark Within Linear S. sciences & Within Within
specification experience trends engineering r̂p quartiles âp quartiles
Reputation × δpc −0.038 −0.021 −0.015 −0.052 −0.026 −0.054
(0.022) (0.019) (0.028) (0.031) (0.012) (0.023)
Icfes × δpc 0.019 0.017 0.010 0.043 0.014 0.009
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.004)
N 581,802 267,924 267,924 273,590 581,802 581,802
R2 0.258 0.225 0.225 0.263 0.259 0.259
# programs 39 39 39 22 39 39
Experience levels 0–9 4–7 4–7 0–9 0–9 0–9
Notes: This table is identical to Table 3 in Section 3, but it uses reputation defined as mean Icfes at the college-program level rather than at the college level.
All columns report coefficients on the interactions of reputation and Icfes with the treatment variable δpc. Regressions in columns (A) and (C)-(F) include a
quadratic in experience interacted with program dummies, dummies for program-cohort cells, and interactions of both reputation and Icfes with program and
cohort dummies. Column (B) includes dummies for program-cohort-experience cells and interactions of both reputation and Icfes with program-experience
and cohort-experience dummies. The sample for each regression is restricted to the experience levels listed in the bottom row. Parentheses contain standard
errors clustered at the program level.
Column (C) adds interactions of both linear experience and cohort terms with college reputation and Icfes for each program. Column (D) restricts the
sample to social sciences and engineering program areas and adds interactions of dummies for social-science-area-cohort cells with both reputation and Icfes.
Column (E) adds interactions of both reputation and Icfes with dummies for cells defined by cohort and each program’s quartile of the returns to reputation
estimated from 2003–2004 cohorts. Column (F) adds interactions of both reputation and Icfes with dummies for cells defined by cohort and each program’s
quartile of the returns to Icfes estimated from 2003–2004 cohorts.
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Chapter 3. Time Gaps in Academic Careers
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1. Introduction
A defining feature of the U.S. education system is that it permits second chances. Many
European countries have national exams and centralized admissions that assign students to
educational tracks, often at young ages. In the U.S., graduation standards have historically
been left up to local districts, and colleges vary widely in admission criteria. U.S. students
can thus more readily switch academic paths, or return to school after dropping out.
A second-chance system helped the U.S. become an early leader in educational attainment,
but it may also partly explain the recent stagnation of high school and college graduation
rates (Goldin and Katz, 2008b). Lenient standards can weaken accountability and reduce
school productivity. This concern has motivated research on accountability systems (Kane
and Staiger, 2002; Hanushek and Raymond, 2005; Figlio and Loeb, 2011), teacher evaluation
(Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005; Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff, 2014), and school choice
(Hoxby, 2003; Urquiola, 2016).
This paper explores a different channel through which flexible standards affect academic
outcomes. Forgiving education systems create churning by allowing students to defer the
completion of their schooling. The result is that many students experience time gaps in
their academic careers as they cycle in and out of school. In the U.S., for example, roughly
one-third of all students who matriculate in college wait more than one semester after high
school to enroll. Such gaps, as measured by age differences between secondary graduates
and tertiary enrollees, tend to be larger in OECD countries without educational tracking.
I examine whether academic time gaps can lower schooling attainment. This builds on
research that asks how the structure of education systems—e.g., school entry or exit ages—
affects attainment (Angrist and Krueger, 1992; Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Dobkin and Fer-
reira, 2010; Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2011; Fredriksson and Öckert, 2014). My focus
is on the potential gaps that arise in the transition from high school to college. Individuals’
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experiences during these gaps may affect their decision of whether to acquire further educa-
tion at all. Joining the labor force can reveal the job satisfaction and earning potential of
an existing degree. Time away from school may make it harder to go back.
Isolating the effect of academic gaps on subsequent enrollment requires quasi-random
variation in transition timing in an education system. For this I use administrative data from
the country of Colombia and a policy that altered its unique system of academic calendars.
Colombian high schools operate on two distinct annual schedules; some schools begin the
academic year in January, while others start in September. All public high schools operate on
the January calendar except for those in two regions, which historically began in September.
From 2008–2010, these regions transitioned public schools to the January calendar. This
altered the academic term at nearly 400 high schools that I call switching schools, which
include all public schools in the affected regions plus some local private schools that followed
suit. Other private high schools in these regions did not switch calendars. I use the term
staying schools to refer to 89 local private schools that stayed on the September calendar.
Colombian colleges offer admission every semester, so students on either high school cal-
endar can typically begin college right after graduation. But the calendar transition led
to an unusual gap before potential college entry at both switching and staying schools, for
separate reasons. Switching schools transitioned to the new calendar by adding mid-term
breaks and delaying graduation by a few months each year. This caused one cohort—2009
graduates—to finish high school just after the start of the September semester at most col-
leges. Thus, many 2009 graduates could not enter college until January—one semester later
than was typical for prior cohorts at switching schools.
Students from staying schools were also affected by the transition. Colombian students
apply to both a college and a major, and while many programs are offered twice per year,
some are annual. To align with the new public high school calendar, colleges in the affected
regions shifted some annual majors from a September to a January start date. Graduates
from staying schools who were interested in these programs therefore had to wait an extra
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semester to enroll. This yielded a second source of post-graduation time gaps, induced in
this case by changes in college calendars rather than high school calendars.
At both switching and staying schools, the calendar changes led to sharp declines in the
number of students who began college in the first semester after graduation. I show this in a
differences in differences analysis with students in unaffected regions as a comparison group.
This initial enrollment reduction is a first stage result; the calendar shift provides quasi-
random variation in the occurrence of one semester gap between high school and college.
I then consider how this time gap affects subsequent college enrollment. Students who
did not enroll in college within one semester could typically have done so within one year.
Many did not. Roughly 50 percent of those exposed to the time gap did not enroll in the
next possible semester. This occurred at both switching and staying schools, leading to a
seven percent reduction in college attendance rates in affected regions. Further, there is
little catch-up enrollment in the next two years, suggesting that the decline is not merely
temporary.
The decline in college enrollment is evident graphically and in regressions, and it is robust
to different comparison groups and to the inclusion of linear trends for each high school.
Staying schools provide a clean test of the timing effect because their graduates had few
changes in college preparation. Graduates from switching schools were affected by other
elements of the transition, such as a longer academic year. But I find little evidence that
these other channels are important; the results do not appear to be driven by changes in
graduates’ entrance exam scores or admission rates at selective colleges.
I explore two sources of heterogeneity that inform the main results. First, I find that
low SES and low ability students are more likely to forgo college after the time gap. These
students also had lower college enrollment rates in the pre-policy years. Thus time gaps may
have a greater effect on individuals who are indecisive about college in the first place.
Second, I show that the enrollment decline comes from students forgoing low-paying ma-
jors; those who entered college after the gap tended to choose high-wage majors. This could
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arise if working or job-hunting in the interim altered students’ relative valuations of dif-
ferent degrees. Consistent with this, I use household survey data to show that labor force
participation increased among 17 year olds in the affected regions during the gap period.
The bottom line is that time gaps in education systems can affect both the mean and
the distribution of schooling, with potential implications for a nation’s wage growth and
inequality (Goldin and Katz, 2008b; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).
My paper relates to four research areas in labor and education economics. First, it con-
tributes to work on institutional features that affect transitions between education tiers.
Some researchers have argued that the U.S.’s disconnected education system, in which K–12
and postsecondary schools function as separate entities, can hinder student outcomes (e.g.,
Venezia, Kirst and Antonio, 2003). This concern underlies research on the benefits of educa-
tional tracking (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006; Schütz, Ursprung and Woessmann, 2008)
and remediation classes (Bettinger and Long, 2009; Martorell and McFarlin Jr, 2011).
I show that timing is another potential disconnect in the transition from high school to
college. This adds to work on the “summer melt,” a phenomenon in which students who
are planning to attend college at the time of high school graduation change their minds
by the end of the summer (Castleman and Page, 2014). My findings suggest that tracking
or curriculum policies can have additional attainment benefits if they limit time gaps in
students’ academic careers. Further, policies that promote college access may have a greater
impact if they are implemented before students finish compulsory education.
Second, this paper adds to research on the information hurdles that affect schooling choices.
Recent work finds that students’ decisions respond to information on tuition costs and finan-
cial aid (Bettinger et al., 2012; Hoxby and Turner, 2013b; Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2013),
returns to education (Jensen, 2010; Nguyen, 2010; Oreopoulos and Dunn, 2013; Dinkelman
and Martínez A., 2014), and school test scores (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008).
In my paper, the information that alters enrollment decisions is acquired not through
interventions but by experiences outside of school. This is consistent with Perez-Arce (2015),
who finds that applicants with deferred admission to a Mexican university are more likely to
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forgo college if they work in the interim. Goodman (2013) also shows that the experience of
taking the American College Test (ACT) induces some students to attend college. More
broadly, my findings contribute to work on how routines/defaults (Scott-Clayton, 2011;
Pallais, 2015) or present biases (Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos,
2009; Fryer, 2011) affect educational choices, which may explain the time gap effects.
Third, recent research finds that students’ choice of major depends on expected earnings
(Arcidiacono, Hotz and Kang, 2012; Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman, 2015), initial beliefs
(Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2014), and heterogenous tastes (Arcidiacono, 2004; Beffy,
Fougere and Maurel, 2012; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). I present evidence that program choices
change when individuals spend time outside of the education system. This finding parallels
that in Zafar (2011), who shows that students update their major preferences based on their
performance in college.
Finally, my paper contributes to work on education externalities from labor market condi-
tions. Booms arising from coal prices (Black, McKinnish and Sanders, 2005), trade reforms
(Atkin, 2012), and the housing market (Charles, Hurst and Notowidigdo, 2015) can lead in-
dividuals to forgo further schooling. My results suggest that education externalities can also
arise from an individual’s labor force participation prior to the completion of her academic
career.
The next section gives background on the prevalence of time gaps between high school
and college in different education systems. Section 3 describes the academic calendar shift in
Colombia. Section 4 discusses the resulting effects on schools that switched to the January
schedule. Section 5 shows the effects on schools that stayed on the September calendar.
Section 6 explores heterogeneity in these results at both school types. Section 7 concludes.
2. Time gaps between high school and college
Every spring roughly three million U.S. students receive their high school diplomas. Ap-
proximately two-thirds of them enroll in a two- or four-year college in the fall of the same
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year. This ratio is sometimes called the immediate college enrollment rate, and in the U.S.
it has hovered between 60 and 70 percent for the past two decades.132
For graduates who do not immediately attend college, the decision to forgo further edu-
cation is not necessarily a permanent one. The dashed line in Figure 1 illustrates this using
the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). It plots the cumulative fraction
of graduates who have ever enrolled in college against the number of years since their high
school graduation. The immediate college enrollment rate for NLSY graduates is slightly
below 60 percent, as indicated by the data point at 0.5 years after graduation. The fraction
ever enrolled rises further after this initial spike, reaching nearly 80 percent after nine years.
This value reflects the overall college enrollment rate, which would be higher if the data
included enrollment at ten or more years.133
The solid line in Figure 1 replicates this curve for Colombian high school graduates using
administrative data described below. Both immediate and overall college enrollment are
substantially lower in Colombia than in the U.S.
Figure 1 shows that students in both countries experience time gaps between high school
and college. In the U.S., 30 percent of students who eventually attended college did not
enroll in the first semester after graduation. Delayed enrollment is even more common in
Colombia, comprising more than two-thirds of all college-goers. Further, Appendix A.1 shows
that these time gaps vary with students’ backgrounds. Low SES and low ability students
are more likely to delay college entry, as are students who are older than the normative
graduation age. This pattern holds in both the U.S. and Colombia.134
Figure 2 explores how post-secondary gaps vary across education systems. Since longitu-
dinal data like that in Figure 1 do not exist in some countries, it uses age gaps as a proxy
for time gaps. Specifically, it plots the difference between the average ages of new tertiary
132 This statistic is from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) (available in December 2015
at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cpa.asp).
133 The overall enrollment could be substantially higher; an NCES report finds that 12 percent
of the 1995 incoming cohort waited ten or more years to enroll (available in December 2015 at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005152.pdf, Figure I).
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Figure 1. College enrollment timing
Notes: The U.S. sample is students in the 1997 NLSY cross-sectional and over-samples with a high school gradua-
tion year in 1995–2002. The x-axis is the difference between college enrollment and high school graduation dates,
aggregated into six month bins. Averages use 2011 panel weights.
The Colombian sample is any 11th grader who took the national college entrance exam in 2001–2002. The x-axis is
the difference between the semesters of college enrollment and the exam. See Section 3 for details on the Colombian
data, entrance exam, and academic calendar structure.
For both countries, I count a student as ever enrolled if she enters a two- or four-year college in the dataset within
nine years of her graduation month. Enrollment at zero years includes students reported to begin college in or before
the month of high school graduation.
entrants and secondary graduates for OECD countries with data in 2011 (plus Colombia).135
Following Hanushek and Woessmann (2006), I classify countries based on early age tracking
of students into different school types. Light grey bars depict countries with tracking below
age 16; black bars indicate countries without tracking by this age.
Age gaps between secondary and tertiary education vary significantly across countries,
ranging from below one to nearly six years. Further, countries with tracking systems tend
to have smaller age gaps. The smallest gaps occur in countries with early tracking; these
include Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Mexico, all of which begin tracking by
age 12. Colombia, the U.S., and Scandinavian countries do not have tracking systems and
are near or above the median. Other institutional features also affect age gaps. The large gap
135 Figure 2 includes only students enrolled in the highest tiers of secondary (general programs) and tertiary
(level A, further education/theoretically based) school. It does not therefore capture age gaps for students
pursuing technical education, which may vary across countries. The sample also includes only students below
age 30; without this restriction the gaps would be larger, and the country ranking may change. Note that
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Figure 2. OECD countries — Secondary/tertiary age gap
Notes: Data are from the OECD for the year 2011 (available in December 2015 at http://stats.oecd.org). Bars
depict the difference between the average ages of new entrants to level A tertiary programs and graduates from
upper secondary general programs. In the U.S., upper secondary includes all education programs because there is no
distinction between general and vocational/technical programs. In Colombia, the age difference is between entrants
to university-level programs and 11th grade college entrance exam takers in 2011 using the data described in Section
3. All secondary and tertiary averages are calculated using students age 29 or below, for which single-year ages are
available from the OECD.
Light grey bars depict countries that track students into school types before age 16. This clas-
sification follows Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) and their cited source (available in December 2015
at http://www.oecd.org/edu/school/programmeforinternationalstudentassessmentpisa/34002216.pdf, Figure 5.20a).
Countries not in this source are classified as in Education Policy Outlook 2015 (available in December 2015 at
http://www.oecd.org/publications/education-policy-outlook-2015-9789264225442-en.htm).
in Israel is due in part to its military service requirement. In Ireland—the country with the
smallest gap—most secondary students participate in a “transition year” of non-academic
subjects and volunteer work before graduating.
Figure 2 suggests that different education systems may lead to substantial variation in the
existence of gaps between schooling tiers. These gaps can affect overall tertiary enrollment
rates if experiences outside of the education system alter students’ views about the returns
or costs to further schooling. In the U.S., roughly three-quarters of high school graduates
who do not immediately enter college join the labor force by the fall of the same year.136
Employment or job-hunting may alter the perceived value of students’ existing education.
136 This statistic is for 2014 graduates and comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (available in December
2015 at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/hsgec.nr0.htm).
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The gaps in Figure 2 are likely correlated with other cultural or labor market factors
that affect college attendance rates. Isolating the time gap effect on subsequent enrollment
requires exogenous variation in delays induced by an education system. In the next section,
I describe a policy that altered Colombia’s academic calendars that provides an opportunity
to test for the causal effect of time gaps after high school.
3. An academic calendar shift in Colombia
This section describes the high school and college calendars in Colombia, my related data
sources, and a government policy that altered these calendars in two regions of the country.
3.1. Academic calendars and college admissions. The high school system in Colombia
is unique in that students begin the school year at two different times. The large majority of
schools start the academic year in January and conclude in November. This schedule yields
the longest break during the Christmas season. A small number of private high schools begin
in September and finish in June. These schools choose a calendar that aligns with that of
U.S. and European colleges.
To enter college, Colombian students are required to take a national standardized admis-
sion exam called the Icfes.137 The exam is generally analogous to the SAT in the U.S., but its
results are also used to evaluate high schools. As a result, the vast majority of graduates take
the exam, even those who do not plan to attend college.138 The Icfes is offered semiannually
at the end of the last year of high school on each calendar. Scores are returned promptly,
and students who apply to college can start in the next semester.
Accordingly, Colombian colleges also enroll students two times per year. Students can be-
gin in either January or September, and nearly all colleges offer admission in both semesters.139
Unlike the U.S., applicants choose both schools and majors at the time of application, but
137 Icfes stands for Institute for the Promotion of Higher Education, the former acronym for the agency
that administers the exam. The Icfes exam is now named Saber 11°, but I use the name Icfes to match the
designation during most of the period covered by my data.
138 The exam agency estimates that over 90 percent of graduates take the exam.
139 The January cohort is slightly larger at many colleges because most high schools use the January calendar,
but the cohort sizes are more balanced than in the U.S., where almost all undergraduates begin in the fall.
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the Colombian market is similar in that there are many public and private colleges with
varying selectivity and degree durations. Admissions are also decentralized; students must
apply to individual colleges, and each institution controls its own selection criteria.
3.2. Data sources. This paper uses two administrative data sources:
(1) Records for all high school seniors (11th graders) who took the Icfes college entrance
exam from 2001–2011. These data are from the testing agency and contain each
student’s high school, background characteristics, and exam scores.
(2) Records for students enrolling in college in 2001–2012. These are from the Ministry
of Education and cover almost all higher education institutions in Colombia.140 The
records include each student’s enrollment date, program of study, and institution.
I merge these two datasets using national ID numbers, birth dates, and names. This defines
the measure of college enrollment for my analysis, which is an indicator for appearing in the
Ministry of Education records.141
In addition, I use two datasets related to students’ labor market outcomes. First, ad-
ministrative data from the Ministry of Social Protection provides 2008–2012 earnings for all
college enrollees employed in the formal sector.142 I use these data to calculate the aver-
age earnings of college graduates by major. Second, I use 2007–2010 Colombian household
survey data to measure labor force participation by age and region.143
3.3. An academic calendar shift. Almost all public high schools in Colombia begin the
academic year in January, but in two regions the public school year historically started in
September. These regions—Valle del Cauca and Nariño—are the third and eighth largest
of Colombia’s 33 administrative departments, and the capital of Valle del Cauca, Cali, is
the country’s third most populous city. I call these two departments the affected regions.
140 See Appendix A.3 for details on data coverage.
141 I match over 91 percent of college enrollees who took the Icfes during the period covered by the data.
Appendix A.2 provides details on the merge and match rates.
142 My administrative earnings records include only college enrollees, so I cannot use these data to examine
labor market outcomes of individuals who do not attend college.
143 The survey is the Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH).
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Anecdotally, the affected regions contained some of Colombia’s first private high schools,
and thus public schools adopted the same September calendar.
In 2008, the affected regions transitioned public schools to the January calendar to align
with the federal fiscal year and with all other public schools. The transition occurred over
two years by adding extra instructional periods and mid-term holidays (see Figure 3 below
for details). The academic calendar shift was complete by January 2011.
Although the policy affected public high schools, some local private schools also changed
from the September to the January calendar. Other private schools chose not to change
schedules. I refer to the public and private schools that switched calendars as switching
schools, and the private schools that stayed on the September calendar as staying schools.
Columns (A)–(C) in Table 1 describe switching and staying schools in the affected regions.
Switching schools include all 290 public schools plus 109 private schools, while 89 private
schools stayed on the September calendar.144 Staying schools are higher quality by several
metrics. 97 percent of staying schools received the exam agency’s high or superior rank
in any year, compared with half of switching schools. 55 percent of staying schools offer
academic-level training, while two-thirds of switching schools provide technical education.
Table 1 also shows the characteristics of 2001–2011 graduates from switching and staying
schools. There are roughly 25,000 switching school graduates per year, and their average
Icfes exam score is near the median of the national distribution. Staying schools graduate less
than 4,000 students per cohort, and their average student performs at the 74th percentile on
the Icfes. Staying school graduates also have higher socioeconomic backgrounds as measured
by mother’s education.
Lastly, Table 1 shows the fraction of graduates who enroll in college, defined as appearing
in any institution in the Ministry of Education records. Roughly 10 percent of switching
school graduates enroll in the semester immediately after the Icfes exam. This fraction
144 Table 1 does not contain all high schools in Colombia because I include only those with exam takers in all
years of my analysis (2001–2011). I also omit schools that ever had a “flexible” calendar, in which students
can begin the school year in either semester. See Appendix A.4 for details on the high school sample.
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Table 1. Summary statistics by school type
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Affected regions Other regions
Switching Staying
schools schools
Public Private Private Public Private
High school characteristics
# high schools  290  109 .  89 .  2,553  1,156
High/superior rank  0.47  0.58 .  0.97 .  0.57  0.90
Academic school  0.38  0.33 .  0.55 .  0.50  0.66
2001–2011 graduate characteristics . . . . . .
Total students per year  19,862  5,247 .  3,727 .  174,335  56,360
Icfes percentile  0.51  0.54 .  0.74 .  0.49  0.67
Mother attended college  0.12  0.26 .  0.65 .  0.14  0.49
Younger than 18  0.66  0.76 .  0.72 .  0.72  0.82
College enrollment by years since Icfes . . . . . .
Enrolled within 0.5 years  0.09  0.13 .  0.28 .  0.09  0.31
Enrolled within 3 years  0.26  0.35 .  0.55 .  0.29  0.60
Enrolled within 6 years  0.33  0.41 .  0.59 .  0.37  0.66
Notes: The sample is 11th graders who took the Icfes in 2001–2011 and attended high schools with exam takers in
every year. Columns (A)–(C) show high schools in Nariño and Valle del Cauca; columns (D)–(E) include high schools
in all other regions. Switching schools are those on the January calendar in 2010 and/or 2011, and on the September
calendar in all other years. Staying schools are on the September calendar in all years. I omit high schools that are
ever listed with a “flexible” academic calendar, affected region schools that change calendars before 2010, and schools
in other regions that ever change calendars. Private schools are those that are listed as private in any year; public
schools are listed as public in all years.
A school is high/superior rank if it ever received one of the exam agency’s top three (of seven) ranks in 2001–2008.
A school is academic if it is academic or normal in any of these years, and zero if it is always technical or academic
& technical. Averages of these variables are weighted by the number of exam takers.
Icfes percentiles are relative to all 11th grade exam takers in the same year and are calculated using the average of
the scores from the six core components that did not change in 2001–2011: biology, chemistry, language, mathematics,
philosophy, and physics. Mother attended college equals one if a graduate’s mother has any degree above basic
secondary; this variable is only available for the 2008–2011 cohorts. Age is calculated at the end of August in the
exam year.
College enrollment within t years of the Icfes is defined as a graduate’s first appearance in the Ministry of Education
college records. These averages are calculated using 2001–2006 graduates.
See Appendices A.3 and A.4 for further details on the included colleges and high schools.
rises to roughly 40 percent by six years after the exam. Both immediate and overall college
enrollment are substantially more common in staying schools.
The next two sections explore the effects of the calendar shift on college enrollment using
schools in other regions of Colombia as a comparison group (columns (D) and (E) in Table
1). In particular, the calendar transition created a time gap between high school and college
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 Icfes exam  c – 1 Year of Icfes exam (c) c + 1
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2007 Icfes  College
2008 Icfes  College
2009 Icfes  College
2010 Icfes  College
2011 Icfes  College









Figure 3. Calendar transition and a time gap
Notes: Grey bars are instructional periods in the last year of high school. Gaps are break periods. White boxes
represent the first potential college semester. Icfes indicates the timing of the college entrance exam.
Schedules are approximate based on half-month increments; there are small yearly differences in start/end dates
and Icfes timing. This figure is based on 2006–2012 resolutions from the Secretary of Education in Cali, Valle del
Cauca. Resolutions from the Security of Education in Nariño show similar schedules.
at both switching schools and staying schools, but for different reasons. The next section
focuses on switching schools; Section 5 discusses staying schools.
4. Switching schools
This section describes how the calendar transition led to a time gap after graduation for
one cohort at switching schools. It then presents the resulting effects on college enrollment.
4.1. Calendar transition and a time gap. Figure 3 illustrates the transition from the
September to the January academic calendar at switching schools.145 It depicts the 2007–
2012 cohorts, defined by the year of the Icfes college entrance exam. The grey bars represent
instructional periods in the last year of high school. Prior to 2009, students began the year
in September, took the Icfes exam in April/May, and graduated in June. They were eligible
to begin college in September of their exam year, indicated by the white boxes.
2009 graduates started senior year and took the Icfes on the typical schedule, but they
graduated three months later than usual. This occurred through one extra month of classes
and two additional mid-term breaks. 2010 graduates also had an extra month of instruction,
145 Figure 3 depicts academic calendars from public resolutions by the government in Cali, Valle del Cauca.
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Panel B. Enrolled within 1 year
Figure 4. Switching schools — College enrollment by years since Icfes
Notes: Switching schools include students from columns (A) and (B) in Table 1. Schools in other regions include
students from columns (D) and (E). College enrollment is defined as in Table 1.
but their school year began and ended several months later. The transition was complete by
2011, when the academic calendar matched that for all other Colombian public schools.
Figure 3 shows that the transition shifted the first possible college enrollment semester
from September to January. This created an unusual four month gap between high school and
potential college enrollment for the 2009 cohort, which graduated just after the September
college semester began. Below I ask how this time gap altered the decision to enroll in
college. I also explore other potential confounding effects such as changes in class time.
4.2. Benchmark effects on college enrollment. To study the effects of the time gap, I
compare college enrollment among graduates from switching schools (columns (A) and (B)
in Table 1) to graduates from other regions of Colombia (columns (D) and (E)).
Figure 4 plots the mean college enrollment rates in switching schools and other schools
by Icfes exam cohort. Panel A shows the fraction of graduates entering college one semester
after taking the Icfes. There is a sharp drop in the 2009 switching school cohort. This
decline in enrollment is in the September college semester, which began before many of these
students graduated (see Figure 3). The 2009 enrollment rate is not zero, suggesting that
some students or schools graduated early. Nonetheless, many 2009 graduates did not enter
college as usual.
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The initial decrease in college enrollment in Panel A is a “first stage” result; some 2009
graduates had to wait one extra semester to enroll. Panel B explores the effects of this time
gap on enrollment within one year of the exam—the next possible college entrance date.
The enrollment decline for the 2009 cohort is less pronounced but still evident; the drop is
roughly half of its magnitude from Panel A. This suggests that many students did not enter
college following the one semester gap.
Table 2 quantifies these effects using the differences in differences regression
(1) ythc = γh + γc + βtδhc + εhc.
The dependent variable, ythc, is the fraction of students from high school h and Icfes exam
cohort c who enroll in college t years after the exam. The regression includes high school
dummies, γh, cohort dummies, γc, and a treatment indicator, δhc, which equals one for
the 2009 cohort at switching schools. The coefficient of interest, βt, measures the change
in enrollment within t years for 2009 switching school graduates relative to other schools.
This is a school-cohort level regression with observations weighted by the number of exam
takers.146
Panel A of Table 2 displays the βt coefficients from (1). The columns use dependent
variables that measure cumulative enrollment at different durations t. The sample includes
only 2001–2009 graduates, for whom I observe enrollment up to t = 3 years later.
Column (A) shows that for 2009 switching school graduates, college enrollment in the
semester after Icfes declined by about five percentage points. This mirrors the “first stage”
result from Panel A of Figure 4. Column (B) shows a three percentage point decline in
enrollment within one year. This is consistent with Panel B of Figure 4.
These results suggest that some graduates who would typically have gone to college did
not enroll following the time gap. Is this a temporary delay or a permanent decision to forgo
further schooling? Columns (C) and (D) measure college enrollment two and three years
after the Icfes exam. The point estimates change little relative to column (B). Though the
146 This yields coefficients identical to those from an individual-level regression but reduces computing time.
187
Table 2. Switching schools — Time gap and college enrollment
Dependent variable: Enrolled in college within t years of the Icfes
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Panel A. Benchmark specification
0.5 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Switching schools, −0.049∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗
2009 cohort (δhc) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
R2 0.884 0.904 0.911 0.911
Panel B. High school matching
0.5 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Switching schools, −0.049∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
2009 cohort (δhc) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
R2 0.890 0.909 0.915 0.915
Panel C. Linear high school trends
0.5 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Switching schools, −0.032∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.019
2009 cohort (δhc) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
R2 0.915 0.932 0.938 0.939
N 36,972 36,972 36,972 36,972
# regions 33 33 33 33
Dependent var. mean 0.161 0.257 0.338 0.382
Notes: The sample is the 2001–2009 Icfes exam cohorts at high schools in columns (A), (B), (D), and (E) of Table 1.
The dependent variables are college enrollment within t years of the Icfes, where t is listed in the column header. All
columns report coefficients on the treatment variable, δhc, which equals one for the 2009 cohort at switching schools
(columns (A) and (B) in Table 1). All regressions include high school dummies and cohort dummies. Regressions are
at the school-cohort level with observations weighted by the number of exam takers. Parentheses contain standard
errors clustered at the region level. Dependent variable means are calculated from the 2001–2008 cohorts.
Panel A estimates equation (1). Panel B adds dummies for cells defined by cohort and groups of schools. There
are 30 groups based on school ownership (public or private), training (academic/normal, academic & technical, or
technical), and Icfes ranking (far superior, superior, high, middle, or low/inferior/far inferior). Each characteristic
is time-invariant; a school is private if it is ever private, and I assign each school its highest training level and Icfes
ranking. Panel C adds school-specific linear cohort trends to Panel B.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
data do not extend beyond three years for the 2009 cohort, the lack of catch-up enrollment
suggests that the decline in college attendance is not merely transitory.
4.3. Robustness specifications. The benchmark results compare switching schools to all
high schools in other regions. Table 1 shows that public switching schools are mostly similar
to other public schools (columns (A) and (D)), but private schools in the two areas differ
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significantly (columns (B) and (E)). For example, private school students in other regions
have higher test scores and socioeconomic backgrounds. These differences arise because the
comparison group includes elite private schools in Bogotá, and because the best private
schools in the affected regions stayed on the September calendar (column (C)).
The differences between switching and comparison schools raise concerns if they lead
to divergent college enrollment trends. Table 2 depicts two robustness specifications that
address this possibility. Panel B alters the implicit comparison group by matching high
schools using their characteristics. I define 30 high school groups g based on a school’s
public/private status, its level of academic training, and its Icfes performance ranking.147
I then add group-cohort dummies, γgc, to equation (1). This yields a matching estimator
(e.g., Abadie and Imbens, 2002; Imbens, 2004) where matches are based on school traits.
The coefficients in Panel B are thus identified only from variation in enrollment outcomes
within similar types of high schools. The results are essentially unchanged from Panel A,
suggesting that the choice of comparison group does not drive the main results.
Panel C adds linear cohort trends for each high school, γ̃h × c, to the specification for
Panel B. This is the standard differences in differences test of adding linear terms in the
“time” dimension (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The coefficient magnitudes fall slightly rela-
tive to previous specifications, which reflects a small divergence in enrollment trends between
switching schools and other schools (see Figure 4). Nonetheless, the sharp decrease in en-
rollment for 2009 switching school graduates is distinguishable from the linear trends, and
the pattern of coefficients across years matches that in Panels A and B.
Standard errors in Table 2 are clustered at the region level. Colombia has 33 administra-
tive regions, which is below the rule-of-thumb for inference using the typical cluster-robust
standard errors (e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2009). To address this, Appendix A.5 describes
additional regressions that are at the region-cohort level and use a t(33− 2) distribution for
147 See the notes to Table 2 for details on the group definitions. Results are similar with alternative
definitions.
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inference. This follows Donald and Lang (2007), who recommend “between-group” estima-
tors in settings with few clusters but a large number of observations per cluster (see also
Wooldridge, 2003). These region-cohort level regressions yield larger standard errors but do
not measurably alter the point estimates or patterns of statistical significance from Table 2.
4.4. Potential explanations for the enrollment decline. Table 2 shows that many 2009
switching school graduates experienced an unusual one semester break after high school and
did not subsequently enroll in college. One potential concern in attributing the enrollment
decline to the time gap is that these students may have been affected by other elements of
the calendar transition. For example, the 2009 school year had fewer instructional days prior
to the Icfes exam, and more days afterward (see Figure 3). This may have harmed students’
exam performance or reduced their likelihood of graduating.
Appendix A.6 tests these hypotheses. The calendar shift did not have a significant impact
on the number students who took the Icfes exam at switching schools. There is also no
change in students’ average Icfes scores. Thus there is little evidence that the transition
reduced students’ college preparedness.
Another potential hypothesis is that the transition decrease admission rates at selective
colleges. This could arise if colleges did not rebalance their January/September cohort slots
in response to the shifting calendar. However, Appendix A.7 shows that the enrollment
decline occurs mainly at non-selective colleges; thus the primary effect of the transition was
a decline in enrollment at colleges with open admissions, not a shift in access to selective
colleges.148
It is also hard to explain the enrollment decline by a decrease in graduates’ returns to
college. The time gap reduced post-college careers by one-half year at at most, and the
corresponding loss in discounted returns is small relative to estimates of the college earnings
premium (Autor, 2014b; Zimmerman, 2014).
148 Further, Section 6 shows that the enrollment decline is largest for low SES and low ability students, who
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Panel B. Labor force participation
Figure 5. 17 year olds in the affected regions
Notes: Data are from the 2007–2010 monthly urban (cabecera) and rural (resto) GEIH household surveys. The sample
is 1990–1992 birth cohorts in the affected regions; this defines cohorts of individuals who turned 17 in 2007–2009. For
February 2009 the sample is current 16 year olds because birthdates are missing. The sample includes only children,
grandchildren, or other relatives of the household head.
The x-axis combines monthly surveys into three-month quarters. It begins in October before the cohort year and
ends in June after the cohort year (e.g., 10/2008 through 6/2010 for the 2009 cohort). 2006 surveys are not available,
so Oct–Dec 2006 values for the 2007 cohort are equal to Oct–Dec 2007 values for the 2008 cohort plus the average
difference between the 2007 and 2008 cohorts in Jan–Jun of the cohort year.
Panel A shows the fraction of each cohort group with a high school degree or above. Panel B shows the fraction in
the labor force, defined as appearing in the employed (ocupados) or unemployed (desocupados) survey. Panel B omits
months with mid-term breaks (1/2007, 1/2008, and 4/2009; see Figure 3) when labor force participation temporarily
increases, and it is lagged one month because survey questions refer to labor force activity in the prior 1–4 weeks
(e.g., October values are from the November survey).
Calculations use weights that are fixed over time, which are the sum of survey weights across all months within
non-missing cells defined by region, age, gender, urban/rural survey, and secondary educated mother.
The time gap more likely influenced college preferences through students’ experiences
while away from school. Figure 5 provides suggestive evidence of this channel using 2007–
2010 Colombian household survey data. The graphs depict two cohorts of individuals in the
affected regions: those who turned 17 years old in the pre-transition years (2007–2008), and
those who turned 17 in the first year of the calendar transition (2009).
Panel A plots the fraction of individuals in each cohort group with a high school degree.
The x-axis displays quarters beginning in October–December before the cohort year; this is
the start of the final year of high school for 17 year olds with on-time academic progress.149
149 Age cohort is a noisy measure of graduation cohort because a few students graduate early and many
others are behind schedule. This explains why 10 percent of 17 year olds have a high school degree before
July and only 40 percent have one after. Figure 5 also cannot separate switching and non-switching schools
in the affected regions, but switching school graduates are a large majority of all graduates (see Table 1).
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The graduation rate for the 2007–2008 cohorts jumps from 10 to 40 percent in the July
quarter but does not reach 40 percent until October for the 2009 cohort. This reflects the
delayed calendar for 2009 graduates in many switching schools (see Figure 3).
Panel B depicts labor force participation rates for the same cohorts and time periods. Prior
to on-time high school graduation, roughly 20 percent of 17 year olds were either employed
or looking for work. These rates increase for all cohorts in July–September as students finish
high school. In October–December, however, labor force participation is higher in the 2009
cohort than in the 2007–2008 cohorts. October–December is the gap between high school
graduation and potential college enrollment for some 2009 graduates. This result suggests
that the time gap led some 2009 graduates to work or look for a job. These experiences may
have prompted some students to forgo further schooling, as suggested by the results in Table
2. Consistent with this, Panel B in Figure 5 shows that labor force participation remains
higher for the 2009 cohort through the start of the next year.150
Though the calendar transition had multiple components, Figure 5 suggests the decline
in college attendance among 2009 graduates is most consistent with a causal effect of the
post-graduation gap. The next section corroborates this finding by analyzing high schools
in the affected regions that did not change calendars, which yield an arguably cleaner test
of the effect of time gaps on college enrollment.
5. Staying schools
This section shows that the academic calendar shift also affected college entry timing for
graduates from schools in the affected regions that did not change calendars, which I call
staying schools. It then asks how the resulting time gap affected college enrollment.
5.1. A time gap at staying schools. Colombian students apply to both a college and
a major. Many programs are offered twice per year, while others begin annually. In the
affected regions, colleges historically offered their annual programs in the September cohort
150 Appendix A.8 shows that the findings in Figure 5 are statistically significant in regressions that also
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Panel B. Both cohorts
Figure 6. Growth in college programs relative to 2008
Notes: This graph shows the number of programs with at least one enrollee in each academic year of the Ministry of
Education records. Programs are defined by an institution and a non-missing program name. Academic year includes
September of the listed year and January of the following year. For both affected regions and other regions, the y-axis
is the number of programs in a given year divided by the number of programs in 2008. Panel A shows the number
of September programs. Panel B shows the number of September programs plus the number of January programs.
because nearly all local high school students graduated in June. With the calendar shift,
the large majority of students now finish in November. As a result, colleges in the affected
regions shifted some annual programs to the January cohort.
Figure 6 illustrates this shift in college program timing. Panel A plots the number of
programs in the September cohort at colleges in the affected regions and in other regions.
The y-axis is normalized to represent the change in programs relative to 2008. In both areas
the quantity of September programs increased by more than two-thirds from 2001–2009.151
In 2010–2011, however, the number of September programs declined by about six percent in
the affected regions, falling behind program growth in other regions.
Panel B shows the total number of programs offered across the September and January
cohorts. The two areas exhibit similar annual program growth in 2010 and 2011. Figure 6
thus shows that colleges in the affected regions shifted some programs from the September
to the January cohort without altering the total annual quantity. This affected the college
enrollment timing of the 2010–2011 cohorts at staying schools, which finished in June. Grad-
uates who wanted to apply to programs that moved to the January cohort had to wait an
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Panel B. Enrolled within 1 year
Figure 7. Staying schools — College enrollment by years since Icfes
Notes: Staying schools include students from column (C) in Table 1. Private schools in other regions include students
from column (E). College enrollment is defined as in Table 1.
extra semester to do so. This created another time gap after graduation, induced in this
case by changes in college calendars rather than high school calendars.
5.2. Effects on college enrollment. I explore the effects of the college program shift by
comparing graduates from staying schools (column (C) in Table 1) to graduates from private
schools in other regions (column (E)).
Figure 7 shows the college enrollment rates for these two school groups by Icfes exam
cohort. Panel A displays the fraction of graduates who began college one semester after
taking the Icfes. These initial college entry rates for staying schools and other schools follow
similar upward trends through 2009. In 2010–2011, the immediate enrollment rate drops
sharply at staying schools. This matches the timing of the college program shift in Figure 6.
Panel A of Figure 7 is a “first stage” result; some graduates could not immediately enter
programs that moved to the January cohort. Panel B shows college enrollment rates within
one year of the exam, which includes entry into both the September and January cohorts.
Since Figure 6 shows no change in annual program offerings, staying school graduates who
were waiting for January programs could have enrolled within one year. Panel B suggests
that many did not. The enrollment decline in the 2010–2011 cohorts is slightly smaller in
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magnitude but still evident. This suggests the time gap after high school altered graduates’
college attendance decisions.
Table 3 presents the regression version of Figure 7. This table is analogous to Table 2,
and the regressions are also based on equation (1). In Table 3, however, the sample is
2001–2011 graduates from staying schools and private high schools in other regions, and the
treatment indicator, δhc, equals one for the 2010–2011 cohorts at staying schools. Since the
college enrollment records extend through 2012, this table shows cumulative enrollment at
a maximum duration of t = 1.5 years after the Icfes.
Panel A shows the benchmark results from equation (1). Columns (A) and (B) match
Figure 7. There is a seven percentage point decline in immediate college enrollment for
2010–2011 staying school graduates relative to graduates from other regions. The enrollment
decline within one year is slightly smaller at five percentage points.
Column (C) depicts cumulative enrollment within 1.5 years. The magnitude of the coef-
ficient falls slightly relative to column (B), but there is still an enrollment shortfall of four
percentage points in staying schools. Data constraints do not allow me to see if this catch-
up enrollment continued, but Table 3 shows that many staying school graduates were not
enrolled in college one full year after the time gap.152
Panels B and C present the same two robustness specifications as in Table 2. Panel B
matches treated and comparison high schools by adding dummies for cells defined by cohort
and school traits (see Section 4.3). These dummies lower the standard errors but have
little effect on the point estimates. Panel C adds high-school-specific linear cohort trends
to the specification for Panel B. These terms have little effect on the immediate enrollment
coefficient, but they substantially increase the magnitudes of the estimates in columns (B)
and (C). This reflects non-parallel enrollment trends in early Icfes cohorts (2001–2005) at
staying schools and comparison schools (see Panel B of Figure 7). Nonetheless, these trends
152 Unlike Table 3, Table 2 shows little evidence of catch-up enrollment at switching schools. This is con-
sistent with evidence in Section 6 that low SES/ability students are more likely to forgo college after the
gap.
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Table 3. Staying schools — Time gap and college enrollment
Dependent variable: Enrolled in college within t years of the Icfes
(A) (B) (C)
Panel A. Benchmark specification
0.5 years 1 year 1.5 years
Staying schools, −0.070∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
2010–2011 cohorts (δhc) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
R2 0.831 0.857 0.866
Panel B. High school matching
0.5 years 1 year 1.5 years
Staying schools, −0.067∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
2010–2011 cohorts (δhc) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
R2 0.839 0.866 0.875
Panel C. Linear high school trends
0.5 years 1 year 1.5 years
Staying schools, −0.072∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗
2010–2011 cohorts (δhc) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
R2 0.874 0.899 0.909
N 13,695 13,695 13,695
# regions 25 25 25
Dependent var. mean 0.338 0.482 0.550
Notes: The sample is the 2001–2011 Icfes exam cohorts at high schools in columns (C) and (E) of Table 1. The
dependent variables are college enrollment within t years of the Icfes, where t is listed in the column header. All
columns report coefficients on the treatment variable, δhc, which equals one for the 2010–2011 cohorts at staying
schools (column (C) in Table 1). All regressions include high school dummies and cohort dummies. Regressions are
at the school-cohort level with observations weighted by the number of exam takers. Parentheses contain standard
errors clustered at the region level. Dependent variable means are calculated from the 2001–2008 cohorts.
Panel A estimates equation (1). Panel B adds dummies for cells defined by cohort and groups of schools (see Table
2 for details). Panel C adds school-specific linear cohort trends to Panel B.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
converge in the cohorts prior to the college program shift (2005–2009), and the estimates in
Panel C of Table 3 still suggest a large negative impact of the time gap on enrollment.153
The results in Table 3 are not attributable to changes in instructional time because staying
schools did not alter their academic calendars. This is corroborated by balance tests in
Appendix A.6 that show no differential changes in the number of Icfes exam takers or their
average scores. Further, the results are not likely due to decreases in college admission rates
153 Appendix A.5 shows that the results in Table 3 are also robust to the stricter inference procedures based
on Donald and Lang (2007) (see Section 4.3).
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as there were no alterations in annual program offerings. Instead, these results are evidence
of a causal effect of post-high school gaps on college enrollment.
6. Heterogeneous responses to the time gap
Sections 4 and 5 showed that switching school and staying school graduates experienced
a time gap after high school, but for different reasons. Both mechanisms, however, led some
graduates to forgo further schooling. The net effect was a seven percent decline in college
enrollment rates in affected regions.
This section asks whether time gaps can also affect the distribution of schooling outcomes
by exploring heterogeneity in these effects at both school types. I first examine whether
responses to the gap vary by student characteristics. I then ask if students were more likely
to forgo low-paying majors.
6.1. Heterogeneity by student characteristics. To study how time gap responses vary
across individuals, I estimate coefficients like those in Tables 2 and 3 for different groups of
students. However, student types may vary in both baseline college enrollment rates and in
their exposure to the time gap. For example, high ability graduates are more likely to enroll
in college, and they may also have been more likely to choose college programs that shifted
from the September to the January cohorts. This could lead to larger estimates even absent
any heterogeneity in responsiveness to the time gap.
To address this, I estimate two stage least squares (2SLS) regressions that relate the long-
term enrollment effect to the immediate effect of the transition. Consider the regressions:
y0.5hc = γh + γc + β0.5δhc + εhc,(2)
ymaxhc = αh + αc + θŷ0.5hc + υhc.(3)
Equation (2) is a first stage regression identical to equation (1). The dependent variable,
y0.5hc , is the fraction of students from high school h and Icfes cohort c who begin college 0.5
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years after the exam. The regression includes high school dummies, γh, cohort dummies, γc,
and a treatment indicator for schools and cohorts affected by the calendar shift, δhc.
Equation (3) is the second stage regression. The dependent variable, ymaxhc , is cumulative
college enrollment at the maximum observable duration since the Icfes exam. The regression
also includes school and cohort dummies, but the main independent variable is enrollment
within 0.5 years of the exam, y0.5hc . The coefficient of interest, θ, measures the effect of a one
percentage point change in the immediate college enrollment rate on longer-term enrollment.
College enrollment is endogenous, so the second stage (3) uses predicted values from the
first stage (2), ŷ0.5hc . In other words, the treatment variable, δhc, is an instrument for y0.5hc . The
2SLS coefficient, θ, equals the ratio of the longer-term enrollment effect to the immediate
effect (βmax/β0.5). Thus θ measures responsiveness to the time gap—the reduction in longer-
term enrollment that is attributable to the decline in initial enrollment from the transition.
Column (A) in Table 4 shows the estimate of θ from equation (3). Panel A displays the
result for schools that switched to the January calendar. The sample is the same as in Table
2, and the dependent variable is cumulative college enrollment within three years of the Icfes.
The coefficient shows that a one percentage point decline in initial enrollment during the
transition led to a 0.55 percentage point decrease in the three-year enrollment rate.154
Columns (B)–(D) use this 2SLS procedure to compare time gap responsiveness across
student types. The columns divide the sample into two groups defined by socioeconomic
status, academic ability, and age, respectively.155 These regressions are similar to column
(A), but all terms are interacted with a dummy for one of the groups. In Table 4 this
dummy is called “Disadvantagedd” and equals one for: low SES students (column (B)), low
ability students (column (C)), and students older than the on-time age (column (D)).156
154 This equals the ratio of the estimates from columns (D) and (A) in Panel A of Table 2.
155 I do not find heterogeneous responses by gender that are consistent across specifications.
156 Regressions in columns (B)–(D) are at the school-cohort-Disadvantaged level (hcd); they calculate en-
rollment rates separately for Advantaged and Disadvantaged students in the same high school and cohort.
The full second-stage specification, of which Table 4 displays only the θ and θD coefficients, is






Table 4. Heterogeneity in responsiveness to the time gap
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Panel A. Switching schools
Dependent variable: Enrolled in college within 3 years of the Icfes
Definition of Disadvantaged group
All Mother Icfes below Age 18
students no college median or older
Time gap (ŷ0.5hcd) 0.553∗∗∗ 0.295∗ 0.385∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.174) (0.177) (0.183)
Time gap (ŷ0.5hcd) × 0.344∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗
Disadvantagedd (0.114) (0.131) (0.100)
N 36,972 14,672 73,074 73,178
R2 0.324 0.253 0.261 0.289
# regions 33 33 33 33
Panel B. Staying schools
Dependent variable: Enrolled in college within 1.5 years of the Icfes
Definition of Disadvantaged group
All Mother Icfes below Age 18
students no college median or older
Time gap (ŷ0.5hcd) 0.564∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.059) (0.071) (0.123)
Time gap (ŷ0.5hcd) × 0.282∗∗∗ 0.054 0.235∗∗∗
Disadvantagedd (0.102) (0.176) (0.079)
N 13,695 9,583 26,660 26,717
R2 0.451 0.332 0.397 0.398
# regions 25 25 25 25
Notes: In Panel A, the sample is as in Table 2. The dependent variable is college enrollment within 3 years of the
Icfes. The treatment variable, δhc, equals one for the 2009 cohort at switching schools.
In Panel B, the sample is as in Table 3. The dependent variable is college enrollment within 1.5 years of the Icfes.
δhc equals one for the 2010–2011 cohorts at staying schools.
Column (A) is the 2SLS regression (3), where enrollment within 0.5 years of the Icfes, y0.5hc , is instrumented by
δhc. I report only the coefficient on ŷ0.5hc . The regression includes high school dummies and cohort dummies. The
regression is at the school-cohort level with observations weighted by the number of exam takers.
Columns (B)–(D) are the same 2SLS regression, but all terms are interacted with a dummy for the “Disadvantaged”
group in the column header. The reported variables, ŷ0.5hcd and ŷ0.5hcd × Disadvantagedd, are instrumented by δhc and
δhc ×Disadvantagedd. The regression is at the school-cohort-Disadvantaged level with observations weighted by the
number of exam takers.
The variables that define Disadvantaged are calculated as in Table 1. Column (B) excludes the 2001–2007 cohorts
because mother’s education is not available. Median Icfes is defined in the sample for each regression.
Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the region level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In column (B) of Panel A, the coefficient on ŷ0.5hcd is the effect of time gap for switching school
graduates whose mothers attended college. The coefficient on the ŷ0.5hcd × Disadvantagedd
interaction is the difference in the time gap effects for students without and with college
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educated mothers. The effect for graduates without college educated mothers (0.295 +
0.344) is more than double that for high SES students (0.295). In other words, low SES
graduates who experienced a time gap after high school were more likely to forgo college.157
Columns (C) and (D) in Panel A show similar patterns for academic ability and age.
Column (C) splits the sample by Icfes scores, and the time gap effect is more than twice as
large for graduates with below-median scores. Column (D) compares students with on-time
and delayed academic progress; the time gap effect is about 50 percent larger for students
who are 18 years old or older.
Panel B of Table 4 shows analogous results for schools in the affected regions that did
not change calendars. The sample is the same as in Table 3, and the dependent variable is
college enrollment within 1.5 years of the Icfes. Column (A) shows that the mean time gap
effect at staying schools is nearly identical to that at switching schools.158 Columns (B)–(D)
show heterogeneity using the same characteristics as in Panel A. The results mirror those
for switching schools. “Disadvantaged” staying school graduates are more responsive to the
time gap, although the heterogeneity by ability is statistically insignificant.
Table 4 thus shows that low SES, low ability, and older students are more likely to forgo
college after the time gap. Another characteristic these groups share is that each has a low
overall college enrollment rate. Figure 8 illustrates this using 16 student types defined by
mothers’ college attendance, age above/below 18, and quartiles of Icfes scores. The y-axis
displays time gap coefficients, θ, from separate estimations of equation (3) for each of the 16
types, with larger symbols indicating more precise coefficients. The x-axis depicts the three-
year college enrollment rates of each group in the pre-transition cohorts (2001–2008). Panel
A displays coefficients from switching schools; Panel B depicts staying school estimates.
The scatterplots in both panels of Figure 8 have a downward shape; student types with low
baseline enrollment rates are also more responsive to the time gap.159 The group definitions
157 Column (B) includes only the 2008–2011 cohorts for which mother’s education is available. Results are
similar if I define SES by mean mother’s education at the high school level and include all 2001–2011 cohorts.
158 This coefficient also equals the ratio of the estimates from columns (C) and (A) in Panel A of Table 3.
159 Some time gap coefficients in Figure 8 are greater than one, suggesting that the gap also reduced the
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Figure 8. Time gap responsiveness and enrollment rates by SES, ability, and age
Notes: The samples for Panels A and B are the same as in Panels A and B of Table 4, respectively. This figure
defines 16 student groups based on the same definitions of SES (two types), ability (four types), and age (two types)
as in Table 4, with two exceptions. First, it uses Icfes quartiles rather than the median. Second, mother’s education
is only available in the 2008–2011 cohorts, so this figure defines SES at the high school level to include all cohorts.
Mother no college indicates high schools above the sample median fraction of 2008 graduates without college educated
mothers; mother college are high schools below the median.
For each of the 16 student groups, the pre-transition college enrollment rate is the fraction of 2001–2008 affected
region graduates who enter college within three years of the Icfes. The time gap coefficient is the estimate of θ
from separate regressions (3) for each student group. Regressions are as in column (A) of Table 4. Symbol size is
proportional to log(1 + 1/σ̂2g), where σ̂2g is the standard error on θ̂g for each group g.
in Figure 8 are analogous to those in Appendix A.1, which shows an inverse relationship
between overall enrollment rates and the likelihood of delayed enrollment. Taken together,
these results suggest that time gaps may have a doubly negative effect on college enrollment;
not only are disadvantaged students more likely to take time off after high school, they are
also more likely to forgo college after these time gaps.
A recent literature explores the mechanisms underlying socioeconomic gaps in college
attendance (Bailey and Dynarski, 2011; Hoxby and Avery, 2013b; Black, Cortes and Lincove,
2015; Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor, 2015). Heterogeneity in transition timing may be another
factor that contributes to these disparities. The results in Table 4 and Figure 8 are also
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consistent with a greater influence of time gaps on individuals who are ex ante indecisive
about college.
6.2. Heterogeneity by average program earnings. The previous section shows that
time gap effects vary across types of students. This section asks if the time gap also influences
students’ program choices.
Specifically, I explore whether graduates’ post-gap program choices were correlated with
their expected earnings in those majors. I calculate program earnings using administrative
social security records for 2003–2008 college graduates. Programs are defined by the Ministry
of Education’s 54 college major groups. For each program, I calculate the average earnings
of college graduates with a given Icfes score and gender.160 This yields a measure of a
potential enrollee’s predicted earnings in each program based on college graduates with
similar characteristics. For each gender and Icfes score combination, I then calculate the
median predicted earnings across all 54 programs. I define “high wage” programs as those
above the median predicted earnings; “low wage” programs are those below the median.
Table 5 shows regressions similar to those in Tables 2 and 3, but the dependent variables
are indicators for enrolling in high or low wage programs. In Panel A, columns (A) and
(B) show the effect of the switching school time gap on enrollment in each program type.
The time gap led to a similar enrollment decline one semester after the Icfes for both high
earnings and low earnings programs. Columns (C) and (D) show the effect on enrollment
within three years of the exam. For low wage programs, the three-year enrollment decline is
similar to the initial effect. The enrollment effect mostly disappears at high wage programs,
and the three-year coefficient is not statistically significant. After the time gap, students
were thus more likely to enter programs that yield high earnings, and more likely to forgo
programs that deliver low earnings.
160 Specifically, for each of the 54 programs, I regress log average daily earnings in 2008–2012 on a gender
dummy, Icfes percentile, and a quadratic in years since college graduation. Predicted earnings are the sum
of the gender and Icfes terms, each multiplied by their coefficients from this regression.
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Table 5. Heterogeneity by program earnings
Dependent variable: Enrolled in college within t years of the Icfes
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Panel A. Switching schools
Enrolled within 0.5 years Enrolled within 3 years
Low wage High wage Low wage High wage
programs programs programs programs
Switching schools, −0.027∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.004
2009 cohort (δhc) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006)
N 36,972 36,972 36,972 36,972
R2 0.758 0.845 0.794 0.860
# regions 33 33 33 33
Dependent var. mean 0.076 0.086 0.183 0.199
Panel B. Staying schools
Enrolled within 0.5 years Enrolled within 1.5 years
Low wage High wage Low wage High wage
programs programs programs programs
Staying schools, −0.037∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.009
2010–2011 cohorts (δhc) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006)
N 13,695 13,695 13,695 13,695
R2 0.636 0.768 0.665 0.787
# regions 25 25 25 25
Dependent var. mean 0.146 0.192 0.244 0.307
Notes: The samples for Panels A and B are the same as in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. All columns report coefficients
on the treatment variable, δhc, which is defined as in those tables. Regressions are identical to Tables 2 and 3 except
for the dependent variables.
The dependent variables measure the fraction of students from each high school and cohort enrolling in high or
low wage programs within t years of the Icfes, as listed in the column header. High/low wage programs are defined
using social security records for 2003–2008 college graduates, with programs defined by the Ministry of Education’s
54 college major groups. For each program (plus one for missing values), I regress log average daily earnings in
2008–2012 on a gender dummy, Icfes percentile, and a quadratic in years since college graduation. I define predicted
earnings as the sum of the gender and Icfes terms, each multiplied by their coefficients from this regression. I then
calculate the median predicted earnings across all 54 programs for each gender and Icfes score combination in the
samples for Panels A and B. “High wage” programs are those above the median predicted earnings; “low wage”
programs are those below the median.
Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the region level. Dependent variable means are calculated from
the 2001–2008 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Panel B shows that this pattern also holds for graduates from staying schools. The coef-
ficients in columns (A) and (B) are similar, suggesting that the initial decline in enrollment
is relatively earnings-neutral. Columns (C) and (D) show that the longer-term reduction in
enrollment is driven by students forgoing programs with low expected earnings.
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Table 5 thus provides suggestive evidence that labor market returns affect students’ deci-
sions to return to school after the time gap. This analysis does not study the causal returns
to program choice as in Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2015) but rather the descriptive
returns, which may be more salient. Related research finds that students’ schooling experi-
ences and preferences affect their major choices (Zafar, 2011; Arcidiacono, Hotz and Kang,
2012; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2014; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). My results suggest
that time outside of the education system can also shape schooling decisions.
7. Conclusion
An influential literature in labor economics argues that college access lowers wage in-
equality (Katz and Murphy, 1992a; Goldin and Katz, 2008b). Recent work shows that one
potential barrier to obtaining a college degree is a lack of information. Thus there has
been a push by both academics and policymakers to make college costs and outcomes more
transparent.
This research and policy agenda focuses on information that is at least potentially attain-
able prior to the enrollment decision through search (Stigler, 1961). For example, Jensen
(2010) and Hoxby and Turner (2013b) provide students with information on search traits
like average returns and tuition, finding substantial effects on their educational choices.
This paper has explored a type of information that is less amenable to information inter-
ventions: individuals’ experiences (Nelson, 1970b). In particular, it asked whether breaks
after high school graduation affect the decision of whether to enroll in college. To isolate this
channel, it exploited a policy that altered academic calendars in some regions of Colombia,
which created a one semester gap before potential college entry for some students.
This brief time gap led to a persistent reduction in college enrollment rates in affected
regions. The decline was largest for students who were less likely to attend college in the
first place. There is also suggestive evidence that labor force participation increased during
the time gap, and that individuals who subsequently enrolled chose higher paying majors.
These results suggest that students’ out-of-school experiences altered their college choices.
204
The idea that individuals’ non-academic experiences matter for their schooling attainment
has implications for the design of education systems. Critics of early tracking argue that it
forces students into career paths based on limited information from high-pressure exams. Yet
such systems may also ease transitions between schooling tiers, which can create educational
churning in more flexible systems. Policies that clarify enrollment standards and simplify
the application process can also limit academic gaps. The success of initiatives to increase
college attainment rates, such as the recent proposal for free community college in the U.S.,
may depend in part on the degree to which they discourage enrollment delays, with potential
implications for wage inequality.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Delayed college enrollment by SES, ability, and age. Figure 1 in Section 2 shows
that delayed enrollment is an important phenomenon in both the U.S. and Colombia. Figure
A1 explores the relationship between overall and delayed college enrollment. To do this it
divides the samples for Figure 1 into 16 student types based on age, socioeconomic status,
and academic ability. For each type, the graph depicts both the overall college enrollment
rate (x-axis) and the prevalence of delayed enrollment (y-axis), defined as the fraction of all
enrollees who wait more than one semester.
Panel A shows U.S. high school graduates from the NLSY. There is a strong negative
relationship between overall and delayed enrollment; students who are less likely to attend
college at all are more likely to delay conditional on enrolling. Both delaying and forgo-
ing college are more common among students who are “disadvantaged” in their academic
progression, as defined by age, socioeconomic status, and ability.
Panel B shows a similar relationship between delayed and overall enrollment for Colombian
high school graduates.
A.2. Data merging. The main analysis of this paper uses two administrative datasets:
1) records of Icfes high school exam takers; and 2) records of students enrolled in colleges
tracked by the Ministry of Education. I merge these datasets using national ID numbers,
birth dates, and names. Nearly all students in both datasets have national ID numbers,
but Colombians change ID numbers around age 17. Most students in the Icfes records have
the below-17 ID number (tarjeta), while the majority of students in the college enrollment
records have the above-17 ID number (cédula). Merging using ID numbers alone would
therefore lose a large majority of students. Instead, I merge observations with either: 1) the
same ID number and a fuzzy name match; 2) the same birth date and a fuzzy name match;
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Figure A1. Delayed college enrollment by SES, ability, and age
Notes: The samples for both panels are students from Figure 1 with non-missing values of the age, SES, and ability
variables described below. College enrollment and years since graduation are defined as in Figure 1. Overall enrollment
rate is the fraction of graduates who enter college within nine years of graduation. Delayed enrollment is the fraction
of all enrollees who began more than six months after graduation.
In Panel A, age is calculated at the end of the month prior to graduation. Mother college means a graduate’s
mother has some college education. Ability is defined by quartiles of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
math/verbal percentile within the sample. All calculations use 2011 panel weights.
In Panel B, age is calculated at the end of August in the college entrance exam year. Mother college means a
graduate’s mother has any degree above basic secondary. Ability is defined by quartiles of the aggregate entrance
exam percentile within the sample. See Table 1 for details on these variables.
Merge quality is important because my main dependent variable—enrolling in college—is
an indicator for a student’s appearance in the enrollment dataset. 41 percent of the 2001–
2011 Icfes exam takers appear in the enrollment records, which is broadly comparable to
the higher education enrollment rate in Colombia during the same time period.161 A better
indicator of merge success is the percentage of college enrollees that appear in the Icfes
records because all domestic college students must take the exam. Among enrollees who
took the Icfes exam between 2001 and 2011, I match 91 percent.162
161 The gross tertiary enrollment rate grew from 25 percent to 43 percent between 2001 and 2012 (World
Bank World Development Indicators, available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia in December
2015). This rate is not directly comparable to my merge rate because not all high school aged Colombians
take the Icfes exam. Roughly 20 percent of the secondary school aged population is not enrolled in high
school. This would cause my merge rate to be higher than the World Bank’s tertiary enrollment rate.
162 The enrollment records contain age at time of Icfes for some students, which allows me to calculate the
year they took the Icfes exam. Approximately 16 percent of students in the enrollment dataset have missing
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Table A1. Higher education institutions in Ministry of Education records
(A) (B) (C)
# # exit exam % colleges 
Institution category colleges takers/year in records
University  122  134,496  1.00
University Institute  103  53,338  0.88
Technology School  3  2,041  1.00
Technology Institute  47  15,092  0.82
Technical/Professional Institute  35  11,408  0.99
Total  310  216,375  0.96
Notes: Column (A) depicts the number of colleges that have Saber Pro exit exam takers in 2009–2011 using ad-
ministrative records from the testing agency. Colleges are categorized into the Ministry of Education’s five higher
education institution types. Column (B) shows the number of 2009–2011 exam takers per year. Column (C) shows the
proportion of colleges that appear in the Ministry of Education records, where colleges are weighted by the number
of exit exam takers.
A.3. Colleges in the Ministry of Education records. This section describes the colleges
that are included in the Ministry of Education records. For this I use another administrative
dataset from a college exit exam called Saber Pro (formerly ECAES). This national exam is
administered by the same agency that runs the Icfes entrance exam. The exit exam became
a requirement for graduation from any higher education institution in 2009.
Column (A) in Table A1 the depicts the 310 colleges that have any exit exam takers in
these administrative records in 2009–2011. These colleges are categorized into the Ministry
of Education’s five types of higher education institutions, which are listed in descending
order of their normative program duration.163 Column (B) shows the number of exit exam
takers per year. The majority of exam takers are from university-level institutions, with
fewer students from technical colleges.
Column (C) shows the fraction of these 310 colleges that appear in the Ministry of Ed-
ucation records that I use in my analysis. These proportions are weighted by the number
of exam takers depicted in column (B). Column (C) shows that the Ministry of Education
birth dates, which accounts for the majority of observations I cannot merge. Some duplicate matches arise
because students took the Icfes exam more than once, though I erroneously match a small number of students
with the same birth date and similar names.
163 Most programs at universities required 4–5 years of study, while programs at Technical/Professional
Institutes typically take 2–3 years.
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records included all Universities but are missing a few colleges that provide more techni-
cal training.164 Overall, 96 percent of exit exam takers attend colleges that appear in the
Ministry of Education records.
Another potential issue is that the Ministry of Education’s institution coverage has been
increasing over time. This could affect the main results if there are differential changes in
coverage across regions. Panel B of Figure 6, however, suggests that this is not an issue. This
panel depicts the number of college-program pairs that appear in the Ministry of Education
records in each academic year. The number of programs is increasing over time due to
both program growth and increasing data coverage. But there is no evidence of differential
increases between affected and unaffected regions.
In sum, the main results in the paper are likely driven by students forgoing college alto-
gether rather than switching to institutions that are not tracked by the Ministry of Education.
A.4. Sample of high schools. This section describes how I select the sample of high
schools for my analysis. My sample excludes two categories of schools. First, I exclude high
schools that have zero Icfes exam takers in any year between 2001 and 2011. This includes
schools for which I cannot cleanly merge in location and academic calendar information.165
I also drop high schools that are listed in different departments or municipalities over time.
This first set of excluded schools includes the 9,548 schools shown in column (A) of Table
A2. It also includes six percent of all exam takers who have no high school information.
Second, I exclude high schools that are listed as having a “flexible” academic calendar in
any year in 2001–2011. A flexible calendar means that students can begin the school year in
either semester. I also omit schools in the affected regions that change calendars before 2010,
and schools in other regions that change calendars in any year. These schools were likely
164 The largest omitted institutions are the national police academy (Dirección Nacional de Escuelas) and the
Ministry of Labor’s national training service (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje). I also omit one university,
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, which has significant variation in the number of enrollees across years in
the records. This omission does not affect my main results.
165 I identify high schools by numeric school IDs, but the Icfes records do not contain these IDs in 2008–
2009. I must therefore merge in location and academic calendar data by high school name in these two
years. This causes me to drop some high schools that have the same name and time of day (complete
day/morning/afternoon) as another school in these years.
209
Table A2. Construction of high school sample
(A) (B) (C)
Unbalanced Flexible Final 
panel only calendar sample
# high schools 9,548 433 4,197
Missing high school 0.06 0.00 0.00
Proportion of all students 0.40 0.05 0.54
# students per school & year 20.1 58.2 61.8
Icfes percentile 0.46 0.41 0.54
Notes: The sample is 11th graders who took the Icfes in 2001–2011. Column (A) includes high schools that are
missing exam takers in any year. It also includes schools for which I cannot cleanly merge in location and academic
calendar information, schools that are listed in different departments or municipalities over time, and observations
with missing school information. Column (B) includes high schools that are listed with a “flexible” academic calendar
in any year, affected region schools that change calendars before 2010, and schools in other regions that ever change
calendars. Column (C) includes the remaining high schools that have exam takers in every year.
# of students per school & year is the total number of students in 2001–2011 divided by the number of high
schools divided by 11. Icfes percentiles are relative to all 11th grade exam takers in the same year and are calculated
using the average of the scores from the six core components that did not change in 2001–2011: biology, chemistry,
language, mathematics, philosophy, and physics.
more able to adapt to the academic calendar shift. This excludes the 433 schools shown in
column (B) of Table A2.
My final sample includes the remaining 4,197 high schools in column (C) of Table A2
(see also Table 1). These schools have Icfes exam takers in every year from 2001–2011, and
they contain 54 percent of all high school graduates during this time period. Schools in my
sample have 62 students per cohort on average and are larger than excluded schools. Their
students also perform better on the Icfes entrance exam.
A.5. Region-cohort level regressions. Standard errors in my main analysis are clustered
at the region level. Colombia has 33 administrative regions, which is below the rule-of-thumb
for inference using the typical cluster-robust standard errors (e.g., Angrist and Pischke,
2009). This section addresses this potential issue by running region-cohort level regressions
that mirror the school-cohort level regressions in Tables 2 and 3. This follows Donald and
Lang (2007), who recommend “between-group” estimators in settings with few clusters but
a large number of observations per cluster (see also Wooldridge, 2003).
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I run the differences in differences regression
(A1) ȳtrc = γr + γc + βtδrc + εrc.
This is similar to the benchmark specification (1), but equation (A1) is at the region-cohort
level rather than the school-cohort level. The dependent variable, ȳtrc, is the mean college
enrollment rate t years after the Icfes exam in region r and exam cohort c. The regression
includes region dummies, γr, cohort dummies, γc, and a treatment indicator, δrc, which
equals one for regions and cohorts affected by the transition. Observations are weighted by
the number of exam takers. Following the advice in Angrist and Pischke (2009), I use the
maximum of OLS and robust standard errors. I use a t(33 − 2) distribution to calculate
statistical significance as suggested by Donald and Lang (2007).
Panel A in Table A3 shows the βt coefficients from equation (A1) using switching schools
and the same comparison group as in Table 2, and with δrc as an indicator for the 2009
affected region cohort. The coefficients are broadly similar to those in Table 2, but the
standard errors are substantially larger in these region-cohort level regressions. Nonetheless,
all estimates except for the t = 3 coefficient are statistically significant, even with the use of
a t(33− 2) distribution for inference.
Panels B–D in Table A3 also estimate the region-cohort level regression (A1), but they
use dependent variables ȳtrc that more closely reflect the three panels of Table 2. Specifically,
I calculate the residuals from three regressions that mirror the panels of Table 2:
ythc = γh + εhc,(A2)
ythc = γh + γgc + εhc,(A3)
ythc = γh + γgc + γ̃h × c+ εhc.(A4)
γh are high school dummies, γgc are dummies for cells defined by high school groups g and
cohort, and γ̃h × c are school-specific linear cohort trends (see Table 2 for details).166 I then
166 Observations in regressions (A2)–(A4) are also weighted by the number of exam takers.
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Table A3. Switching schools — Region-cohort level regressions
Dependent variable: Enrolled in college within t years of the Icfes
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Panel A. Regional means
0.5 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Affected regions, −0.046∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.023∗ −0.022
2009 cohort (δhc) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
R2 0.905 0.913 0.909 0.914
Panel B. Benchmark specification mean residuals
0.5 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Affected regions, −0.049∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.027∗∗
2009 cohort (δhc) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
R2 0.782 0.815 0.799 0.800
Panel C. High school matching mean residuals
0.5 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Affected regions, −0.047∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.027∗∗ −0.027∗∗
2009 cohort (δhc) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
R2 0.093 0.024 0.019 0.019
Panel D. Linear high school trend mean residuals
0.5 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
Affected regions, −0.031∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.019∗
2009 cohort (δhc) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
R2 0.044 0.018 0.020 0.015
N 297 297 297 297
# regions 33 33 33 33
Notes: The sample is as in Table 2. All columns report coefficients on the treatment variable, δrc, which equals one
for the 2009 cohort in the affected regions. All regressions include region dummies and cohort dummies. Regressions
are at the region-cohort level with observations weighted by the number of exam takers. Parentheses contain the
maximum of OLS and robust standard errors.
In Panel A, the dependent variables are mean region-cohort level college enrollment within t years of the Icfes,
where t is listed in the column header. The dependent variables in Panels B, C, and D are the mean region-cohort
residuals from equations (A2), (A3), (A4), respectively. See Table 2 for details.
Inference uses a t(33− 2) distribution. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
calculate the mean of the residuals from these regressions for each region r and cohort c.
The region-cohort mean residuals from (A2)–(A4) are the dependent variables ȳtrc in Panels
B–D of Table A3. The regressions and inference procedures are otherwise identical to those
for Panel A.
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The coefficients in Panels B–D of Table A3 closely correspond to those in Table 2, but
the standard errors are in most cases substantially larger. However, all estimates are still
statistically significant at the ten percent level.
Table A4 repeats these region-cohort level regressions for staying schools and the same
comparison group as in Table 3. The table and methods are otherwise identical to those
in Table A3 except the treatment variable, δrc, equals one for the 2010–2011 cohorts in the
affected regions. The comparison group for these regressions excludes public schools, and
private schools appear in only 25 regions in my sample. Thus inference in Table A4 is based
on a t(25− 2) distribution.
The results in Table A4 mirror those in Table 3. The point estimates are similar in both
tables, and despite larger standard errors in the region-cohort level regressions, nearly all
coefficients are statistically significant.
In sum, the results in Tables A3 and A4 show that the main results of this paper are
robust to stricter inference methods that address the relatively small number of clusters.
A.6. Balance tests. This section tests for effects of the calendar transition on the number
of Icfes exam takers or their scores. This is a potential concern at switching schools, where
students may have been affected by other elements of the transition such as changes in
instructional time. I also test for effects at staying schools, although other transition elements
are less of a concern as these schools did not change their academic calendars.
Panel A of Table A5 shows the results of these balance tests for switching schools. The
sample is the same as in Table 2. I use the same benchmark regression (1) with different
dependent variables. In column (A), the dependent variable is the number of Icfes exam
takers in each high school and cohort. The differences in differences coefficient shows that
the number of exam takers declined by two students in the 2009 cohort at switching schools
relative to schools in other regions. This change is small relative to the mean of 62 students
per school-cohort and is not statistically significant.
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Table A4. Staying schools — Region-cohort level regressions
Dependent variable: Enrolled in college within t years of the Icfes
(A) (B) (C)
Panel A. Regional means
0.5 years 1 year 1.5 years
Affected regions, −0.060∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗ −0.028
2010–2011 cohorts (δhc) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
R2 0.932 0.931 0.928
Panel B. Benchmark specification mean residuals
0.5 years 1 year 1.5 years
Affected regions, −0.069∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗
2010–2011 cohorts (δhc) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
R2 0.847 0.865 0.847
Panel C. High school matching mean residuals
0.5 years 1 year 1.5 years
Affected regions, −0.072∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗
2010–2011 cohorts (δhc) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
R2 0.164 0.128 0.112
Panel D. Linear high school trend mean residuals
0.5 years 1 year 1.5 years
Affected regions, −0.074∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗
2010–2011 cohorts (δhc) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
R2 0.106 0.133 0.128
N 275 275 275
# regions 25 25 25
Notes: The sample is as in Table 3. All columns report coefficients on the treatment variable, δhc, which equals
one for the 2010–2011 cohorts in the affected regions. All regressions include region dummies and cohort dummies.
Regressions are at the region-cohort level with observations weighted by the number of exam takers. Parentheses
contain the maximum of OLS and robust standard errors.
In Panel A, the dependent variables are mean region-cohort level college enrollment within t years of the Icfes,
where t is listed in the column header. The dependent variables in Panels B, C, and D are the mean region-cohort
residuals from equations (A2), (A3), (A4), respectively. See Table 3 for details.
Inference uses a t(25− 2) distribution. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column (B) tests for effects of the transition on students’ entrance exam scores by using
Icfes percentile as the dependent variable. The point estimate of the transition effect is
one-half of one percentile in magnitude and is not statistically significant.
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Table A5. Balance tests
(A) (B)




Switching schools, −2.281 −0.005
2009 cohort (δhc) (1.816) (0.009)
N 36,972 36,972
R2 0.885 0.889
# regions 33 33
Dependent var. mean 61.537 0.527




Staying schools, −1.696 −0.002
2010–2011 cohorts (δhc) (1.832) (0.004)
N 13,695 13,695
R2 0.892 0.913
# regions 25 25
Dependent var. mean 48.277 0.664
Notes: The samples for Panels A and B are the same as in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. All columns report coefficients
on the treatment variable, δhc, which is defined as in those tables. Regressions are at the school-cohort level with
observations unweighted in column (A) and weighted by the number of exam takers in column (B). Regressions are
otherwise identical to Tables 2 and 3 except for the dependent variables.
In column (A), the dependent variable is the number of Icfes exam takers in each high school and cohort. The
dependent variable in column (B) is the school-cohort mean Icfes percentile (see Table 1).
Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the region level. Dependent variable means are calculated from
the 2001–2008 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Panel B replicates these regressions for staying schools. The sample and regressions are
identical to those in Table 3. In both columns, the point estimates are smaller than those in
Panel A and are insignificant. There is no evidence of differential changes in the number of
exam takers or their performance in the 2010–2011 cohorts at staying schools.
Thus, Table A5 suggests that the decline in college enrollment at switching schools and
staying schools is not driven by changes in the student population or their college preparation.
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A.7. Heterogeneity by college selectivity. This section explores the hypothesis that the
observed college enrollment decline for switching school graduates was driven by an increased
difficulty in gaining admission to selective colleges. This could arise if affected region colleges
did not rebalance their January/September cohort slots in response to the shifting academic
calendar.
To test this hypothesis, I run regressions that are similar to the benchmark specification in
Table 2, but I use dependent variables that differ according to the selectivity of the college
of enrollment. I use aggregate Ministry of Education data on the number of applicants
and admitted students to calculate the admission rate for each college in the years before
the calendar transition (2007–2008). I define “less selective” colleges as those above the
median admission rate, and “more selective” colleges as those below the median. I then
run regressions as in Table 2 with dependent variables that measure only enrollment in less
selective or more selective colleges.
Panel A in Table A6 shows the results for switching school graduates using the same
sample as in Table 2. Columns (A) and (B) show the enrollment effect one semester after
the Icfes exam. The decline in enrollment at switching schools occurs at both less selective
and more selective colleges with a similar magnitude. Columns (C) and (D) show the effect
on enrollment within three years of the exam. For less selective colleges, the three-year
enrollment decline is similar to the initial effect. The enrollment decline mostly disappears
at selective colleges and is not statistically significant.
Panel A thus shows that the results in Table 2 are driven by students forgoing colleges
with open enrollment and not by an enrollment decline at selective colleges. This argues
against the hypothesis that changes in admission rates are driving the main results. The
results in Panel A of Table A6 are also consistent with evidence in Section 6 showing that
low SES and low ability students were more likely to forgo college during the transition, as
these students less frequently attend selective colleges.
Panel B of Table A6 replicates the regressions in Panel B for the staying school sample
from Table 3. Unlike the results for switching schools, both the initial and longer-term
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Table A6. Heterogeneity by college selectivity
Dependent variable: Enrolled in college within t years of the Icfes
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Panel A. Switching schools
Enrolled within 0.5 years Enrolled within 3 years
Less More Less More
selective selective selective selective
colleges colleges colleges colleges
Switching schools, −0.024∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.020∗ −0.007
2009 cohort (δhc) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)
N 36,972 36,972 36,972 36,972
R2 0.816 0.829 0.854 0.857
# regions 33 33 33 33
Dependent var. mean 0.080 0.081 0.186 0.196
Panel B. Staying schools
Enrolled within 0.5 years Enrolled within 1.5 years
Less More Less More
selective selective selective selective
colleges colleges colleges colleges
Staying schools, −0.025∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.048∗∗∗
2010–2011 cohorts (δhc) (0.007) (0.004) (0.012) (0.006)
N 13,695 13,695 13,695 13,695
R2 0.713 0.856 0.760 0.875
# regions 25 25 25 25
Dependent var. mean 0.154 0.183 0.258 0.292
Notes: The samples for Panels A and B are the same as in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. All columns report coefficients
on the treatment variable, δhc, which is defined as in those tables. Regressions are identical to Tables 2 and 3 except
for the dependent variables.
The dependent variables measure the fraction of students from each high school and cohort enrolling in
less or more selective colleges within t years of the Icfes, as listed in the column header. College selectiv-
ity is defined using aggregate application data from the Ministry of Education (available in December 2015 at
http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/sistemasdeinformacion/1735/w3-article-212400.html). The sample for this calcu-
lation includes technical- and university-level programs with a non-zero number of applicants and admitted students
in the pre-transition periods for which data are available (2007–2008). I calculate the admission rate for each college
by dividing the total number of admitted students by the total number of applicants over this time period. I then
calculate the median admission rate across all colleges in the samples for Panels A and B. “Less selective” colleges
are those above the median admission rate or that do not appear in the aggregate application data; “more selective”
colleges are those below the median.
Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the region level. Dependent variable means are calculated from
the 2001–2008 cohorts.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
enrollment declines at staying schools are driven primarily by more selective colleges. This
reflects the fact that time gap for staying school graduates was due to a shift in annual
programs from the September to the January calendar (see Figure 6). Annual programs
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typically cover specialized subjects and are thus offered primarily by selective colleges; non-
selective colleges mainly offer semiannual programs in only the most popular subjects. Thus
one would expect the staying school enrollment decline to occur primarily at more selective
colleges that shifted their academic calendars, consistent with Panel B.
A.8. Colombian household survey regressions. Figure 5 in Section 4 provides sugges-
tive evidence that many 2009 switching school graduates joined the labor force during the
time gap created by the calendar transition. This section explores the statistical significance
of this finding in a regression framework.
For this I use the same 2007–2010 waves of the Colombian household survey as in Figure
5. As in that figure, I define three cohorts of individuals denoted by c: those who turned 17
years old in the pre-transition years (c ∈ 2007–2008), and those who turned 17 in the first
year of the calendar transition (c = 2009).
Figure 5 plots dependent variables against time since the start of each cohort’s last year of
high school. In this section I use t to denote months with t = 0 representing the beginning
of the last high school grade for students with on-time progression. The regressions below
include the first seven quarters following the start of this last grade (t ∈ 1–21). Further, while
Figure 5 includes only 17 year olds in the affected regions, below I also include individuals
in other regions as an additional comparison group. I use r to denote regions.
I estimate the regression
(A5) ȳrct = γrc + γrt + γct + βpδrc + εrct.
The dependent variable, ȳrct, is a mean outcome in a region-cohort-month cell. The re-
gression includes region-cohort dummies, γrc, region-month dummies, γrt, and cohort-month
dummies, γct. The treatment indicator, δrc, equals one for the 2009 cohort in the affected
regions. I allow the treatment coefficient, βp, to vary with time periods p that capture the
quarter of typical high school graduation (t ∈ 10–12), the time gap quarter for the 2009
cohort (t ∈ 13–15), and the period following the time gap (t ∈ 16–21).
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Equation (A5) is thus a triple differences regression. The “time” dimension is months
since the start of the last year of high school, t, and it uses both age cohorts c and regions
r as comparison groups. Treatment is defined for the 2009 cohort in the affected regions as
the months of delayed graduation and the periods following it (t ≥ 10). βp measures how
the change in the outcome from previous months compares to analogous changes in other
regions and cohorts. I weight observations by the sum of survey weights in each region-
cohort-month cell. Since equation (A5) is a “between-groups” regression, I use the same
inference procedures as in Appendix A.5.167
Table A7 shows the results from regression (A5). The dependent variable in column
(A) is the fraction of individuals with a high school degree. The table reports the three
βp coefficients from this regression, which corresponds to the time periods listed in the
beginning of each row for the 2009 cohort in the affected regions. July–September is the
quarter in which affected region students typically finished high school in the years before the
calendar transition. The first coefficient in Table A7 shows that in July–September 2009, the
fraction of affected region 17 year olds reporting a high school degree falls by 15 percentage
points relative to other cohorts and regions. This graduation effect disappears by the last
quarter of 2009, as the other two coefficients in column (A) are near zero. Column (A) thus
replicates the finding from Panel A in Figure 5 that the academic calendar transition led to
a one-quarter graduation delay for some students in the 2009 cohort.
Column (B) of Table A7 also estimates equation (A5), but the dependent variable is an
indicator for labor force participation. I define individuals as in the labor force if they report
being either employed or looking for work in the household survey data. The first coefficient
shows that there is no differential change in labor force participation in July–September
2009. However, affected region labor force participation rates increase by 11 percentage
points in October–December 2009 relative to other regions and cohorts. This is the time gap
between high school graduation and potential college enrollment for some 2009 graduates in
167 Specifically, I use the maximum of OLS and robust standard errors (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), and I
use a t(24 − 4) distribution for inference (Donald and Lang, 2007) given 24 regions in the survey data and
three coefficients of interest.
219
Table A7. 17 year olds in Colombian household survey data
(A) (B)
Dependent variable
Affected regions, Graduated In the
2009 cohort (δrc) in . . . high school labor force
July−September 2009 −0.149∗∗∗ −0.011
(0.036) (0.036)
October−December 2009 −0.054 0.109∗
(0.057) (0.053)




# regions 24 24
Dependent var. mean 0.372 0.244
Notes: Data are from the 2007–2010 monthly urban (cabecera) and rural (resto) GEIH household surveys. The sample
is the 1990–1992 birth cohorts; this defines cohorts of individuals who turned 17 in 2007–2009. For February 2009
the sample is current 16 year olds because birthdates are missing. The sample includes only children, grandchildren,
or other relatives of the household head.
The columns estimate the region-cohort-month level regression (A5) with t defined as months since the start of
11th grade for most high schools in the region. This means that t = 0 in September before the cohort year in the
affected regions, and t = 0 in February of the cohort year in other regions. The sample includes months t = 1 to
t = 21 for each cohort. 2006 surveys are not available, so values at t ≤ 3 are missing for the 2007 cohort in the
affected regions.
The dependent variable in column (A) is the fraction of each region-cohort-month cell with a high school degree
or above. In column (B), the dependent variable is the fraction of each region-cohort-month cell in the labor force,
defined as appearing in the employed (ocupados) or unemployed (desocupados) survey. This variable is lagged one
month because survey questions refer to labor force activity in the prior 1–4 weeks (e.g., October values are from the
November survey).
All columns report coefficients βp on the treatment variable, δrc, which equals one for the 2009 cohort in the
affected regions. This variable is interacted with dummies for three time periods p defined by t ∈ 10–12, t ∈ 13–15,
and t ∈ 16–21. This corresponds to the time periods listed in the beginning of each row for the 2009 cohort in the
affected regions.
All regressions include region-cohort dummies, region-month dummies, and cohort-month dummies. Regressions
use weights that are fixed over time, which are the sum of survey weights across all months within non-missing
cells defined by region, age, gender, urban/rural survey, and secondary educated mother. Parentheses contain the
maximum of OLS and robust standard errors. Dependent variable means are calculated from the 2007–2008 cohorts.
Inference uses a t(24− 4) distribution. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
the affected regions. Like Panel B of Figure 5, this result suggests that the time gap led some
2009 graduates to work or look for a job, but Table A7 shows that this effect is statistically
significant at the ten percent level.
The last coefficient in column (B) shows that the labor force participation increase for the
2009 cohort persists into the first half of 2010 and is statistically significant. The magnitude
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of this effect falls by roughly 50 percent, consistent with the finding in Table 2 that the initial
effect of the time gap on college enrollment declines by one-half in subsequent periods.
In sum, Table A7 shows that the effects of the calendar transition on high school gradu-
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